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Foreword
We are pleased and honored to join in congratulating the Council to 
Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) on the landmark 
publication of  its Guidelines for Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response, which 
address some of  the most critical elements of  a more effective, prevention-
oriented food safety system.
The Guidelines is the culmination of  a three-year process that brought 
together public health and food safety practitioners and experts from all 
levels of  government to improve our response to foodborne outbreaks and 
create a common framework for evaluating foodborne disease surveillance. 
The CIFOR process alone provides a model for the kind of  collaboration 
across professional, agency, and geographic boundaries that is essential 
to tackling a problem—in this instance, foodborne illness—that defies 
boundaries.
Publication of  the Guidelines is significant also for the commitment it reflects 
to harmonize and integrate as fully as possible how health officials and 
regulators detect, investigate, and control outbreaks so that fewer people get 
sick. By harmonizing data collection, improving data sharing, and fostering 
new levels and modes of  collaboration, we have the opportunity not only to 
contain outbreaks more promptly but also to learn more robustly the lessons 
they can teach for future prevention.
Like any guideline, the Guidelines for Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response will be, 
in the end, only as good as their implementation by our many colleagues 
in local, state, and federal agencies, for whom it provide both a flexible, 
forward-looking framework and a call to action. The call to action is 
important in the policy arena, too. Implementation of  the Guidelines requires 
the commitment of  policymakers and elected officials, who as surrogates 
for the public, rightfully demand improved foodborne disease surveillance 
and outbreak response and must provide the legal authorities, financial 
resources, and organizational capacities to achieve .
The CIFOR Guidelines points the way toward a better system of  outbreak 
response. It is now incumbent on all of  us to go there. 
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The Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) Guidelines 
for Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response were developed to aid government 
agencies responsible for preventing and managing foodborne disease. 
The Guidelines focuses on local and state agencies, including public health, 
environmental health, agriculture, and other agencies responsible for food 
safety, because they investigate most of  the outbreaks of  foodborne disease 
in the United States. However, the Guidelines also supports the federal public 
health and regulatory agencies critical to the U.S. food-safety infrastructure.
The Guidelines describes the overall approach to outbreaks of  foodborne 
diseases, including preparation, detection, investigation, control, and 
follow-up. The Guidelines also describes the roles of  all key organizations 
involved in these outbreaks, provides recommendations for processes 
to improve communication and coordination among multiple agencies 
during multijurisdictional outbreaks, and identifies indicators that different 
organizations can use to gauge their performance in responding to 
foodborne disease outbreaks. Even though the Guidelines document provides 
comprehensive information for individuals and organizations involved 
in foodborne disease, it is not intended to replace existing procedure 
manuals. Agencies and individuals should use the Guidelines to compare 
existing procedures, fill gaps in and update site-specific procedures, create 
procedures where they do not exist, and train program staff.
CIFOR intends the Guidelines to serve as a foundation for epidemiologists, 
laboratorians, environmental health specialists, and others involved in food-
safety programs. Many local, state, and federal government agencies work 
to solve outbreaks of  foodborne diseases, and CIFOR hopes this document 
will standardize foodborne disease investigation across all those agencies.
Technical experts from different government and academic organizations 
across the country, representing a wide variety of  disciplines, have 
compiled the information in the Guidelines. The Guidelines have undergone 
a comprehensive public review process. CIFOR considers these Guidelines 
a consensus document that captures best practices and identifies emerging 
new practices in outbreak response to foodborne diseases.
Preface
The development of  the CIFOR Guidelines for Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response 
took thousands of  hours of  work by dozens of  individuals over a 3-year 
period. Every one of  these individuals had a full-time job, and many of  them 
were repeatedly distracted by foodborne disease outbreaks over the course 
of  the project. They gave of  their time, energy, and expertise because of  a 
strong commitment to improving the quality of  foodborne disease outbreak 
response. CIFOR expresses its deep gratitude to everyone who participated.
We particularly acknowledge John Besser, Craig Hedberg, Pat McConnon, 
Don Sharp, and Jeanette Stehr-Green, who repeatedly stepped up to provide 
extra guidance and support whenever the need arose. Jac Davies, the editor 
and lead author, had a particularly large role in the creation of  this document 
and was committed to giving her time and effort to this project. We would 
like to especially acknowledge her involvement.
The following organizations participate in CIFOR and their representatives 
participated in the development of  these Guidelines:
• Association of  Food and Drug Officials
• Association of  Public Health Laboratories
• Association of  State and Territorial Health Officials
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
• Council of  State and Territorial Epidemiologists
• Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
• National Association of  County and City Health Officials
• National Association of  State Departments of  Agriculture
• National Environmental Health Association
• U.S. Department of  Agriculture/Food Safety and Inspection Service  
 (USDA/FSIS)
This publication was supported by Cooperative Agreement Number 
1U38HM000414 from CDC. Its contents are solely the responsibility of  the 
authors and do not necessarily represent the official views of  CDC.
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lthough a variety of steps for investigating an outbreak 
exist in the training literature, there is no agreed upon, 
standard approach for response to an outbreak. Why is 
this? Simply put, no one set of steps is appropriate for all outbreaks. 
The response varies with the outbreak and surrounding circumstances 
(e.g., etiologic agent, number of cases, and likely source of exposure). 
The response also varies depending on the agencies involved, 
available resources, and the expertise of investigators.
To add to the possible range of responses to an outbreak, certain 
activities might be required by local ordinance or state statute in 
some jurisdictions but not others. In addition, some activities that are 
considered part of an outbreak response are routinely undertaken in 
some jurisdictions before an outbreak is ever recognized (e.g., follow-
up of cases to collect detailed information about exposures).
Overview of CIFOR 
Guidelines






















1 Overview of CIFOR Guidelines
The challenge of  developing standard steps 
for an outbreak response is amplified by the 
fact that investigation activities are rarely 
undertaken sequentially or linearly. Some 
activities can take place concurrently with 
other activities, while others must wait for 
the results of  earlier activities. Furthermore, 
some activities, such as communication or 
implementation of  control measures, occur 
repeatedly throughout an investigation.
Nonetheless, a description of  the steps involved 
in the response to an outbreak is instructive. 
Such a portrayal, although not an accurate 
depiction of  reality, is more easily understood 
by the novice who needs to learn about 
outbreak investigation. A description also 
emphasizes the need to work systematically 
through each outbreak investigation, allowing 
activities to consciously be omitted or 
rearranged, but not overlooked in the urgency 
of  the moment.
The CIFOR Guidelines for Foodborne Disease 
Outbreak Response describes the overarching 
functions and related activities that are 
common to most outbreak investigations. 
These functions include
• Planning and Preparation (Chapter 3),
• Surveillance and Outbreak Detection  
 (Chapter 4),
• Investigation of  Clusters and Outbreaks  
 (Chapter 5), and
• Control Measures (Chapter 6).
The CIFOR Guidelines is not limited to 
one approach to performing these functions 
but provide a range of  approaches with 
the rationale behind them. In this way, the 
Guidelines allows users to make practical 
decisions about their (or their agency’s) 
response to an outbreak, including the order, 
magnitude, or necessity of  the associated 
activities.
Because investigations that involve multiple 
agencies in different geographic locations 
or from different sectors are more complex, 
the CIFOR Guidelines provides special 
considerations for Multijurisdictional 
Outbreaks (Chapter 7). As a context 
for responding to foodborne outbreaks, 
the Guidelines also covers Fundamental 
Concepts of  Public Health Surveillance and 
Foodborne Disease (Chapter 2) and Legal 
Considerations for the Surveillance and 
Control of  Foodborne Disease Outbreaks 
(Chapter 9). Finally, to assist agencies 
in assessing their response to foodborne 
disease outbreaks, the Guidelines provides 
Performance Indicators for Foodborne 
Disease Programs (Chapter 8).
The following sections summarize the contents 
of  Chapters 2 through 6, which provide key 
background information and cover all of  the 
critical steps in detecting and responding to 
foodborne disease outbreaks. These summaries 
are intended to give a high level overview of  
each chapter, thus making it easier to find 
information of  particular interest. The detailed 
information about each topic covered below 
can be found under the chapter and section 
numbers referenced in each paragraph.
Overview of Chapter 2. Fundamental Concepts of Public 
Health Surveillance and Foodborne Disease
Introduction (Section 2.0)
Preventing foodborne illness relies on our 
ability to translate the principles of  food safety 
into the practices that occur at each step in 
the production of  food. Foodborne illnesses 
and disease outbreaks, detected through public 
health surveillance, reflect what and how we eat 
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and represent important sentinel events that 
signal a failure in the food-safety process.
Trends in Diet and the Food Industry 
(Section 2.1)
Dietary Changes (2.1.1) 
The American diet has transformed 
significantly in recent years with the 
consumption of  a broader variety of  foods 
and increasing amounts of  fruit, vegetables, 
and seafood. Culinary practices that use 
undercooked or raw foods have become 
popular. In addition, an increasing number of  
Americans eat their meals away from home.
Changes in Food Production (2.1.2) 
The food industry has accommodated 
Americans’ dietary demands by moving from 
locally grown and raised products to routine 
importation of  out-of-season or exotic foods 
from other countries. Changes in technology 
and improved growing, harvesting, packaging, 
and transportation practices facilitate the 
importation of  distantly grown, fragile foods.
The industrialization of  food production has 
led to concentrated animal feeding operations 
and increasingly intense agricultural practices 
that can facilitate spread of  disease and 
contamination of  food products. Changes 
in agricultural processing or packaging can 
facilitate bacterial contamination or growth, 
and routine use of  antibiotics to promote the 
growth of  livestock and poultry has increased 
human infections caused by drug-resistant 
bacteria. The broadening distribution of  foods 
has contributed to outbreaks of  foodborne 
disease involving larger numbers of  people, 
multiple states, and even multiple countries.
Trends in Food Product Recalls (2.1.3) 
Food recalls are one indication of  food-safety 
problems. During February 2007 through 
February 2008, the U.S. Department of  
Agriculture (USDA) and the federal Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) reported 
more than 90 voluntary recalls of  food 
associated with microbial contamination. 
Recalled products were distributed locally, 
nationally, or internationally and were sold 
in a variety of  retail settings. Many recalls 
were for contaminated meat; however, other 
foods also were recalled. The contaminating 
pathogens most commonly identified in food 
recalls were Listeria monocytogenes, Shiga toxin-
producing Escherichia coli, and Salmonella species, 
but products also were recalled that were 
contaminated with viruses, parasites, and toxins.
Trends in Surveillance (Section 2.2)
Overview (2.2.1) 
Many surveillance systems are used in the 
United States to provide information about 
the occurrence of  foodborne disease. Some 
focus on specific enteric pathogens likely to 
be transmitted through food and have been 
used extensively for decades. More recently, 
new surveillance methods have emerged (e.g., 
hazard surveillance, sentinel surveillance 
systems, and national laboratory networks). 
Each surveillance system plays a role in 
detecting and preventing foodborne disease 
and outbreaks.
Selected Surveillance Systems of Relevance to 
Foodborne Diseases (2.2.2)
Notifiable disease surveillance (2.2.2.1) 
In notifiable disease surveillance, health-care 
providers and laboratorians are required by 
law to report individual cases of  disease when 
selected pathogens are identified in patient 
specimens or specific clinical syndromes are 
recognized. Local public health agencies 
report these diseases to the state or territorial 
public health agency, which in turn submits the 
information to the National Notifiable Disease 
Surveillance System, which the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
oversees.























Notifiable disease surveillance is “passive” (i.e., 
the investigator waits for disease reports from 
those required to report) and is susceptible to 
diagnosis and reporting problems.
Foodborne disease complaints/notifications (2.2.2.2) 
Foodborne Disease Complaint/Notification 
systems allow public health agencies to 
receive, triage, and respond to reports from 
the public about possible foodborne illnesses. 
The processing of  complaints varies by 
agency. Most agencies collect some exposure 
information and record the complaint 
in a log book or on a standardized form. 
Regular review of  these reports for trends or 
commonalities can identify foodborne illnesses 
in the community and possibly clusters of  
foodborne diseases.
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (2.2.2.3) 
The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System (BRFSS) is a state-based telephone 
survey established by CDC that collects 
information about health risk behaviors, 
preventive health practices, and health-care 
access. BRFSS is not an appropriate system 
for detecting foodborne illness, but it can be 
used to identify behaviors (e.g., food handling 
practices and eating meals away from home) 
that can inform foodborne illness prevention 
efforts.
Hazard surveillance (2.2.2.4) 
Factors that lead to the contamination of  
food with microorganisms or toxins or allow 
survival and growth of  microorganisms in food 
(i.e., contributing factors) are used to develop 
control and intervention measures at food 
production and service facilities. Inspections 
of  these facilities, often referred to as Hazard 
Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) 
inspections, are targeted at the implementation 
of  these measures. Results of  these inspections 
form the basis for hazard surveillance. 
Currently no national hazard surveillance 
system exists.
Contributing factor surveillance (2.2.2.5) 
Investigators from state and local public 
health agencies gather information about 
contributing factors in foodborne outbreaks 
through environmental assessments conducted 
by food control officials and/or their 
own staff  and report the results to CDC. 
Contributing factors cannot be identified 
through general inspections of  operating 
procedures or sanitary conditions like those 
used for licensing or routine inspection of  a 
restaurant but require a systematic description 
of  what happened and how events most likely 
unfolded in an outbreak. Because many food 
control officials fail to adjust their day-to-day 
regulatory inspection process to conduct an 
environmental assessment, contributing factor 
data in outbreak investigations often are not 
adequately assessed.
CDC’s Environmental Health Specialists 
Network (EHS-Net) was established in 2000 to 
address the environmental causes of  foodborne 
disease. Participants include environmental 
health specialists and epidemiologists from 
nine states, the FDA, USDA, and CDC. 
Improving environmental assessments in 
foodborne outbreak investigations and 
reporting contributing factor and antecedent 
data to CDC is one of  EHS-Net’s primary 
research activities. CDC is exploring 
development of  a surveillance system for 
contributing factors and antecedents from 
investigations of  foodborne disease outbreaks.
Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance System 
(FoodNet) (2.2.2.6) 
FoodNet is a sentinel surveillance system 
undertaken at 10 participating sites in the 
United States in collaboration with CDC, 
USDA, and FDA. FoodNet concentrates on 
foodborne disease documented by laboratory 
testing and is an active surveillance system (i.e., 
investigators regularly contact laboratories 
to enhance reporting). FoodNet serves as a 
Overview of Chapter 2. Fundamental Concepts of Public 
Health Surveillance and Foodborne Disease
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platform for a variety of  epidemiologic studies 
and provides insights into the incidence of  and 
trends in foodborne and diarrheal diseases.
National Molecular Subtyping Network for Foodborne 
Disease Surveillance (Pulse Net) (2.2.2.7) 
PulseNet is a national network of  local, 
state, territorial, and federal laboratories 
coordinated by CDC that perform pulsed-
field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) on selected 
enteric pathogens using standardized 
methods. PulseNet allows investigators from 
participating sites to upload PFGE patterns 
to an electronic database and compare them 
with patterns of  other pathogens isolated 
from humans, animals, and foods to identify 
matches and possible linkages between 
pathogens (e.g., outbreaks). PulseNet has vastly 
improved rapid detection of  even relatively 
small foodborne disease outbreaks occurring in 
multiple sites across the country.
National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring 
System–Enteric Bacteria (NARMS) (2.2.2.8) 
NARMS was developed to monitor antibiotic 
resistance patterns in selected bacteria found in 
people, animals, and meat products. NARMS 
data enable investigators to better understand 
the interaction between antibiotic use in 
livestock and antibiotic resistance in pathogens 
from animals and humans who ingest animal 
food products.
Foodborne Outbreak Reporting System (2.2.2.9) 
CDC’s Foodborne Outbreak Reporting System 
collects voluntary reports from public health 
agencies summarizing the results of  foodborne 
outbreak investigations. This system has been 
modified and expanded over time. In 2001, 
reporting became Web-based in a system 
called the electronic Foodborne Outbreak 
Reporting System (eFORS). Starting in 2009, 
the system includes modules for reporting 
waterborne outbreaks and enteric disease 
outbreaks caused by person-to-person contact 
and by direct contact with animals and will 
be called the National Outbreak Reporting 
System.
Quality and Usefulness of Surveillance Data 
(2.2.3) 
Surveillance statistics reflect only a fraction of  
cases that occur in the community. Incomplete 
diagnosis and reporting of  foodborne illnesses 
inhibits surveillance and the detection of  
foodborne disease outbreaks (2.2.3.1). The 
specific data elements collected through 
surveillance and the validity and accuracy of  
the information collected further impact the 
usefulness of  surveillance information (2.2.3.2).
Etiologic Agents Associated with 
Foodborne Diseases (Section 2.3)
Overview (2.3.1) 
Foodborne illnesses have myriad causes 
including microorganisms (e.g., bacteria, 
viruses, parasites, and marine algae) and 
their toxins, mushroom toxins, fish toxins, 
heavy metals, pesticides, and other chemical 
contaminants. Human illness caused by 
these agents is often categorized into those 
caused by toxins present in food before it is 
ingested (preformed toxins) or those caused by 
multiplication of  the pathogen in the host and 
damage from toxins produced within the host 
or invasion of  host cells (infection).
Patterns in Etiologic Agents Associated with 
Foodborne Disease Outbreaks (2.3.2) 
On the basis of  reports to eFORS from 1998 
to 2002, bacteria (including their toxins) 
accounted for 55% of  foodborne disease 
outbreaks for which an etiologic agent was 
determined. Viruses accounted for 33% of  
these outbreaks but increased from 16% in 
1998 to 42% in 2002 probably because of  the 
increased availability of  methods to diagnose 
viral agents. Marine algae, fish, and mushroom 
toxins and other chemicals accounted for 10% 
of  outbreaks for which a cause was known.























Because no etiologic agent is identified for a 
large proportion of  foodborne outbreaks and 
not all outbreaks are detected, investigated, 
and reported through eFORS, the relative 
frequency of  various etiologic agents based on 
eFORS or similar data should be interpreted 
with caution.
Determining the Etiologic Agent in an 
Outbreak (2.3.3) 
Laboratory testing of  clinical specimens from 
patients is critical in determining the etiology 
of  a foodborne disease outbreak. For most 
foodborne diseases, stool is the specimen of  
choice. In an outbreak, specimens are collected 
as soon as possible after onset of  symptoms 
from at least 10 individuals who manifest 
illness typical of  the outbreak and have not 
received antibiotics.
Isolation of  the etiologic agent from food is 
more challenging because certain pathogens 
require special collection and testing 
techniques. In addition, food samples collected 
during the investigation might not reflect foods 
eaten at the time of  the outbreak. As a result, 
food testing results should be interpreted with 
caution (2.3.3.1).
Predominant signs and symptoms, and the 
average incubation period, can provide insights 
into the etiologic agent. Illnesses resulting 
from preformed toxins manifest rapidly, often 
in a matter of  minutes or hours. The most 
common symptom is vomiting, although other 
symptoms occur depending on the agent. 
Illnesses caused by infections take longer to 
manifest, ranging from hours to days or weeks. 
Symptoms usually include diarrhea, nausea, 
vomiting, and abdominal cramps. Fever and an 
elevated white blood cell count also can occur.
Because certain pathogens are commonly 
associated with certain foods, the suspected 
food in an outbreak can suggest a particular 
disease agent. However, most foods can be 
associated with a variety of  pathogens and 
new vehicles emerge each year, so care must 
be taken in inferring an etiologic agent on the 
basis of  a suspected food (2.3.3.2.2).
Mode of Transmission (2.3.4) 
Many agents responsible for foodborne illness 
can be transmitted by other routes (e.g., water, 
person to person, and animal to person). Early 
in the investigation of  a potential foodborne 
disease outbreak, investigators should consider 
all potential sources of  transmission.
Occasionally case characteristics suggest 
one mode of  transmission over others in an 
outbreak.
• Foodborne transmission is suggested by cases 
 with distinctive demographic characteristics  
 (i.e., age group, sex, and ethnicity) that could 
 reflect unique food preferences or exposures  
 and cases with a geographic distribution  
 similar to the distribution of  food products.
• Waterborne transmission should be  
 considered if  illness is widespread, both  
 sexes and all age groups are affected, the  
 geographic distribution of  cases is consistent  
 with public water distribution, complaints  
 about water quality in the affected  
 community have been reported, or multiple  
 pathogens are involved.
• Person-to-person transmission should be  
 suspected when cases cluster in social units  
 (e.g., families, schools, dorms or dorm rooms) 
 and when cases occur in waves separated by  
 approximately one incubation period of  the  
 disease agent.
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Good planning and preparation will help 
investigators identify the source of  an outbreak 
more quickly and implement control measures 
more efficiently and effectively. Planning and 
preparation activities are far-reaching and 
include
• Identification of  the agencies likely to be  
 involved in an outbreak investigation and  
 their available resources (Section 3.1);
• Establishment and training of  a core  
 outbreak response team (Section 3.2),
• Identification of  necessary resources  
 (Section 3.3);
• Development of  standard processes for  
 receiving foodborne illness complaints  
 (Section 3.4), managing records  
 (Section 3.5), communication (Section 3.6),  
 escalation to involve other agencies  
 (Section 3.9), and recovery and follow-up  
 after an outbreak (Section 3.7); and
• Assurance of  legal preparedness  
 (Section 3.8).
Agencies likely to be involved in an outbreak 
response also should decide in advance 
whether and how to apply an Incident 
Command System in the event of  an outbreak 
(Section 3.10).
Agency Roles (Section 3.1)
A foodborne disease outbreak can be managed 
solely by a single local health agency or 
become the shared responsibility of  multiple 
local, state, and federal agencies. The agencies 
involved will depend on the nature of  the 
outbreak (e.g., type of  pathogen, suspected 
or implicated vehicle, number of  individuals 
affected) and the resources necessary to address it.
The following local, state, and federal agencies 
have access to different resources and can 
contribute to outbreak response efforts in 
different ways:
• Local health agencies (3.1.2.1),
• State health departments (3.1.2.2),
• State environmental conservation or quality  
 agencies (3.1.2.3),
• State agriculture departments (3.1.2.4),
• CDC (3.1.2.5),
• FDA (3.1.2.6), and
• USDA/FSIS (3.1.2.7).
If  an outbreak occurs in a facility or 
community managed by an agency that has 
some level of  autonomy or operates its own 
public health program, other agencies might 
be involved in an investigation or take the lead, 
such as a tribal organization (3.1.3.1), military 
agency (3.1.3.2), or National Park Service unit 
(3.1.3.3). In addition, food manufacturers, 
distributors, retailers, and trade associations 
can provide knowledge and information about 
product identities, formulations, processing 
practices, and distribution patterns and are key 
to outbreak investigation and implementation 
of  control measures (3.1.4).
Outbreak Investigation and Control Team 
(Section 3.2)
Typically, the responsibility for conducting 
a foodborne outbreak investigation, 
recommending control measures, and 
monitoring their implementation falls on a 
core team of  individuals.
The composition of  the core team should be 
determined before an outbreak occurs and 
should include individuals with knowledge and 
skills to address the responsibilities common to 
most outbreaks, such as
• Team leader (3.2.2.1),
• Epidemiologic investigator (3.2.2.2),
• Environmental investigator (3.2.2.3),
• Laboratory investigator (3.2.2.4), and
• Public information officer (3.2.2.5).
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Depending on the unique characteristics of  
the disease or the outbreak, individuals with 
other expertise may be needed in an outbreak 
investigation. Such individuals might include 
statisticians, health educators, and health-
care providers; however, those specific needs 
probably cannot be anticipated before an 
outbreak occurs (3.2.2.6).
Outbreak Investigation and Control Teams—
Model Practices (3.2.3) 
Outbreak response team members should 
work closely together, not in isolation. Because 
the work of  one team member often builds 
on that of  another team member, good 
communication among team members and 
timely sharing of  pertinent information 
is critical. In addition, implementation of  
the following practices will improve the 
effectiveness of  the team:
Emergency response unit (3.2.3.1) 
If  population size and number of  outbreaks 
warrant it, an emergency response unit 
consisting of  senior epidemiologists, 
environmental scientists, and laboratorians 
that train and work together in response to all 
outbreaks should be established.
Additional support for large-scale outbreaks (3.2.3.2) 
Because some outbreaks are too large for a 
single agency to manage, health departments 
should identify individuals outside the agency 
who would be willing and able to provide 
support during a large-scale outbreak (e.g., 
staff  from other branches of  government, 
university students, and Medical Reserve Corp 
volunteers).
Agency-specific response protocol and other resources 
(3.2.3.3) 
The outbreak response team should have pre-
identified protocols for outbreak investigation 
and access to resources that allow them to 
answer questions and make decisions during 
an outbreak. A list of  people inside and outside 
the agency who should be contacted in the 
event of  an outbreak should be prepared and 
updated regularly.
Training for the team (3.2.3.4) 
Team members should be trained in the 
agency’s outbreak response protocols and their 
role on the team. Training can be provided 
through established classroom and self-study 
courses but is likely to be more effective when 
interesting and provided through team and 
interagency exercises, on-the-job training 
during a real-life investigation, and debriefings 
after each outbreak investigation.
Resources (Section 3.3)
To ensure a rapid response to an outbreak, 
health departments should assemble (and learn 
to use) resources necessary for an investigation 
before an outbreak occurs. Recommended 
resources include
• Support personnel to make phone calls,  
 answer calls, and enter data (3.3.2.1),
• Legal counsel (3.3.2.2),
• Equipment (3.3.2.3),
• Supplies (3.3.2.4),
• Outbreak investigation documents (3.3.2.5),  
 and
• Reference materials (3.3.2.6).
Procedures for routinely reviewing and 
replacing missing or outdated supplies, 
equipment, and reference materials should 
be part of  an agency’s outbreak response 
protocol.
Complaint Processing (Section 3.4)
A process, including a standard data collection 
form, should be established to receive 
complaints of  potential foodborne illnesses 
from the public. Use of  an enteric illness log 
or database to track all illness complaints and 
designation of  one person to process or review 
all complaints will increase the likelihood of  
identifying patterns and possible outbreaks.
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Records Management (Section 3.5)
Before an outbreak occurs, procedures for 
records management should be established, 
including use of  standard forms for collecting 
and organizing outbreak information, 
development of  database templates, and 
identification of  tools to analyze outbreak 
data to ensure speedy analysis of  investigation 
results. Staff  should be trained in the use of  
these items. Policies for sharing information 
between members of  the investigation team 
(and their associated agencies) and facilities 
implicated in an outbreak also should be 
established.
Communication (Section 3.6)
Good communication is critical throughout 
the investigation of  a foodborne disease 
outbreak. Agencies should develop methods 
for communication with individuals and 
organizations key to an investigation before an 
outbreak occurs (3.6.2.1). Key individuals and 
organizations include the following:
• The outbreak investigation team and involved 
 agencies (3.6.2.2);
• Other local, state, and federal authorities  
 (3.6.2.3);
• Local organizations, food industry, and other 
 professional groups (3.6.2.4);
• The public (3.6.2.5);
• Cases and family members (3.6.2.6); and
• The media (3.6.2.7).
Processes for communicating with these 
individuals and organizations should include 
routinely updated contact lists (where 
appropriate) and standard channels of  
communication so that each knows who to 
communicate with and where the information 
will come from during an outbreak.
Recovery and Follow-up (Section 3.7)
Agencies should establish protocols for actions 
that must be taken or results that must be 
achieved before an implicated facility or food 
source can return to normal operations and 
develop methods to monitor those facilities. 
Agencies should establish a process for creating 
after-action reports following investigations, 
with lessons learned and action items for 
follow-up and quality improvement.
Legal Preparedness (Section 3.8)
Legal preparedness is the foundation for 
an effective outbreak response effort. The 
following items will ensure legal preparedness: 
a) laws and legal authorities needed to support 
surveillance, detection, investigation, and 
control activities; b) professional staff  who 
understand and are competent in using their 
legal authorities; c) memoranda of  agreement 
and other legal agreements for coordinated 
implementation of  laws across jurisdictions 
and sectors; and d) information about best 
practices in using law for outbreak response.
Escalation (Section 3.9)
If  an outbreak affects multiple jurisdictions or 
is likely to exceed the resources or expertise 
of  a particular agency, investigators should 
escalate the investigation and involve other 
agencies as soon as the need is suspected. 
Investigators from local health departments 
should notify their state program. Investigators 
from the state health department should notify 
CDC and the appropriate food-regulatory 
agency.
Incident Command System (Section 3.10)
An Incident Command System (ICS) 
is a structure that provides for internal 
communications within a government system 
among primary event responders, public 
information officers, and security and safety 
officers and for external liaison with various 
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organizations. ICS is designed to enable 
effective, efficient incident management 
by integrating a combination of  facilities, 
equipment, personnel, procedures, and 
communications operating within a common 
organizational structure. The role of  an ICS 
response in an outbreak investigation varies 
and is not without controversy, with some 
agencies using an ICS structure while others 
do not. Agencies involved in foodborne 
outbreak investigation and response should 
decide in advance whether and how to apply 
an ICS and, if  applicable, incorporate the ICS 
structure into their response planning.
Overview of Chapter 4. Foodborne Disease Surveillance and 
Outbreak Detection
Foodborne disease surveillance generally refers 
to the routine monitoring in a population of  
enteric diseases potentially transmitted through 
food. Foodborne disease surveillance serves 
many functions, including detection of  disease 
clusters and problems in food production or 
delivery.
Three general surveillance methods are used to 
detect foodborne disease outbreaks:
• Pathogen-specific surveillance (Section 4.2)
• Notification/complaint systems (Section 4.3)
• Syndromic surveillance (Section 4.4)
Pathogen-Specific Surveillance  
(Section 4.2)
In pathogen-specific surveillance, health-
care providers and laboratorians report 
individual cases of  disease to the public health 
agency when certain pathogens are identified 
in patient specimens or specific clinical 
syndromes are recognized (e.g., hemolytic 
uremic syndrome and botulism). In addition, 
clinical laboratories forward selected patient 
isolates or other clinical material to public 
health laboratories.
Staff  from the public health agency may 
interview reported cases one or more times to 
collect clinical, demographic, and exposure 
information. The scope of  these interviews 
varies by jurisdiction and can include routine 
collection of  detailed exposure information 
at the time of  initial report. The causative 
agent, onset of  illness, location of  the case, 
and exposures are examined to identify disease 
trends and clusters. Clusters are examined as a 
group and, if  a common exposure seems likely, 
investigated as a potential outbreak (4.2.4).
The public health laboratory confirms 
the disease agent and conducts tests 
(e.g., serotyping, molecular subtyping, or 
antimicrobial susceptibility assays) to further 
characterize the agent. Laboratory data are 
uploaded to national systems, such as PulseNet. 
Except for individual cases of  botulism, and 
occasionally other infections, testing of  food or 
other environmental specimens related to cases 
is not advised without strong epidemiologic 
or environmental information implicating the 
item (4.2.5).
Strengths of Pathogen-Specific Surveillance 
for Outbreak Detection (4.2.7) 
Strengths of  pathogen-specific surveillance 
in outbreak detection largely relate to the 
specificity with which disease agents are 
classified and include the
• Ability to detect widespread disease clusters  
 initially linked only by a common agent and
• High sensitivity for detecting unforeseen  
 problems in our food and water supply  
 systems.
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Limitations of Pathogen-Specific  
Surveillance (4.2.8) 
The limitations of  pathogen-specific 
surveillance include
• Inclusion of  only diseases detected by  
 routine testing and reported to the public  
 health agency and
• Delay in cluster detection and follow-up due  
 to events that must occur between the time  
 a patient is infected and the time he or she is  
 recognized as part of  a cluster.
Key Determinants of Successful  
Pathogen-Specific Surveillance (4.2.9) 
If  the percentage of  cases detected through 
pathogen-specific surveillance is low (i.e., 
low sensitivity), small outbreaks or outbreaks 
spread over space and time are more likely to 
be missed. In addition, reported cases might 
differ significantly from those not reported, 
resulting in a mischaracterization of  an 
outbreak (4.2.9.1).
The more prevalent a disease is in the 
community, the more difficult outbreaks of  that 
disease are to identify and the more difficult 
background cases are to distinguish from 
outbreak cases. Increasing the specificity of  the 
case definition by including more specific agent 
classifications (e.g., subtype results) or certain 
time, place, or person characteristics among 
cases can minimize this problem (4.2.9.2)
For cases detected through pathogen-specific 
surveillance, consider potential exposures 
within the usual incubation period of  the 
disease. Interviews to detect these exposures 
should be undertaken as soon possible and 
include a mixture of  questions, as appropriate 
circumstances, that
• Ask about specific exposures previously  
 (or plausibly) associated with the pathogen,
• Specifically ask about a wide variety of   
 potential exposures,
• Prompt cases to describe common  
 exposures in greater detail (e.g., provide brand 
 information and place of  purchase), and
• Enable cases to identify unanticipated  
 exposures (i.e., exposures not previously  
 associated with the pathogen) (4.2.9.3).
The usefulness of  pathogen-specific 
surveillance in preventing ongoing 
transmission of  disease from contaminated 
food is directly related to the speed of  the 
surveillance and investigation process. 
Processes that decrease the time between 
infection of  the patient and determination that 
the patient is part of  a disease cluster increases 
the success of  pathogen-specific surveillance 
(4.2.9.4).
Routine Surveillance — Model Practices (4.2.10) 
Practices used by an agency vary and depend 
on a host of  factors (e.g., circumstances specific 
to a specific cluster or outbreak, staff  expertise, 
agency structure, and resources). The following 
model practices should be considered to 
improve pathogen-specific surveillance:
• Encourage health-care providers to test  
 patient specimens as part of  the routine  
 diagnostic process for possible foodborne  
 diseases (4.2.10.1).
• Increase reporting and isolate submission by  
 clinical laboratories and health-care  
 providers through education, modification  
 of  reporting rules, laboratory audits,  
 and simplification of  the reporting process  
 (4.2.10.1).
• Minimize delays in processing reports and  
 transporting specimens.
• Undertake subtyping of  isolates as  
 specimens are submitted and post results  
 to national databases as quickly as possible  
 (4.2.10.2).
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• Interview cases using a standardized  
 questionnaire for exposure information  
 (consistent with the incubation period of   
 the pathogen) as soon as possible. Collection  
 of  detailed exposure information as cases  
 are reported can help evaluate clusters  
 in real time but is resource intensive. At a  
 minimum, collect information about limited  
 high-risk exposures specific to the pathogen  
 at the time of  the initial report and re- 
 interview cases with a detailed exposure  
 questionnaire if  a cluster becomes apparent  
 (4.2.10.3).
• To identify clusters, use daily, automated  
 reporting and analysis systems to compare  
 disease agent frequencies at multiple levels  
 of  specificity with historical frequencies and  
 national trends (4.2.10.4).
• Establish and use routine procedures  
 for communicating among epidemiology,  
 laboratory, and environmental health  
 branches within an agency and among local, 
 state, and federal agencies (4.2.10.5).
Notification/Complaint Systems  
(Section 4.3)
In notification/complaint systems, public 
health agencies receive, triage, and respond 
to reports from the public about possible 
foodborne illnesses. Reporting is passive and 
falls into two basic categories:
• Reports from an individual or group who  
 observes a pattern of  illness affecting a  
 group of  people, usually following a  
 common exposure (e.g., event or venue) and
• Multiple independent reports about illness  
 in single individuals.
Health-care provider reports of  unusual 
disease clusters are triaged; occurrence 
of  the same disease is confirmed; cases 
are interviewed; data are analyzed; and 
investigations are initiated.
For reports of  group illness associated 
with an event or venue, the investigation 
generally involves obtaining lists of  attendees, 
confirming ill persons have the same disease, 
obtaining menus from the event (and other 
possible group exposures), interviewing cases, 
performing a cohort or case-control study, and 
collecting food and patient specimens.
With independent complaints, individuals are 
interviewed about their illness and exposures at 
the time of  the report. Exposure information 
generally is limited and biased toward 
exposures shortly before onset of  symptoms. In 
the absence of  common, suspicious exposures 
shared by two or more cases, independent 
complaints of  illness with nonspecific 
symptoms (e.g., diarrhea or vomiting) generally 
are not worth pursuing unless required by local 
or state statute.
Strengths of Notification/Complaint Systems 
for Outbreak Detection (4.3.6) 
The primary strengths of  notification/
complaint systems result from their lack of  
dependence on health-care system contact and 
laboratory testing. These strengths include
• Ability to detect outbreaks from any cause,  
 known or unknown, and
• Increased speed of  detection.
For event-related notifications, another 
strength is that exposures associated with the 
event can normally be determined and recall 
of  exposures among attendees is usually good.
Limitations of Notification/Complaint  
Systems (4.3.7) 
Lack of  detailed exposure information and 
specific agent or disease information limits 
notification/complaint systems, resulting in the 
following:
• Inability to link related cases and exclude  
 unrelated cases,
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• Inability to detect widespread low-level  
 contamination events, and
• Detection primarily of  outbreaks resulting  
 from illnesses of  short incubation (i.e.,  
 chemical or toxin-mediated) or with unique  
 symptoms.
Key Determinants of Successful Notification/
Complaint Systems (4.3.8) 
Detection of  outbreaks by notification of  
group illness is limited by the severity of  the 
illness, public awareness of  where to report the 
illness, ease and availability of  the reporting 
process, and investigation resources. Detection 
of  outbreaks from independent complaints is 
influenced by these factors and by the number 
of  cases reported, the interview process, the 
uniqueness of  the illness or reported exposure, 
and methods used to evaluate reports (4.3.8.1).
When an outbreak associated with a group 
event is reported, some group members may 
be ill for reasons other than a group exposure. 
Inclusion of  these cases in the analyses hinders 
detection of  associations between exposures 
and disease. The likelihood of  this occurring 
depends on the nature of  the symptoms and 
their background prevalence. Identification 
of  a specific disease agent or increasing the 
specificity of  symptom information (e.g., 
bloody diarrhea or specific duration of  illness) 
can minimize this problem (4.3.8.2).
Because exposures associated with group 
events are limited and can be described 
specifically, patient recall and timing are 
less of  an issue than with pathogen-specific 
surveillance or independent complaints. 
Nonetheless, the more specific exposure-
related questions are during case interviews, 
the better recall will be. Interviewing food-
preparation staff  or event organizers before 
cases can help (4.3.8.3).
When individual exposure histories are 
collected for independent complaints or group 
illnesses, potential exposures are broad-
ranging and difficult to recall. The problem 
may be even greater than in pathogen-specific 
surveillance because no causative agent has 
been identified that would allow investigators 
to focus on exposures previously associated 
with that pathogen. Hence, interviews must 
be done promptly and systematically to be 
effective (4.3.8.3).
Notification/Complaint Systems —  
Model Practices (4.3.9) 
Multiple factors influence an agency’s response 
to a notification or complaint. The following 
model practices should be considered to 
improve notification/complaint systems:
• For group illnesses associated with an event,  
 focus interviews on shared exposures with  
 the realization that the individuals within  
 the group might have more than one event  
 in common (4.3.9.1).
• For group illnesses, obtain clinical and food  
 specimens. Collect and store food samples,  
 but generally test food only after  
 epidemiologic implication (4.3.9.4).
• For group illnesses, establish an etiology  
 to enable implementation of  rational  
 interventions and allow linkages with other  
 outbreaks or sporadic cases (4.3.9.5).
• For individual complaints, collect a detailed  
 5-day exposure history (unless otherwise  
 indicated by the incubation period of  the  
 illness) using a standardized form that covers  
 both food and nonfood exposures and record 
 exposure information in a way that facilitates 
 comparisons with histories reported by other 
 individuals (4.3.9.2).
• Review interview data regularly to look for  
 trends or commonalities and compare with  
 information obtained through pathogen- 
 specific surveillance (4.3.9.6),
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• Improve interagency cooperation and  
 communication among agencies that receive 
 illness complaints (4.3.9.7 and 4.3.9.12).
• Check complaint information against national 
 databases (e.g., USDA/FSIS Consumer  
 Complaint Monitoring System) (4.3.9.12).
• Improve reporting from the public by  
 simplifying the reporting process (4.3.9.9)  
 and increasing public awareness to report  
 (4.3.9.10).Train food managers and workers  
 about the importance of  reporting unusual  
 patterns of  illness among workers or  
 customers and food code requirements for  
 disease reporting. 
• Centralize reporting or the process for  
 reviewing reports to increase the likelihood  
 that patterns are detected (4.3.9.11).
Syndromic Surveillance (Section 4.4)
Syndromic surveillance involves the systematic 
(usually automated) gathering of  data on 
nonspecific health indicators that may reflect 
increased disease occurrence. Syndromic 
surveillance typically relies on the following 
types of  information:
• Preclinical information, which does not  
 depend on access to health-care (e.g., school  
 and work absenteeism, sales of  over-the- 
 counter drugs, calls to poison control centers);
• Clinical prediagnostic information, which  
 requires contact with the health-care system  
 but not definitive diagnosis or reporting  
 (e.g., emergency department chief   
 complaints, ambulance dispatches, and lab  
 test orders); and
• Postdiagnostic data, which requires contact  
 with the health-care system and some degree 
 of  diagnosis (e.g., hospital discharge codes).
In syndromic surveillance, increases in specific 
indicator signals are evaluated. If  the increase 
is determined likely to represent a true 
outbreak, exposure information is collected 
through interviews of  individual cases (4.4.4)
Strengths of Syndromic Surveillance (4.4.6) 
In theory, syndromic surveillance offers increased 
speed in outbreak detection; the ability to detect 
outbreaks from any cause, known or unknown, 
diagnosed or not; and reduced dependence on 
individuals because of  automated reporting.
Limitations of Syndromic Surveillance (4.4.7) 
Syndromic surveillance has serious limitations, 
including numerous false-positive signals 
caused by the lack of  specificity of  indicators, 
reliance on routine surveillance to evaluate 
signals, lack of  exposure information, and 
substantial costs for system development. In 
addition, in response to concerns about patient 
confidentiality, many agencies collect only de-
identified data, which slows the investigation of  
positive signals from the system.
Key Determinants of Successful Syndromic 
Surveillance Systems (4.4.8) 
The key determinants of  successful syndromic 
surveillance are the specificity of  the indicators 
and speed of  detection, factors that are 
inversely proportional. Less specific indicators 
mean that more cases are needed to overcome 
background noise and that false-positive alerts 
are likely. More specific signals decrease these 
problems but do not offer any time advantage 
over other forms of  surveillance.
Practices for Improving Syndromic Surveillance 
(4.4.9) 
Because the utility of  syndromic surveillance 
for detecting foodborne disease events has 
not been established, the need for additional 
investment is not clear. To improve a 
syndromic surveillance system, however, it 
might be useful to integrate the system with 
standard surveillance systems and corroborate 
findings using data from multiple sources. Fine-
tuning algorithms used to signal an alert also 
might reduce false-positive signals.
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Introduction (Section 5.0)
An outbreak is the occurrence of  two or 
more cases of  a similar illness shown by 
an investigation to result from a common 
exposure. Outbreaks identified through 
pathogen-specific surveillance are initially 
recognized as clusters of  cases defined 
by pathogen subtype characteristics. The 
distribution of  these cases by time, space, and 
personal characteristics provide clues about 
whether the cases are likely to represent an 
outbreak from a common source of  exposure. 
Only a systematic investigation can confirm 
whether the cluster actually is an outbreak.
Because many agents transmitted by food 
also can be transmitted by water and from 
person to person, animal to person, or other 
mechanisms, when a potential foodborne 
disease outbreak is detected, investigators must 
keep an open mind and not rule out other 
causes prematurely.
Characteristics of Outbreak  
Investigations (Section 5.1)
Importance of Speed and Accuracy (5.1.1) 
Speed and accuracy are the two key 
ingredients of  all outbreak investigations. One 
cannot be sacrificed for the other. Speed and 
accuracy can help public health officials
• Stop an outbreak quickly and prevent  
 additional illnesses;
• Prevent future outbreaks by identifying the  
 circumstances that led to the current outbreak;
• Identify new hazards, including new  
 agents, new food vehicles, new agent–food  
 interactions, and other unsuspected gaps in  
 the food-safety system;
• Maintain the public’s confidence in the food  
 supply and in the public health system; and
• Empower the public to protect itself  from  
 food-safety problems.
Principles of Investigation (5.1.2) 
Although general principles underlie successful 
investigations, no one specific method works 
best in all situations. Investigators need to be 
flexible and innovative and undertake activities 
in a thoughtful and systematic manner. 
Leadership of  an investigation should 
reflect the focus of  investigation activities 
and may shift among laboratory studies; 
epidemiologic studies; regulatory investigations 
of  food-production sources and distribution 
chains; environmental evaluations of  food 
production, processing, and service facilities; 
and communication of  investigation findings 
to support control and prevention measures 
(5.1.2.2).
Investigations are rarely linear. Although most 
procedures for investigating outbreaks follow 
a logical process, most actual investigations 
feature multiple concurrent steps. Maintaining 
close communication and coordination among 
epidemiologic, environmental health, and 
laboratory investigators is the best way to 
ensure concurrent activities do not interfere 
with each other and important investigation 
steps are not forgotten (5.1.2.3).
Hypothesis generation should begin early 
in an outbreak investigation to narrow the 
focus of  the investigation and use time and 
resources most effectively. As more information 
is obtained, hypotheses can be modified. Key 
steps in hypothesis generation include the 
following:
• Reviewing previously identified risk factors  
 and exposures for the disease;
• Examining the descriptive epidemiology  
 of  cases to identify person, place, or time  
 characteristics that might suggest particularly 
 likely exposures; and
• Interviewing in detail the affected persons  
 or a sample of  affected persons to identify 
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unusual exposures or commonalities among 
cases (5.1.2.4).
The use of  standardized forms for collecting 
information (e.g., exposure histories from cases, 
environmental health assessment information) 
ensures that pertinent information is not 
overlooked and enables investigators to 
become proficient with the forms, saving 
time during an investigation (5.1.2.5). The 
use of  standardized “core” questions and 
data elements facilitates data sharing and 
comparisons across jurisdictions.
All outbreak investigations involve collection 
of  private information that must be protected 
from public disclosure to the extent allowed 
by law. Investigators need to be familiar with 
relevant state and federal laws and practices, 
including the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) (5.1.2.6).
Cluster and Outbreak Investigation 
Procedures (Section 5.2)
Conduct a Preliminary Investigation (5.2.1) 
Foodborne disease outbreaks typically are 
detected through three general methods: 
pathogen-specific surveillance, notification/
complaint systems, and syndromic surveillance 
(5.1.2.1). After detection, a preliminary 
investigation should be undertaken to 
determine whether the reported illnesses may 
be part of  an outbreak.
• For complaints of  group illness attributed  
 to a particular event or establishment,  
 multiple cases with similar symptoms and an  
 incubation period consistent with the timing  
 of  the reported exposure are suggestive of   
 an outbreak (5.2.1.1).
• For case clusters identified through  
 pathogen-specific surveillance, cases (defined  
 by subtype characteristics) clearly in excess  
 of  the expected number and demographic  
 features or known exposures of  cases  
 suggestive of  a common source are clues  
 that the cluster might represent an outbreak  
 (5.2.1.2).
Assemble the Outbreak Investigation and 
Control Team (5.2.2) 
Outbreak investigation and control team 
leaders should be alerted as soon as a potential 
outbreak is identified (5.2.2.1). After reviewing 
the descriptive features of  the outbreak and 
relevant background information, team leaders 
should assess the priority of  investigating 
the outbreak. Highest priority is typically 
given to outbreaks that have a high public 
health impact; are ongoing; or appear to be 
associated with a food-service establishment, 
commercially distributed food product, or 
adulterated food (5.2.2.2).
Team leaders then should assess the availability 
of  sufficient staff  to conduct the investigation, 
particularly to interview cases quickly and 
solicit controls, as needed. If  sufficient staff  
are not available, team leaders should request 
external assistance (5.2.2.3). 
The outbreak investigation and control team 
should be assembled and briefed about the 
outbreak, the members of  the team, and 
their individual roles in the investigation. For 
outbreaks involving multiple jurisdictions, 
the outbreak investigation and control team 
should include members from all agencies 
participating in the investigation (5.2.2.3).
Establish Goals and Objectives for the 
Investigation (5.2.3) 
The outbreak investigation and control team 
should establish goals and objectives for the 
investigation. The primary goals of  most 
investigations are to implement interventions 
to stop the outbreak and prevent similar 
outbreaks. To achieve these goals, the outbreak 
investigation and control team will need to
• Identify the etiologic agent,
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• Identify persons at risk,
• Identify mode of  transmission and vehicle,
• Identify the source of  contamination,
• Identify contributing factors, and
• Determine potential for ongoing  
 transmission and need for abatement  
 procedures.
Select and Assign Investigation Activities 
(5.2.4) 
Epidemiologic, environmental health, and 
public health laboratory activities that support 
these objectives should be assigned to outbreak 
investigation and control team members. These 
activities will differ depending on the specifics 
of  the outbreak and whether the outbreak is 
associated with an event (or establishment) 
(Table 5.1) or was identified through pathogen-
specific surveillance (Table 5.2).
Cluster investigation—model practices (5.2.4.1) 
The practices used by an agency to investigate 
a cluster vary on the basis of  a host of  factors. 
The following practices should be considered 
to improve cluster investigation:
• Interview cases involved in a cluster as soon  
 as possible and use interview techniques (e.g., 
 reviewing cash register receipts or looking at  
 a calendar and reconstructing recent events)  
 that encourage recall of  exposures  
 (5.2.4.1.1).
• Use a dynamic cluster investigation process  
 to generate hypotheses (5.2.4.1.2). In this  
 model, initial cases in a recognized cluster  
 are interviewed with a detailed exposure  
 history questionnaire. As new suspicious  
 exposures are suggested during the  
 interviews (i.e., are reported among 5-10  
 cases), initial cases are systematically re- 
 interviewed to uniformly assess their  
 exposure and the suspicious exposure  
 is added to the interview of  subsequently  
 identified cases.
o For agencies that routinely interview ALL  
 cases with a detailed exposure  
 questionnaire, dynamic cluster  
 investigation can be initiated as soon as  
 a cluster is recognized. Such an approach  
 results in improved recall because cases  
 are more likely to remember exposures  
 when specifically questioned about them.  
 The approach also is more likely to result  
 in a meaningful intervention because  
 of  the compressed time frame of  the  
 investigation (5.2.4.1.2).
o For agencies that do not have sufficient  
 resources to conduct detailed exposure  
 history interviews for every case, a  
 two-step interviewing process may be  
 the best alternative approach. All cases are 
 interviewed to collect information about a  
 limited set of  “high-risk” exposures  
 specific to the pathogen. When a cluster  
 becomes apparent, all cases in the cluster  
 are then interviewed using a detailed  
 exposure questionnaire following the  
 “dynamic cluster investigation” approach  
 (5.2.4.1.2.2).
o For agencies that do not have sufficient  
 resources to conduct detailed interviews  
 with all cases in a cluster, hypothesis- 
 generating interviews can be undertaken  
 with a subset of  cases after a cluster  
 becomes obvious. Exposures reported by  
 a substantial proportion of  these cases can  
 then be studied (5.2.4.1.3).
• Use the FoodNet Atlas of  Exposures for  
 an initial evaluation of  shared exposures  
 among cases. The Atlas includes information 
 about exposures that might be associated  
 with foodborne illnesses and can be used  
 as a crude estimate of  the background rate  
 of  different food exposures in the  
 community. In the absence of  survey data,  
 common-sense estimates of  the prevalence  
 of  a given exposure can help identify  
 exposures of  interest (5.2.4.1.4).
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• Conduct an environmental health 
assessment of  implicated facilities. An 
environmental health assessment differs 
from a general, routine inspection used for 
licensing a restaurant or food-production 
facility. It focuses on the problem at hand 
and considers how the disease agent, host 
factors, and environmental conditions 
interacted to result in the problem 
(5.2.4.1.5). The specific activities included in 
an environmental health assessment differ by 
disease agent, suspected vehicle, and setting 
but usually include the following:
o Describing the implicated food,
o Observing procedures to make food,
o Talking with food workers and managers,
o Taking measurements,
o Collecting food and other environmental  
 samples,
o Collecting and reviewing documents on  
 the source of  food (e.g., invoices), and
o Drawing a food flow diagram showing each 
 step in the production of  the food item.
• Conduct informational tracebacks/ 
 traceforwards of  food items under  
 investigation. Tracing implicated food  
 items or ingredients through the distribution  
 chain to the source of  production can help  
 identify epidemiologic links among cases.  
 The convergence of  food items eaten by  
 multiple cases along a distribution pathway  
 can help identify the source of   
 contamination. Conversely, the failure to  
 identify common suppliers among suspected  
 foods eaten by different cases might indicate  
 that the food item is not the vehicle for the  
 outbreak (5.2.4.1.6).
Coordinate Investigation Activities (5.2.5) 
The outbreak investigation and control team 
should meet daily and regularly update others 
involved in the investigation. If  the outbreak 
has gained public attention, the public 
information officer needs to prepare a daily 
update for the media.
Close communication and collaboration 
among epidemiology, environmental health, 
and public health laboratory are necessary to 
ensure concurrent activities do not interfere 
with each other and to guide the activities of  
individual investigators. The public health 
laboratory needs to immediately forward 
new case information to epidemiologists. 
As epidemiologists interview cases about 
exposures in restaurants and other licensed 
facilities, they should rapidly forward 
that information to environmental health 
specialists. Environmental health specialists 
should share results of  interviews with food 
workers and reviews of  food-preparation that 
indicate important differences in exposure 
potential that should be distinguished in 
interviews of  cases.
Compile Results and Reevaluate Goals for 
Investigation (5.2.6) 
Document and compile results of  each 
outbreak investigation in a manner that allows 
comparison with the original goals for the 
investigation. Demonstrate how each goal 
was achieved or, if  the goal was not achieved, 
explain why. Novel questions or opportunities 
to address fundamental questions about 
foodborne disease transmission can develop 
during an investigation. The opportunity to 
address these issues might require reevaluation 
of  the investigation’s goals.
Development of  an epidemic curve that is 
regularly updated can help depict the course 
of  an outbreak and provide insight to disease 
transmission and relationships to notable 
events.
Interpreting Results (5.2.7) 
The outbreak investigator must use all 
available information to construct a coherent 
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narrative of  what happened and why. 
Results of  epidemiologic studies must be 
integrated with results of  informational 
product tracebacks, food worker interviews, 
environmental health assessments, and food 
product and environmental testing.
In this process, investigators should consider 
their data critically. Statistical associations 
between exposure and illness may reflect a 
causal link but may also reflect confounding, 
bias, chance, and other factors. Conversely, 
failure to achieve a statistically significant 
association between illness and exposure may 
result from small sample size, contamination of  
multiple vehicles or unrecognized ingredient, 
or high background rates of  exposure.
Investigators should be wary of  explanations 
that depend upon implausible scenarios. Minor 
inconsistencies are common and may be 
ignored, but large numbers of  inconsistencies 
might indicate that alternate hypotheses need 
to be considered.
Conduct a Debriefing at End of  
Investigation (5.2.8) 
Encourage a postoutbreak meeting among 
investigators to assess lessons learned and 
compare notes on final findings. This is 
particularly important for multiagency 
investigations but also is important for single 
agency investigations.
Summarize Investigation Findings, 
Conclusions, and Recommendations (5.2.9)
At a minimum, every outbreak investigation 
should be documented using a standardized 
form to facilitate inclusion in state and national 
outbreak databases (e.g., CDC’s form 52.13 or 
its equivalent). Investigators are encouraged 
to submit preliminary reports while the 
investigation is ongoing to help link outbreaks 
occurring in multiple places at the same time 
and facilitate further investigation. Larger or 
more complex investigations or investigations 
with significance for public health and food-
safety practice demand a more complete report 
and, potentially, publication in a peer-reviewed 
journal.
Distribute Report (5.2.10) 
Copies of  the report should be shared with 
all persons involved with the investigation, 
(e.g., investigation team members, health 
department officials and press officers, 
health-care providers who reported cases) 
and distributed to persons responsible for 
implementing control measures (e.g., owners 
and managers of  establishments identified as 
the source of  the outbreak and program staff  
who might oversee implementation of  control 
measures or provide technical assistance). 
The report is a public record and should be 
made available to members of  the public who 
request it.
Overview of Chapter 6. Control Measures
Introduction (Section 6.0)
To prevent further illness in an outbreak, 
control measures should be initiated as soon 
as possible, even concurrently with ongoing 
investigations. However, the quality of  
information about which control measures 
are based as well as the potential positive and 
negative consequences of  undertaking the 
control measures (or not undertaking control 
measures) should be kept in mind.
Control measures can be categorized as 
those that control the source (i.e., prevent 
continued exposure to the original source of  
the foodborne illness [Section 6.2]) and those 
that prevent secondary transmission (i.e., 
transmission from persons infected through the 
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original source to others through food, water, 
or person-to-person transmission [Section 
6.3]). Additional measures might be necessary 
to prevent future outbreaks (Section 6.8).
Control of the Source (Section 6.2)
Nonspecific Control Measures (6.2.1) 
Nonspecific control measures (e.g., holding 
of  leftovers, emphasizing hand-washing, 
excluding any ill employees) can be 
implemented as soon as a facility has been 
implicated in an outbreak, even though a 
specific food or causative agent has not been 
identified. Nonspecific control measures are 
good public health practice and are generally 
effective, regardless of  the disease.
Specific Control Measures (6.2.2) 
When a food has been implicated, control 
measures directed at the specific cause can 
be implemented. Specific control measures 
will vary depending on whether the 
implicated food is associated with food-service 
establishment or home processing (6.2.2.1) 
or is associated with a processor or producer 
as evidenced by its occurrence at multiple 
facilities or multiple locations (6.2.2.2).
Food associated with food-service establishments or 
home processing (6.2.2.1) 
Specific control measures include
• Removing the implicated food from  
 consumption (6.2.2.1.1),
• Cleaning and sanitizing the implicated  
 facility and equipment (6.2.2.1.2),
• Training staff  on general safe food- 
 preparation practices and practices specific  
 to controlling the causative agent (6.2.2.1.3),
• Modifying food production or preparation  
 at the facility to prevent further contamination 
 of  food or survival and growth of  microbes  
 already present in food (6.2.2.1.4),
• Eliminating the implicated foods from the  
 menu until it is certain that control measures 
 are in place (6.2.2.1.5),
• Removal of  infected food workers (6.2.2.1.6), 
 and
• Closure of  the facility and an outline of   
 actions necessary for the facility to reopen  
 (6.2.2.1.7).
Food associated with a processor/producer (6.2.2.2) 
If  multiple facilities are involved in an 
outbreak or the outbreak is associated with 
a product distributed to multiple locations, 
the above control measures might still be 
appropriate; however, efforts also might be 
needed to recall the implicated food from the 
market (6.2.2.2.1). The decision to recall a food 
is based on the strength of  the evidence linking 
the food to illness and the ongoing risk for 
exposure among consumers (i.e., the likelihood 
that the food is still on the market or is in the 
homes of  consumers).
Product recall (6.2.2.2) 
If  evidence supports the recall of  a food 
(6.2.2.2.1), the appropriate agency should 
contact the manufacturer or distributor 
immediately and get its cooperation. The 
manufacturer or distributor might decide to 
issue a voluntary food recall that will include 
removal of  food from distribution and market 
shelves and notification of  customers and the 
public through regulatory agencies and the 
media. While awaiting the manufacturer’s 
decision about a recall, it might be appropriate 
to directly ask retailers and distributors to 
voluntarily remove the product from their 
shelves and withhold the product from 
distribution.
Removal of  food from market (6.2.2.2) 
Removal of  food from the market goes more 
smoothly if  certain steps are undertaken by 
industry, retail establishments, and public 
health agencies before a food-safety problem 
occurs. Industry and retail establishments 
should routinely maintain product source 
and shipping information for quick access in 
conducting tracebacks and trace forwards and 
develop methods to rapidly notify customers 
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(e.g., blast e-mail/fax). Public health agencies 
should establish relationships with industry 
and retail establishments before a food-safety 
problem occurs. They should also develop a 
list of  control measures to immediately put in 
place when a recall has been issued, and be 
aware of  common errors that lead to recalled 
food being put back into commerce.
Control of Secondary Spread (Section 6.3)
Education (6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.4) 
Education is key to preventing the spread 
of  infection from individuals exposed to the 
original outbreak source to others through 
food, water, and person-to-person contact. 
Health-care providers should be encouraged 
to collect appropriate patient specimens and 
report cases of  notifiable disease to the health 
department (6.3.1). The public should be 
reminded of  basic food-safety precautions as 
well as means to decrease risk for infection 
through the current outbreak (6.3.2). The 
operator of  the implicated facility should be 
notified of  the steps needed to control the 
situation and to prevent further outbreaks 
(6.3.4). Food workers at the implicated 
facility should be educated about the disease 
(e.g., symptoms, mode of  transmission, and 
prevention) and general infection control 
precautions including thorough hand-washing, 
not working when ill, and use of  gloves when 
handling ready-to-eat foods (6.3.4).
Excluding Infected Persons (6.3.3) 
Infected persons should be excluded from settings 
where transmission might occur including food-
preparation, health-care, and child-care settings. 
Individuals who are no longer ill with vomiting 
or diarrhea can usually return to work without 
testing if  they practice good personal hygiene and 
are adequately supervised. For some diseases or 
settings, however, testing might be necessary to 
ensure the person is no longer likely to transmit 
the disease. Regardless, local ordinances or 
state statutes should determine requirements for 
returning to work.
Prophylaxis (6.3.5) 
For some diseases, prophylaxis might be 
appropriate, and the public health agency 
should work with area hospitals, physicians, 
local health departments, specialty clinics, 
or other health-care providers to provide 
vaccination, immune globulin, or antibiotics 
to exposed persons. Special attention should 
be given to prophylaxis of  groups at higher 
risk for severe illness and poor outcomes from 
foodborne disease including infants, pregnant 
women, the elderly, and immunocompromised 
persons.
Communication (Section 6.4)
Communication is critical in determining what 
control measures to implement and when to 
change an intervention’s focus.
Outbreak Response Team (6.4.1) 
Information should routinely be shared 
with all members of  the outbreak response 
team including actions taken and updates on 
the outbreak (6.4.1). Agency heads should 
routinely receive information about the status 
of  the investigation (6.4.2). If  the outbreak is 
potentially multijurisdictional, other agencies 
and organizations should also routinely receive 
status reports.
Implicated Facility (6.4.1, 6.4.4) 
The owner/manager of  the implicated facility 
should be contacted as soon as possible about 
potential control measures and instructed or 
advised about the need to report any new 
information that could affect the investigation. 
Because enforcement action may result from 
the investigation, it is important to understand 
the local legal framework before interacting 
with facilities that may be linked to an 
outbreak.
Industry (6.4.4) 
Interactions with the food industry and 
related trade associations can help dispel 
misconceptions about the outbreak and take 






















1 Overview of Chapter 6. Control Measures
advantage of  a teachable moment. However, 
state, local and federal agencies need to have 
working relationships with industry before an 
outbreak occurs.
The Public ( 6.4.3) 
Communication with the public might be 
necessary in response to an outbreak if  risk 
for exposure to the source is ongoing or 
if  urgent medical treatment is needed for 
individuals who already have been exposed. 
If  the outbreak involves a distributed product 
that is being recalled, the public must be 
notified using all available sources, including 
the Internet, television, radio, and newspaper. 
Messages to the public should follow good risk 
communication practices and be prepared with 
assistance from a Public Information Officer. 
Attempts should be made to reach all members 
of  the population at risk, including non-
English speaking and low-literacy populations.
Conclusion of the Outbreak Investigation 
(Sections 6.5, 6.6, 6.7)
Determining End of Outbreak and Post-
Outbreak Monitoring (6.5.1, 6.5.3) 
Most outbreaks can be considered over when 
two or more incubation periods have passed 
without new cases (6.5.1). Post-outbreak 
monitoring is necessary to ensure the outbreak 
has ended and the source has been eliminated 
(6.5.3). Efforts should be made to monitor the 
population at risk for disease, the implicated 
foods for contamination, and the implicated 
facilities to make sure they are complying with 
all required procedures. The latter may require 
increased inspections and customized training.
Postoutbreak Briefing (6.6)
All members of  an outbreak response team 
should be briefed on the results of  the 
investigation, including the cause, long-term 
and structural control measures, effectiveness 
of  outbreak control measures, problems with 
the response effort and needed changes, and 
need for further study.
Outbreak Report (6.7)
Summary reports should be prepared for all 
outbreaks to document activities, educate staff, 
and look for trends across outbreaks that can 
be useful in future investigations. For a large 
outbreak, the final report should be more 
comprehensive, with information provided by 
all team participants. Such a report should be 
disseminated to all participating organizations 
and investigators. Reports should not identify 
individuals or share other legally nonpublic 
information, unless absolutely necessary, nor 
should they include inappropriate language.
Control of Future Outbreaks (Section 6.8)
An outbreak investigation might point to the 
need for future studies or research (6.8.1). It 
might identify the need for broad education 
efforts of  the public, the food preparation 
industry, or health-care providers (6.8.2). It 
might also identify the need for new public 
health or regulatory policies at the local, state 
or federal level such as changes in inspection 
practices, source controls, or surveillance 
procedures (6.8.3). The investigation of  an 
outbreak might also identify the need for 
new measures to detect, control, or eliminate 
pathogenic microorganisms (or their toxins) 
from food (i.e., applied food research) (6.8.4).
Chapter
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uring the past century, the American diet transformed 
significantly in what food we eat, how we grow or raise 
that food, and how that food arrives to our tables. Factors 
contributing to these changes included industry consolidation and 
globalization, health concerns and dietary recommendations, and 
culinary trends and dining habits. What and how we eat relate directly 
to the foodborne diseases we experience.
Preventing foodborne disease relies on our ability to translate knowledge 
of the principles of food safety to the practices of food production 
at each level of the food system. Foodborne disease outbreaks 
represent important sentinel events that signal a failure of this process.
At either end of any food chain you find a biological system—a 
patch of soil, a human body—and the health of one is 
connected—literally—to the health of the other.
Michael Pollan
The Omnivore’s Dilemma, 2006






























































 Determining whether this failure was due 
to the emergence of  a new hazard or failure 
to control a known hazard is an important 
outcome of  an outbreak investigation. 
This determination is critical to developing 
strategies to prevent future outbreaks and 
to evaluate the success of  those strategies. A 
variety of  surveillance programs are required 
to accomplish this complex task.
This chapter provides an overview of  some 
factors responsible for recent trends and 
challenges in public health surveillance and 
foodborne disease in the United States.
2.1. Trends in Diet and the Food Industry
2.1.1. Dietary Changes
That we no longer are a nation of  meat and 
potato eaters is evidenced by the most recent 
dietary recommendations of  the U.S. Department 
of  Health and Human Services and the U.S. 
Department of  Agriculture (USDA), which 
emphasize the importance of  eating a variety of  
fruit, vegetables, and protein.2 From 1985 through 
2005, the annual per capita consumption of  fruit 
and vegetables rose from 89 to 101 pounds and 
from 123 to 174 pounds, respectively.3 In 2006, 
the annual per capita consumption of  seafood 
(fish and shellfish) was 16.5 pounds, compared 
with 12.5 pounds in 1980.4
The food industry has accommodated 
Americans’ demand for a broader variety 
of  food by moving from locally grown and 
raised products to routine importation of  
items once considered out-of-season or too 
exotic for Americans to buy. The burgeoning 
international agribusiness created by the 
demand for ready-to-eat and processed foods 
supports monoculture farming (i.e., the practice 
of  growing one single crop), mega-feedlots (i.e., 
feedlots raising thousands of  cattle), and mass 
importation and distribution of  foods.1, 5
Concurrent with the changes in demand, 
technology has improved growing, harvesting, 
packaging, handling, and transportation 
practices, facilitating year-round importation 
of  distantly grown, fragile foods, such as 
raspberries from the Southern Hemisphere. 
Less stringent trade agreements with major 
fruit-growing countries also have contributed 
to the growth of  international imports: during 
1990–2006, the annual cost of  imports of  fresh 
fruits and vegetables into the United States 
rose from $2.7 to $7.9 billion; simultaneously, 
the proportion of  tropical fruits (primarily 
from Mexico and Costa Rica) constituting 
these imports increased from 7% to 15%.3
Increasingly more Americans eat their meals 
away from home. According to the National 
Restaurant Association’s 2008 industry 
overview, 945,000 restaurant locations will have 
more than 70 billion meal and snack occasions. 
In 2005, 41% of  all food spending was on food 
away from home, up from 26% in 1970.86 
The increased number of  meals eaten away 
from home most likely have influenced 
foodborne disease. A review of  foodborne 
outbreaks in the seven states participating in 
CDC’s Foodborne Disease Active Surveillance 
Network (FoodNet) revealed that 66% of  
outbreaks (222 of  336) occurring in 1998 and 
1999 were associated with restaurants, and 9% 
(30 outbreaks) were associated with catered 
events.6 In addition, a variety of  studies of  both 
sporadic and outbreak-associated foodborne 
illness, including infection with Escherichia coli 
O157:H7, Salmonella Enteritidis, Salmonella 
Typhimurium, and Campylobacter jejuni, suggest 
that commercial food-service establishments, 
such as restaurants, play an important role in 
foodborne disease in the United States.7
Culinary trends that use undercooked or raw 


























































2.1. Trends in Diet and the Food Industry
foods—particularly dairy, fish, or shellfish—
might be contributing to increased infections 
and outbreaks caused by the microorganisms 
associated with these foods.19–25
2.1.2. Changes in Food Production
Changes in what we eat and drink are not 
the only contributors to trends in foodborne 
disease. How our food is cultivated or raised, 
processed, and distributed and how and by 
whom our food is prepared also are factors. 
Food can be contaminated anywhere along 
the supply chain from farm to fork. The 
industrialization of  food production, with 
concentrated animal feeding operations and 
increasingly intense agricultural practices, and 
the broadening distribution of  food products 
have contributed to outbreaks of  foodborne 
disease involving larger numbers of  people, 
multiple states, and even multiple countries.8–18 
Changes in agricultural, processing, or 
packaging methods might facilitate bacterial 
contamination or growth,8,9,16,23,26–34 and 
routine use of  antibiotics to promote the 
growth of  livestock and poultry has increased 
human infections caused by drug-resistant 
bacteria.49, 50, 84, 85
2.1.3. Trends in Food Product Recalls
Food recalls are one indicator of  food-safety 
problems. Distributors or manufacturers 
voluntarily recall their food products for either 
of  two reasons: (a) a problem discovered in the 
course of  routine inspection of  the food or its 
processing or distribution or (b) suspicion or 
identification of  the product as the cause of  
human or animal disease. During February 
2007 through February 2008, USDA and the 
federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
reported more than 90 voluntary recalls of  
food associated with microbial contamination. 
These recalls demonstrate the breadth of  
products and pathogens responsible for 
foodborne diseases in the United States.17,18
During that period, many of  the recalls were 
for contaminated meat, primarily ground beef  
and other beef  products. However, distributors 
or manufacturers also recalled shellfish and 
smoked, dried, frozen, and uneviscerated 
fish; fresh fruit, herbs, and vegetables; canned 
vegetables; raw milk; cheese and other dairy 
products; chocolate; ready-to-eat foods; frozen 
pizza; peanut butter; sesame seeds; tahini; 
tofu; and bottled water. The products were 
distributed locally, nationally, or internationally 
and were sold not only by national chain retail 
stores and food services but also at farm stands 
and small health food stores carrying organic 
and “natural” products. In other words, no 
one is completely protected from the risk for 
contaminated food.17,18
Most of  these recalls followed identification of  
bacterial contamination of  a food or beverage. 
In at least 20 instances, the contamination 
was associated with reported human illnesses, 
including 628 residents of  47 states infected 
with Salmonella after eating contaminated 
peanut butter.16 The contaminating pathogens 
most commonly identified in food recalls 
were bacteria: Listeria monocytogenes, Shiga 
toxin-producing E. coli (STEC), and Salmonella 
species; the latter two were associated 
most frequently with recalls resulting from 
foodborne outbreaks.
Products also were recalled that were 
contaminated with viruses (e.g., norovirus 
in shellfish), parasites (e.g., Cryptosporidium in 
bottled water), and toxins (e.g., Clostridium 
botulinum neurotoxin, Staphylococcus aureus 
enterotoxin, and tetrodotoxin produced by 
pufferfish).17,18 The largest single food recall 
in the United States, a staggering 148 million 
pounds of  beef, began after discovery that 
a California food processor used disabled 
(i.e., “downer”) cows in beef  production—a 
concern because of  the theoretical risk for 
infection of  the cattle with the agent associated 
with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) 
or “mad cow disease.”35–37





























































2.2. Trends in Surveillance
Foodborne disease is an important cause of  
illness in the United States. In 1999, CDC 
estimated that foodborne diseases were 
responsible for 76 million illnesses each year, 
resulting in 325,000 hospitalizations and 5000 
deaths.38 During 1998–2002, 6427 foodborne 
disease outbreaks were reported to CDC, 
resulting in at least 128,370 individual illnesses 
and 88 deaths.39
Our ability to use public health surveillance 
for tracking cases of  foodborne disease and 
outbreaks, as well as behaviors and conditions 
that contribute to foodborne diseases, is critical to 
our understanding and control of  these diseases.
2.2.1. Overview
Public health surveillance is the foundation 
of  communicable disease epidemiology and 
an essential component of  a food-safety 
program.40 Surveillance data can reveal 
the burden of  a particular disease in the 
community or the presence and scale of  a 
possible outbreak. Surveillance data also can 
provide clues to the source of  and contributing 
factors to disease outbreaks. Over time, 
surveillance data can identify disease and 
behavioral trends and enable investigators to 
learn more about the diseases being tracked 
and ways to prevent these diseases.
Surveillance programs conducted by public 
health and other health-related agencies 
are much broader than foodborne disease 
surveillance. Surveillance is conducted to 
identify waterborne diseases and diseases 
transmissible from person to person; 
breakdowns in infection control in health-care 
facilities; animal-based diseases that may affect 
people; patterns of  behavior that increase 
risk for poor health, and many other reasons. 
Furthermore, surveillance programs typically 
use a variety of  data sources to provide a 
complete understanding of  a particular disease 
in the community and insight into its control 
(Figure 2.1).
2.2.2. Selected Surveillance Systems of 
Relevance to Foodborne Diseases
Multiple types of  surveillance systems are 
used in the United States related to foodborne 
disease. Some of  them, including notifiable 
condition surveillance, complaints from 
consumers about potential illness, and reports 
of  outbreaks, focus on the detection of  specific 
enteric diseases likely to be transmitted by food 
and have been used extensively by health-
related agencies for decades. More recently, 
new surveillance methods have emerged 
including hazard surveillance, sentinel 
surveillance systems, and national laboratory 
networks for comparing pathogen subtypes, 
which are particularly applicable to foodborne 
disease.41
Each surveillance system plays a critical role 
in detecting and preventing foodborne disease 
and outbreaks in the United States and each 
represents one part of  the public health system 
needed to ensure food is safe as it moves from 
its original source through the food chain to 
the tables of  U.S. citizens.
2.2.2.1. Notifiable disease surveillance 
One of  the oldest public health surveillance 
systems in the country is notifiable disease 
surveillance. Notifiable disease surveillance 
begins with an ill person who seeks medical 
attention. The health-care provider sends a 








































































2.2. Trends in Surveillance
specimen (for foodborne illness, this usually 
is a stool specimen) to the laboratory for the 
appropriate tests, and the laboratory identifies 
the agent responsible for the patient’s illness so 
the patient can be treated. Next, the laboratory 
or health-care provider notifies local public 
health officials of  the illness. Once the patient’s 
information goes to a public health agency, the 
illness is no longer considered as an isolated 
incident but is compared with other similar 
reports. Combining the information in these 
separate reports allows investigators to identify 
trends and detect outbreaks.
All states and territories have legal 
requirements for the reporting of  certain 
diseases and conditions, including enteric 
diseases likely to be foodborne, by health-care 
providers and laboratories to the local public 
health agency. In most states and territories, 
the law usually requires local public health 
agencies to report these diseases to the state 
or territorial public health agency. What to 
report and with what urgency vary by state. 
States and territories (or sometimes local public 
health agencies) then send the information to 
the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance 
System, which CDC oversees. In the past, 
disease reports usually arrived by mail or 
facsimile transmission, but many agencies 
now encourage telephone reporting and have 
developed electronic disease reporting locally. 
State public health laboratories also participate 
in national surveillance through programs such 
as the Public Health Laboratory Information 
System (PHLIS), a PC-based electronic 
reporting system for laboratory-confirmed 
isolates including Salmonella and Shigella,42 and 
PulseNet (see below).43
Notifiable disease surveillance is “passive”—
i.e., the investigator waits for a disease report 
from health-care providers, laboratories, 
and others who are requested or required 
to report these diseases to the public health 
agency—and is susceptible to diagnosis and 
reporting problems. As little as 5% of  bacterial 
foodborne illness might be reported to CDC 
through notifiable disease surveillance.44
2.2.2.2. Foodborne disease complaints/notifications 
Receiving and responding to complaints of  
disease from the public is a basic function of  
many public health agencies and other health-
related agencies and can identify foodborne 
illnesses in the community and possibly clusters 
of  persons with suspected foodborne disease.
The processing of  foodborne illness complaints 
varies by agency on the basis of  the suspected 
pathogen and agency resources. Some health 
departments are required by local or state 
statute to investigate all commercial food 
establishments named by sick persons. Most 
health departments record complaints in a log 
book or on a standardized form. Some health 
departments enter this information into an 
electronic database for easy review and analysis.
Some complaint systems are more publicized 
and involve community members more heavily. 
A Web-based system in Michigan (RUsick2) 
allows ill persons to share information about 
their illness and recent exposures and helps the 
health department identify clusters of  persons 
with unsuspected foodborne disease. During 
a pilot test in 2002, this system resulted in an 
estimated fourfold increase in the reporting of  
foodborne illness complaints. Two foodborne 
outbreaks were identified that most likely would 
not have been identified through other means. 45
2.2.2.3. Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System 
The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System (BRFSS) is a state-based system 
of  health surveys that collects information 
about health risk behaviors, preventive health 
practices, and health-care access primarily 
related to chronic disease and injury. For many 
states, BRFSS is the only source of  timely, 
accurate data on health-related behaviors.
CDC established BRFSS in 1984; currently, 
data are collected by random-digit–dialed 
telephone surveys in all 50 states, the District 





























































2.2. Trends in Surveillance
of  Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin 
Islands, and Guam. More than 350,000 adults 
are interviewed each year, making BRFSS the 
largest telephone health survey in the world. 
States use BRFSS data to identify emerging 
health problems, establish and track health 
objectives, and develop and evaluate public 
health policies and programs. Many states 
also use BRFSS data to support health-related 
legislative efforts.
BRFSS consists of  core questions asked of  all 
respondents across the country, and state-
specific questions that are added by state and 
local health agencies each year. Although a 
minimum number of  respondents is needed 
in each state to ensure statistical significance, 
states can choose to over-sample (place a 
higher number of  phone calls) in certain 
regions or among certain populations to 
increase their ability to detect trends within 
those regions or populations.
Because of  the length of  time necessary 
to conduct the survey and lack of  clinical 
information, BRFSS is not an appropriate 
tool for detecting foodborne illness. However, 
BRFSS can be used to identify behaviors, such 
as food handling methods, or trends, such as 
changes in the number of  meals eaten outside 
the home, that can provide information about 
efforts to prevent foodborne illness.
2.2.2.4. Hazard surveillance 
Food-control authorities have a regulatory 
and public health mandate to prevent diseases 
that can be unintentionally and intentionally 
transmitted through food. Approximately 75 
state and territorial agencies and approximately 
3000 local agencies assume the primary 
responsibility for licensing and inspecting retail 
food-service establishments.46 Many of  these 
same agencies oversee other aspects of  the 
domestic food supply chain. The retail food-
service industry segment alone consists of  more 
than one million establishments and employs 
over 12 million people.46
Factors that contribute to foodborne outbreaks 
(e.g., factors that lead to contamination of  
food with microorganisms or toxins or allow 
survival and growth of  microorganisms 
in food) are used to develop control and 
intervention measures at food-service 
establishments. Routine inspections then focus 
on implementation of  these measures. Often 
referred to as Hazard Analysis Critical Control 
Point (HACCP) inspections, this is the basis 
for hazard surveillance. No national hazard 
surveillance system is available to food control 
authorities, although work being conducted 
through the Conference for Food Protection 
may evolve into a national system.
2.2.2.5. Contributing factor surveillance 
Communicable disease control officials or 
foodborne outbreak surveillance officials from 
state and local health departments gather 
information about contributing factors in 
outbreaks from environmental assessments 
conducted by food control officials, from their 
own environmental assessments, or through some 
combination of  the two and report it to CDC. 
Although the contributing factors may seem to 
require little explanation, they are a sophisticated 
listing of  factors based on known microbiologic 
characteristics of  and symptoms produced by 
specific pathogens, toxins, or chemicals and 
historical associations between known causative 
agents and specific food vehicles.
Whether based on etiology identification, 
vehicle identification, or both, factors 
contributing to an outbreak cannot be 
identified through a food-safety program 
inspection of  a food-service or food-production 
establishment as conducted day to day by 
food control authorities. The process of  
identifying contributing factors associated with 
an outbreak must be driven first by describing 
what and how events probably unfolded, 
rather than by identifying regulation violations. 
Failures to implement regulatory requirements 
will come to light over the course of  this 
process. Unfortunately, many food control 


























































2.2. Trends in Surveillance
authorities fail to adjust their day-to-day 
regulatory inspection process to adequately 
conduct an environmental assessment during 
investigation of  an outbreak of  foodborne; 
therefore, contributing factors often are not 
adequately assessed and reported.
CDC’s Environmental Health Specialists 
Network (EHS-Net) was established in 
2000 to better provide information about 
environmental causes of  foodborne disease. 
Participants include environmental health 
specialists and epidemiologists from nine states 
and the FDA, USDA, and CDC. Improving 
environmental assessments in foodborne 
outbreak investigations and reporting 
contributing factor and antecedent data to 
CDC is one of  EHS-Net’s primary research 
activities. CDC is exploring development of  
a surveillance system for contributing factors 
and antecedents from foodborne outbreak 
investigations. This system would link to the 
existing surveillance system for foodborne 
outbreaks, CDC’s electronic Foodborne 
Outbreak Reporting System (eFORS) (see 
below) and provide the level of  detail from 
environmental assessments conducted during 
foodborne outbreak investigations that food 
control authorities need.
2.2.2.6. Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance 
System (FoodNet) 
FoodNet, a sentinel surveillance system, is 
an enhanced foodborne disease surveillance 
system led and largely funded by CDC, with 
10 participating sites covering a population of  
about 45 million. FoodNet concentrates on a 
subset of  enteric diseases that are documented 
by laboratory testing. In contrast to routine 
notifiable disease surveillance, it is an “active 
surveillance system” in that FoodNet site 
investigators regularly contact area laboratories 
to enhance reporting of  foodborne disease. 
FoodNet sites also conduct surveys of  
the frequency of  enteric illness and food 
consumption in the population47 and practices 
in clinical laboratories.48 FoodNet reports 
provide valuable insight into the national 
incidence of, and trends in, foodborne and 
diarrheal diseases25,49–56 and has identified 
previously unrecognized sources of  foodborne 
infection such as chicken as a risk factor 
for infection with Salmonella Enteritidis,55,57 
hummus and melon as risk factors for infection 
with Listeria monocytogenes,58 and riding in a 
shopping cart next to raw meat or poultry 
as a risk factor for infection with Salmonella 
and Campylobacter in infants.59,60 FoodNet also 
provides information to evaluate new strategies 
for conducting epidemiologic investigations, 
including investigations of  outbreaks.
2.2.2.7. National Molecular Subtyping Network for 
Foodborne Disease Surveillance (PulseNet) 
PulseNet is a national network of  local, 
state or territorial, and federal laboratories 
coordinated by CDC that allows comparison 
of  subtypes of  pathogens isolated from 
humans, animals, and foods across local, state, 
and national jurisdictions. The name derives 
from pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE), 
a laboratory method used to determine the 
molecular fingerprints of  bacteria. This test, 
developed and refined during the 1980s, 
revolutionized the investigation of  foodborne 
disease outbreaks by identifying unique 
strains within a bacterial species. For example, 
each of  the many strains of  Salmonella has a 
unique PFGE pattern or fingerprint. Because 
foodborne outbreaks usually are caused by 
a single bacterial strain, investigators can 
identify illnesses in the subgroup of  persons 
infected with the same strain of  Salmonella 
as a cluster of  possibly related cases, to be 
considered separately from persons infected 
with other strains of  Salmonella, thus enabling 
investigators to focus on the correct group 
of  individuals and more quickly identify the 
source of  an outbreak. PFGE also can be used 
to characterize bacterial strains in food or 
the environment to determine whether those 
strains match the pattern responsible for an 
outbreak.14,29,50,61–63





























































2.2. Trends in Surveillance
PulseNet has standardized the PFGE 
methods used by participating laboratories 
to distinguish strains of  STEC, Salmonella, 
Shigella, Listeria, and Campylobacter. In addition, 
PulseNet maintains an electronic database of  
PFGE patterns that enables investigators from 
participating sites to upload their pattern and 
compare it with patterns of  bacterial strains 
circulating nationally. This capability has vastly 
improved investigators’ ability to rapidly detect 
even relatively small outbreaks in multiple sites 
across the country.43
2.2.2.8. National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring 
System–Enteric Bacteria (NARMS) 
NARMS was developed to monitor antibiotic 
resistance patterns in selected enteric 
bacteria found in people, animals, and meat 
products. Bacterial isolates are forwarded 
to reference laboratories at CDC, USDA, 
or FDA and are tested against a panel of  
antimicrobial drugs important in human and 
animal medicine. Data collected by NARMS 
enables investigators to better understand 
the interaction between the use of  antibiotics 
for livestock and the patterns of  antibiotic 
resistance in animals and humans who ingest 
animal food products.15,49,50,64–68
2.2.2.9. Foodborne Outbreak Reporting System 
The Foodborne Outbreak Reporting System 
was initiated by CDC in the 1960s to collect 
voluntary reports from public health agencies 
summarizing the results of  foodborne outbreak 
investigations. In 1973, the database for the 
system was computerized. In 1998, CDC 
increased communication with state, local, and 
territorial health departments about foodborne 
outbreaks and formalized procedures to 
finalize reports from each state each year. 
These changes most likely led to a substantial 
increase in the proportion of  outbreaks 
reported, resulting in a discontinuity in trends 
during 1997–199839 (Figure 2.2).
In 1999, the reporting form was expanded to 
collect information about a broader range of  
food items, places, and contributing factors 
and, in 2001, reporting became Web-based 
in a system called the electronic Foodborne 
Outbreak Reporting System (eFORS). 
Beginning in 2009, eFORS will include 
modules for reporting waterborne outbreaks 
and enteric disease outbreaks caused by person-
to-person contact and by direct contact with 
animals. The expanded system will be called 
the National Outbreak Reporting System.
Figure 2 .2  Number of reported foodborne disease outbreaks, United States, 1993-2002 (from Lynch 2006)












































































2.2. Trends in Surveillance
2.2.3. Quality and Usefulness of 
Surveillance Data
Shortcomings of  surveillance information 
hinder the use and usefulness of  the data. 
These limitations must be considered when 
viewing these data.
2.2.3.1. Completeness of  detection and reporting of  
foodborne diseases 
Although the national capacity for detection 
and surveillance of  potentially foodborne 
disease has improved considerably in the 
past 20 years,51 for a number of  reasons, 
surveillance statistics reflect only a fraction 
of  cases: (a) some people do not seek medical 
attention for vomiting or diarrhea of  limited 
duration or do not seek care because they lack 
health-care coverage, (b) health-care providers 
do not always obtain diagnostic tests for 
illnesses likely to be self-limited, (c) not all types 
of  infections can be diagnosed with routine 
laboratory testing, and (d) laboratories and 
health-care providers may fail to report the 
illness to their local public health agency.6,52,69,70
For example, according to a population-based 
survey undertaken in 1996–97 in selected 
states, only 12% of  persons with a diarrheal 
illness (14.6% of  those with bloody diarrhea 
and 11.6% of  those with non-bloody diarrhea) 
sought medical care. Among those who 
sought medical care, 21% were asked by their 
physician to provide a stool specimen for 
culture, and 89% of  these complied with this 
request. 71
As a result, cases of  foodborne illness are lost 
at each step in the diagnosis and reporting 
process and thus are not included in national 
statistics. Some investigators portray this 
disparity between the occurrence of  foodborne 
illness and the reporting of  cases to the health 
department by using a burden of  illness 
pyramid44 (Figure 2.3).
Key to the success of  surveillance is 
confirmation of  the agent causing a foodborne 
disease. However, because most diarrheal 
illnesses are self-limited and laboratory test 
results often are not used to guide the initial 
course of  treatment for a patient, health-care 
providers often do not request stool cultures. 
Physicians are more likely to request a culture 
for persons with acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome, history of  travel to a developing 
country, bloody stools, diarrhea of  >3 days’ 
duration, or fever or who require intravenous 
rehydration.70
Lack of  laboratory confirmation can hinder 
appropriate management and treatment of  
the individual patient with acute diarrhea 
and inhibit surveillance and other public 
health actions.70,72 For the individual patient, 
identification of  the specific agent can
• Help in the appropriate selection of   
 antimicrobial therapy, shortening the  
 patient’s illness and reducing morbidity.
• Support the decision not to treat, if  the  
 patient would not benefit from antimicrobial  
 therapy or would even be harmed by the use  
 of  antibiotics (e.g., prolongation of  the  
 carrier state with salmonellosis).
Figure 2 .3  Burden of illness pyramid reflecting  
 the proportion of foodborne 
 illnesses that make it through each  
 step of the diagnosis and reporting  
 process. (from Angulo, et al., 1998)
Reported to Health Dept/CDC
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2.2. Trends in Surveillance
• Guide the use of  invasive diagnostic  
 techniques (e.g., avoid colonoscopy if  an  
 infectious etiology is identified).
From a public health perspective, an pathogen-
specific diagnosis and prompt notification of  
public health authorities can70,72
• Enhance actions to prevent the spread of  
infection to others through patient 
education and exclusion of  ill persons from 
food preparation or care of  individuals 
at increased risk for poor outcomes from 
foodborne diseases.
• Allow tracking of  trends in foodborne  
 diseases through surveillance.
• Enhance the detection and control of   
 outbreaks, particularly outbreaks caused by  
 low-level contamination of  food or  
 exposures over a wide geographic area.
• Provide antimicrobial sensitivity data for the  
 community.
• Prevent the emergence of  drug resistance  
 through the more judicious use of  antibiotics 
 and avoidance of  broad-spectrum antibiotics.
Although the costs associated with laboratory 
testing are an important consideration, 
diagnostic stool testing provides information 
for both individual patient care and public 
health purposes. Health-care providers need 
improved parameters for stool testing.
2.2.3.2. Quality and usefulness of  information 
collected 
Unfortunately, public health surveillance and 
outbreak investigation programs have evolved 
independently from food-safety programs, and 
current human health statistics address the 
questions of  communicable disease control 
authorities better than the questions of  food 
control authorities.73
Many factors influence decisions about which 
surveillance data to collect and how to collect 
them, both of  which affect the quality and 
usefulness of  the data. The contributing factor 
category of  data reported to CDC through the 
Foodborne Outbreak Reporting System is a 
good example of  how these decisions are made 
and how surveillance systems evolve over time 
to balance user needs, identification of  data to 
include, willingness of  officials to report, and 
accuracy of  officials’ reports.
Before October 1999, contributing factor 
data were reported and summarized into 
five broad categories: Improper storage or 
holding temperature; Inadequate cooking; 
contaminated equipment or working surfaces; 
food acquisition from unsafe source; poor 
personal hygiene of  food handler; and other. 
Food control authorities used the information, 
but the broad categories were not detailed 
enough and did not fully meet their needs. 
Articles by Bryan et al., Guzewich et al., and 
Todd et al.41,40,74,75 framed information gleaned 
from foodborne disease surveillance systems 
in terms of  the key end user—those charged 
with foodborne disease prevention. One 
article was devoted to data on vehicles and 
contributory factors and described the value 
and limitations of  these data, as well as how 
they can be summarized and presented.75 The 
article included a recommended list of  specific 
contributing factors to be reported. To meet 
the needs of  data users, CDC incorporated the 
contributing factors suggested by Bryan into 
the new foodborne outbreak reporting form in 
October 1999. Another factor, glove-handed 
contact by handler/worker/preparer, was 
added.
Although CDC adjusted the foodborne 
outbreak reporting form to address the needs 
of  system users with regard to contributing 
factor data, the change is not without 
controversy among those who report and 
use this information. Some question whether 
food control authorities have the expertise to 
accurately identify the most likely contributing 
factors from among the now complicated 
list of  factors. Some believe the contributing 


























































2.2. Trends in Surveillance
factor list is too complex for a surveillance 
system and should be removed entirely or 
returned to the pre-1999 abbreviated list. Still 
others believe without a context for the factors 
reported—even the pre-1999 abbreviated list 
of  factors has limited, if  any, value. As new 
information becomes available about the value 
of  specific data elements, the contributing 
factor surveillance system, like all surveillance 
systems, will continue to evolve.
2.3. Etiologic Agents Associated with Foodborne Diseases
2.3.1. Overview 
Foodborne illnesses have myriad causes 
including microorganisms (e.g., bacteria, 
viruses, parasites, and marine algae) and 
their toxins, mushroom toxins, fish toxins, 
heavy metals, pesticides, and other chemical 
contaminants (Table 2.1). These agents 
cause human disease through a number of  
mechanisms and are often categorized into 
those caused by toxins present in food before it 
is ingested (preformed toxins) and those caused 
by multiplication of  the pathogen in the host 
and damage resulting from toxins produced 
within the host (enterotoxins) or adherence to 
or invasion of  host cells (infection).
Details about the most common foodborne 
disease causing agents, including signs and 
symptoms, incubation periods, modes of  
transmission, common food vehicles, and 
control measures, can be found in:
• American Public Health Association. Control  
 of  Communicable Diseases Manual. Washington,  
 DC: APHA;2008.
• CDC. CDC A–Z Index. Available at  
 http://www.cdc.gov/az/a.html
• U.S. Food and Drug Administration. The  
 Bad Bug Book. Available at  
 http://www.foodsafety.gov/~mow/intro.html
• International Association of  Milk, Food  
 and Environmental Sanitarians. Procedures  
 to Investigate Foodborne Illness. 5th edition.  
 Des Moines, Iowa: IAMFES (reprinted 2004).
• CDC. Diagnosis and management of   
 foodborne illnesses: A primer for physicians  
 and other health-care professionals. Morb  
 Mortal Wkly Rep 2004:53(RR-4). Available  
 at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/ 
 category/3629.html
Table 2.1. Examples of agents that commonly cause foodborne illness, by agent type  

















Enterotoxigenic E. coli (STEC)
Vibrio cholerae





























































2.3. Etiologic Agents Associated with Foodborne Diseases
Table 2.1. Examples of agents that commonly cause foodborne illness, by agent type  


















Yersinia enterocolytica and Y. pseudotuberculosis
Virus Infection Hepatitis A














Preformed toxin Brevetoxin (neurotoxic shellfish poisoning)
Ciguatoxin (ciguatera)
Domoic acid (amnestic shellfish poisoning)
Saxitoxin (paralytic shellfish poisoning) 
Fungal toxins Preformed toxin Aflatoxin
Mushroom toxins (amanitin, ibotenic acid, museinol, muscarine, and 
psilocybin)
Fish toxins Preformed toxin Gempylotoxin (escolar)








































































2.3. Etiologic Agents Associated with Foodborne Diseases
2.3.2. Patterns in Etiologic Agents 
Associated with Foodborne Disease 
Outbreaks 
Patterns in the agents causing foodborne 
disease outbreaks have been identified through 
the voluntary reporting of  outbreaks to CDC 
through eFORS. In the most recent CDC 
surveillance summary of  U.S. foodborne 
disease outbreaks (covering 1998–2002), 
bacteria (including their toxins) accounted 
for 55% of  reported outbreaks that had 
an identified cause (Figure 2.4). The most 
common bacteria were Salmonella, E. coli, 
Clostridium perfringens, Staphylococcus aureus, 
Shigella, Campylobacter, Bacillus cereus, and Vibrio 
species (Figure 2.5). Listeria monocytogenes 
and Clostridium botulinum also were reported 
but were less common, bacterial causes of  
foodborne disease.39
During the same surveillance period, viruses 
constituted 33% of  identified causes of  
foodborne disease outbreaks, increasing from 
16% in 1998 to 42% in 2002. (In 2006, 54% 
of  outbreaks with a known etiology resulted 
from viruses.76) The increase in proportion 
of  outbreaks from viral pathogens probably 
reflects the increased availability of  methods 
to diagnose viral agents in recent years.39,77 
During 1998–2002, noroviruses were the 
most common viral cause of  foodborne 
outbreaks (93%), followed by hepatitis A (7%). 
Astroviruses and rotaviruses played a minor 
role in foodborne disease outbreaks.
Parasites accounted for 0.3% of  outbreaks 
with identified etiologies. Cryptosporidium, 
Cyclospora, and Trichinella each constituted 0.1% 
of  reports.39, 78
Marine algae and fish toxins, mushroom 
toxins, and other chemicals accounted for 
10% of  outbreaks with an identified cause. 
The most commonly reported chemical causes 
were scombrotoxin (54%) and ciguatoxin 
(38%). Only 0.02% of  outbreaks with a known 
etiology were caused by heavy metals and 
other chemicals.39
For a large proportion (67%) of  outbreaks 
reported during 1998–2002, no etiologic agent 
was identified. Reasons include inadequate 
collection of  stool specimens, delay in the 
Figure 2 .4  Foodborne disease outbreaks by  
 confirmed etiology, United States,  










*Includes only outbreaks for which an etiology was determined. 
For 67% of outbreaks, no etiologic agent was identified.
Figure 2 .5  Distribution of bacterial foodborne 
 disease outbreaks by etiologic  
 agent, United States, 1998–2002  
 (from Lynch, 2006)
*Most foodborne outbreaks caused by E. coli were STEC.
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2.3. Etiologic Agents Associated with Foodborne Diseases
collection of  specimens, and inappropriate 
testing of  specimens. 79, 80 Because laboratory 
methods for confirming viral disease are 
less available than tests for bacteria, many 
outbreaks of  foodborne illness from viruses 
probably fall into the “unknown etiologic 
agent” category. 79
In addition, not all outbreaks are detected, 
investigated, and reported through eFORS. 
Outbreaks that are most likely to be brought 
to the attention of  public health authorities 
include those that can cause serious illness, 
hospitalization, or death.39 Furthermore, 
outbreaks of  diseases characterized by a short 
incubation period, such as those caused by a 
chemical agent or staphylococcal enterotoxin, 
are more likely to be recognized than diseases 
with longer incubation periods, such as 
hepatitis A.79 Therefore, the relative frequency 
of  various causes of  foodborne disease 
outbreaks based on eFORS or similar data 
should be interpreted with caution.
2.3.3. Determining the Etiologic Agent  
in an Outbreak
2.3.3.1. Laboratory confirmation of  etiologic agent 
Laboratory testing of  clinical specimens from 
cases is critical in determining the etiology 
of  a suspected foodborne disease outbreak 
and implementation of  appropriate control 
measures. For most foodborne diseases, 
stool is the specimen of  choice; however, 
blood, vomitus, or other tissue or body fluid 
occasionally are indicated. Specimens are 
collected as soon as possible after onset 
of  illness from at least 10 individuals who 
manifest illness typical of  the outbreak and 
who have not undergone antibiotic treatment. 
Methods for collection, storage, and transport 
vary depending on the suspected agent (e.g., 
bacteria, virus, parasite).39,81,82
Isolation of  the causative agent from a 
suspected food item can provide some of  the 
most convincing evidence of  the source of  a 
foodborne outbreak. Food testing, however, 
has inherent limitations. Specific contaminants 
or foods might require special collection 
and testing techniques, and demonstration 
of  an agent in food is not always possible. 
Furthermore, results of  testing are often 
difficult to interpret. Because contaminants 
in food change with time, samples collected 
during an investigation might not be 
representative of  those ingested when the 
outbreak occurred. Subsequent handling 
or processing of  food might result in the 
death of  microorganisms, multiplication of  
microorganisms originally present at low 
levels, or introduction of  new contaminants. If  
contamination of  the food is not uniform, the 
sample collected might miss the contaminated 
portion. Finally, because food is usually not 
sterile, microorganisms can be isolated from 
samples but not be responsible for the illness 
under investigation. As a result, food testing 
should not be undertaken routinely but should 
be based on meaningful associations.
2.3.3.2. Other clues to the etiologic agent 
While awaiting laboratory confirmation, the 
following information can help shorten the list 
of  likely agents causing an outbreak:
• Predominant signs and symptoms among  
 ill individuals,
• Incubation period, if  known,
• Duration of  illness, and
• Suspected food, if  known.
An example of  how predominant signs and 
symptoms and incubation period can be used 
to help determine the etiologic agent in an 
outbreak is provided in Appendix 2.
Note: Determining the incubation period for 
an illness (i.e., the time from exposure to the 
etiologic agent to development of  symptoms)  
is influenced by whether the calculation is 
based on the onset of  prodromal symptoms 
that occur early in the course of  an illness  
(e.g., general feeling of  being unwell) or 


























































2.3. Etiologic Agents Associated with Foodborne Diseases
specific signs of  enteric disease (e.g., vomiting 
or diarrhea) that may occur a bit later during 
the illness. Because the onset of  the latter 
typically is more clearly recalled by cases, some 
investigators consistently use the onset of  these 
“harder” symptoms to calculate the incubation 
period.
2.3.3.2.1. Signs, symptoms, incubation period,  
and duration of  illness 
In identifying the likely etiologic agent in an 
outbreak on the basis of  signs, symptoms, 
incubation period, and duration of  illness, it 
is often helpful to first categorize a suspected 
foodborne illness as resulting from a preformed 
toxin or infection.
Illnesses from preformed toxins are caused 
by ingestion of  food already contaminated by 
toxins. Sources of  preformed toxin include 
certain bacteria, poisonous chemicals; 
heavy metals; and toxins found naturally in 
animals, plants, or fungi. Preformed toxins 
most often result from bacteria that release 
toxins into food during growth in the food, 
such as Staphylococcus aureus, Bacillus cereus, and 
Clostridium botulinum. The preformed toxin is 
ingested; thus live bacteria do not need to be 
consumed to cause illness.
Illness from a preformed toxin manifests more 
rapidly than does illness from an infection 
because time for growth and invasion of  the 
intestinal lining is not required. The incubation 
period for illnesses from a preformed toxin is 
often minutes or hours.
Signs and symptoms depend on the toxin 
ingested but commonly include vomiting. 
Other symptoms can range from nausea 
and diarrhea to interference with sensory 
and motor functions, such as double vision, 
weakness, respiratory failure, numbness, 
tingling of  the face, and disorientation. Fever is 
rarely present.
Infections result from growth of  a microorganism 
in the body. Illness results from two mechanisms:
• Viruses, bacteria, or parasites invade the  
 intestinal mucosa and/or other tissues,  
 multiply, and directly damage surrounding  
 tissues.
• Bacteria and certain viruses invade and  
 multiply in the intestinal tract and then  
 release toxins that damage surrounding  
 tissues or interfere with normal organ or  
 tissue function (enterotoxins).
The necessary growth of  the microorganism, 
damage of  tissues, and production and release 
of  toxins takes time. Thus, the incubation 
periods for infections are relatively long, often 
days, compared with minutes or hours as with 
preformed toxins. The incubation periods for 
viruses (excluding hepatitis A) tend to be shorter 
than for bacteria which tend to be shorter than 
the incubation periods for most parasites.
Symptoms of  infection usually include 
diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, and abdominal 
cramps. Fever and an elevated white blood cell 
count can also occur. If  an infectious agent 
spreads from the gut to the bloodstream, other 
organs (e.g., liver, spleen, gallbladder, bones, 
and meninges) can be affected, resulting in an 
illness of  longer duration, increased severity, 
and signs and symptoms associated with the 
particular organ affected.
2.3.3.2.2. Suspected food 
Certain microorganisms are associated with 
certain food items because the food derives 
from an animal reservoir of  the microorganism 
or the food provides conditions necessary for 
the survival and growth of  the organism. As a 
result, the food item suspected in an outbreak, 
if  known, occasionally can provide insight 
into the etiologic agent (Table 2.2). However, 
most foods can be associated with a variety 
of  etiologic agents, and new vehicles for 
transmission emerge each year. Therefore, care 
must be taken in inferring the etiologic agent 
based on the suspected food item.





























































2.3. Etiologic Agents Associated with Foodborne Diseases
2.3.4. Mode of Transmission
Many agents responsible for foodborne illness 
also can be transmitted by other routes, 
such as water, person to person, and animal 
to person transmission. For example, it is 
estimated that only 20% of  shigellosis cases, 
10% of  cryptosporidiosis cases, and 40% of  
norovirus infections result from foodborne 
transmission.38 Consequently, early in the 
investigation of  a potential foodborne disease 
outbreak, investigators should consider all 
potential sources of  transmission and collect 
information from ill persons about sources of  
water, exposure to other ill persons and child 
care settings, contact with animals, and food 
and other exposures.
Although in depth case interviews and 
epidemiologic, environmental health, and 
laboratory studies are necessary to confirm 
suspicions about the mode of  transmission in 
an outbreak, characteristics among cases or 
timing of  illness onset might provide clues that 
suggest one mode of  transmission over others 
and allow investigators to focus on investigating 
that source.
2.3.4.1. Transmission by a food 
Illness among individuals with the following 
characteristics might suggest transmission of  
an agent by food:
• Individuals who have shared a common  
 meal or food, and onset of  illness is  
 consistent with when the shared meal or  
 food was consumed;
• Individuals with distinctive demographic  
 characteristics (i.e., age group, sex,  
 and ethnicity) and possibly unique food  
 preferences; and
• Individuals with a geographic distribution  
 similar to the geographic distribution of   
 food products.
2.3.4.2. Transmission by water 
The following clues might be suggestive of  
transmission of  an agent by public drinking 
water:
• Widespread illness affecting both sexes and  
 all age groups;
• Geographic distribution of  cases consistent  
 with public water distribution but not food  
 distribution patterns (e.g., limited to  
 individuals residing within city limits);
Table 2.2. Examples of food items and commonly associated microorganisms  
 (from Chamberlain 2008)83
ITEM COMMONLy ASSOCIATED MICROORGANISM
Raw seafood  Vibrio spp., Hepatitis A, Noroviruses 
Raw eggs Salmonella (particurlarly serotype Enteritidis)
Undercooked meat or poultry
Salmonella and Campylobacter spp., Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia 
coli (STEC), Clostridium perfringens
Unpasteurized milk or juice Salmonella, Campylobacter, and Yersinia spp., STEC
Unpasteurized soft cheeses Salmonella, Campylobacter, Yersinia, and Listeria spp., STEC
Home-made canned goods Clostridium botulinum
Raw hot dogs, deli meat Listeria spp.


























































2.3. Etiologic Agents Associated with Foodborne Diseases
• Absence of  cases among breast-fed babies  
 or individuals who drink only bottled water  
 or beverages from boiled water;
• Dose-response with increasing attack rates  
 among persons drinking more water;
• Concurrent complaints about water quality  
 in the affected community; and
• Involvement of  multiple pathogens.
A clustering of  cases adjacent to cattle ranches 
or farms that are served by well water might 
suggest transmission by contaminated well 
water. A clustering of  cases among children, 
particularly those who have shared a common 
recreational water exposure such as a water 
park, community pool, or lake might suggest 
transmission by recreational water.
2.3.4.3. Transmission from person to person 
Person-to-person transmission should be 
suspected when:
• Cases cluster in social units, such as families,
schools (and classes within schools), dorms or 
dorm rooms, and sororities/fraternities and
• Cases occur in waves separated by 
approximately one incubation period of  the 
etiologic agent.
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he primary goal of a foodborne disease outbreak 
investigation is to identify the processes that led to food 
contamination or pathogen transmission and to implement 
control measures as quickly as possible to halt transmission of illness. 
Another goal is to understand the reasons for the outbreak well 
enough to prevent similar outbreaks. Good planning and preparation, 
including the right expertise in the investigation and rapidly sharing 
investigation findings can accomplish these goals.
The early days of an investigation are critical. Ideally an agency should 
always be prepared for an investigation so it will spend as little time as 
possible getting organized once an outbreak is identified. This chapter 
describes the roles of the major organizations involved in foodborne 
disease outbreak response and highlights the resources, processes, 
and relationships that should be in place before an outbreak.























When a potential foodborne disease outbreak 
is first detected or reported, investigators 
will not know whether the disease is 
foodborne,waterborne, or attributable to other 
causes. Investigators must keep an open mind 
in the early stages of  the investigation to ensure 
that potential causes are not prematurely 
ruled out. Although these Guidelines focus 
on foodborne disease, the agency roles and 
responsibilities described in this chapter, 
and many of  the surveillance and detection 
methods described in Chapter 4 and the 
investigation methods described in Chapter 5 
apply to a variety of  enteric and other illnesses, 
regardless of  source of  contamination.
3.1. Agency Roles
3.1.1. Overview
A foodborne disease outbreak may be 
managed solely by a single local agency or 
may become the shared responsibility of  
multiple local, state, and federal agencies. 
The nature of  the outbreak, including the 
type of  pathogen, the suspected or implicated 
vehicle, the number and location of  affected 
persons, the geographic jurisdictions involved 
and the local and state food-safety rules and 
laws will determine the types of  agencies 
that need to be involved. Outbreak response 
will also be influenced by agencies’ roles 
and responsibilities and typically available 
resources. Each agency’s response plan should 
include its likely role in a foodborne disease 
outbreak investigation, staff  (or positions) 
that may be involved, contact information for 
relevant external agencies, and communication 
and escalation procedures for working with 
those agencies.
3.1.2. Local, State, and Federal Agencies
Across the country, state and local agencies 
differ widely in their organizational structure, 
responsibilities and relationships. The sections 
below summarize typical responsibilities 
for agencies at the local and state levels. 
However, assignment of  those responsibilities 
will vary depending on a particular state’s 
organizational, legal, and regulatory structure; 
the distribution of  responsibilities across 
different types of  state and local agencies; and 
the size and capacity of  the local agencies.
3.1.2.1. Local health agencies
•	 Roles	and	responsibilities
Conduct surveillance; receive complaints 
about potential foodborne diseases; maintain 
and routinely review log of  complaints; 
routinely communicate with local health-
care professionals; regulate food-service 
operations; routinely inspect food-service 
operations; investigate complaints; implement 
control measures to stop outbreaks; educate 
food workers on preventing outbreaks of  
foodborne disease; inform the public and the 
media; serve as liaison with local industry 
representatives and with the state and federal 
public health and food-safety regulatory 
agencies. May also provide advanced 
laboratory testing, including subtyping, such 
as molecular fingerprinting in PulseNet.
•	 Resources
Vary by agency but may include expertise in 
epidemiologic and environmental outbreak 
investigation and response; and health 
information and promotion information 
for dissemination to the public. Extensive 
knowledge of  local populations and 
community businesses, health-care providers 
and organizations, and other resources.
•	 Contribution	to	outbreak	investigation  
 and response
Detect foodborne diseases; identify local 
outbreaks; know about suspected facilities 























(e.g., facility inspection reports, previous 
complaints); support recall efforts; know 
affected communities; know local health-care 
professionals and diagnostic practices.
3.1.2.2. State agencies—health department
•	 Roles	and	responsibilities
Conduct surveillance; identify local 
and statewide outbreaks; coordinate 
multijurisdictional outbreaks; provide 
advanced laboratory testing, including 
molecular fingerprinting in PulseNet; 
support or direct environmental, laboratory, 
and epidemiologic investigations with 
advanced expertise; provide health 
education and promotion materials; 
maintain tools for collecting and analyzing 
outbreak-associated information; provide 
public information; provide legal support 
for outbreak investigation and control; 
promote statewide policies to increase 
food safety; serve as liaison and coordinate 
communication with other state, local, and 
federal agencies; disseminate information to 
local agencies. May conduct investigations 
in local areas were there is no local health 
agency with jurisdiction.
•	 Resources
Expertise in epidemiologic and 
environmental outbreak investigation and 
response (including traceback investigations); 
expertise in specific disease agents; advanced 
laboratory testing with expertise in microbial 
analyses and identification through their 
state laboratories; tools for collecting and 
analyzing outbreak-associated information; 
health information and promotion 
information (often in multiple languages) for 
dissemination to the public; additional staff  
to aid in outbreak investigations.
•	 Contribution	to	outbreak	investigation	 
 and response
Epidemiologic, environmental, and 
laboratory support for local health agencies; 
coordination of  multijurisdictional outbreaks.
3.1.2.3. State agencies—environmental  
conservation or quality
Note: these roles may be carried out by agencies with 
different names, including environmental health.
•	 Roles	and	responsibilities
Support or direct environmental testing; 
provide advanced laboratory testing 
of  food or environmental samples; 
provide educational materials and public 
information about environmental and food 
safety; maintain tools for collecting and 
analyzing outbreak-associated information; 
promote statewide policies to increase food 
and environmental safety; serve as liaison 
with other state, local, and federal agencies; 
disseminate information to local agencies.
•	 Resources
Expertise in environmental and food-safety 
investigation and response; advanced 
laboratory testing with expertise in microbial 
analyses and identification; additional staff  
to aid in outbreak investigations.
•	 Contribution	to	outbreak	investigation 
 and response
Environmental investigation and laboratory 
support for local health agencies.
3.1.2.4. State agencies—food-safety regulatory 
authorities
Note: these roles may be carried out by agencies with 
different names, including Department of  Agriculture, 
Food Protection, or Environmental Health.
•	 Roles	and	responsibilities
Ensure good manufacturing practices in 
commercial food operations; test dairy, 
meat, and food products for microbial 
contamination; inspect plant after an 
outbreak; coordinate food recalls carried out 
by industry; and stop sales of  adulterated 
product within their jurisdiction. Conduct 
regulatory sanitation inspections at retail 
establishments such as grocery stores, 
supermarkets and warehouses. Consult 
with health departments in outbreak 























investigations (e.g., with knowledge of  food 
production and distribution and information 
provided by industry that may contribute 
to the success of  the investigations) and 
to direct plant inspections by thoroughly 
understanding the epidemiologic, 
environmental, and laboratory data.
•	 Resources
Expertise in food manufacturing and 
distribution; staff  to conduct plant 
inspections and specialized testing of  
dairy, meat, and food products; expertise 
in regulatory tracebacks. Laboratory 
support, usually involving surveillance 
for food adulterants, including chemical, 
physical, and microbiologic adulterants and 
contaminants.
•	 Contribution to outbreak investigation  
 and response
Support investigations that involve 
commercially distributed food products 
through consultation with health department 
investigators, plant inspections, traceback 
investigations, and food recalls.
3.1.2.5. Federal agencies—Centers for Disease  
Control and Prevention
•	 Roles	and	responsibilities
Conducts or coordinates national surveillance 
for illnesses caused by pathogens commonly 
transmitted through food and for outbreaks 
of  foodborne diseases of  any cause; leads 
and supports the national surveillance 
networks, Public Health Laboratory 
Information System (PHLIS), Foodnet, 
PulseNet, EHS-Net, and CDC’s electronic 
Foodborne Outbreak Reporting System 
(eFORS); maintains clinical, epidemiologic, 
and laboratory expertise in pathogens of  
public health importance; develops and 
implements better tools for public health 
surveillance; provides consultation, assistance, 
and leadership in outbreak investigations; 
improves and standardizes laboratory testing 
methods for foodborne disease organisms; 
provides advanced laboratory testing; 
facilitates coordination among jurisdictions 
within multijurisdictional outbreaks where 
appropriate; coordinates communication with 
other federal agencies; provides training in 
methods; coordinates and collaborates with 
international surveillance, communication, 
and training methods; regulates ships that 
travel to international ports.
•	 Resources
Experts (or trainees) in clinical, 
epidemiologic, and environmental health 
aspects to assist with cluster evaluation 
and outbreak investigations; advanced 
laboratory capacity (including resources to 
develop new testing methodologies); surge 
capacity to assist in large outbreaks; tools for 
collecting and analyzing outbreak-associated 
information; training programs; educational 
materials for the public.
•	 Contribution to outbreak investigation  
 and response
Assistance in single jurisdiction outbreaks 
upon request of  the jurisdiction; leadership, 
coordination, and logistics support and 
coordination for multijurisdictional 
outbreaks; centralized data collection and 
analysis for large multistate outbreaks; 
assistance in outbreaks from new or rare 
disease agents or from new modes of  
transmission of  known disease agents; 
advanced laboratory testing; availability of  
additional personnel and other resources to 
aid local and state health agencies; conduit 
to other federal agencies.
3.1.2.6. Federal agencies—Food and Drug 
Administration
•	 Roles	and	responsibilities
Regulates the safety of  most foods (except 
meat, poultry, and pasteurized egg products, 
which are regulated by USDA’s Food Safety 
and Inspection Service [FSIS]); regulates 
food additives and food labeling for FDA-
regulated foods; oversees seafood and juice 























regulations for Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Point; oversees imported food 
products under FDA jurisdiction; conducts 
research into foodborne contaminants; 
inspects food-processing plants; conducts 
food industry postmarket surveillance and 
compliance; oversees regulatory traceback 
investigations and recalls of  the food 
products it regulates; publishes the Food 
Code; regulates ships that travel interstate 
such as on rivers and intercoastal waters and 
trains and buses that travel interstate.
•	 Resources
Twenty district offices located in five regions, 
providing coordination, field investigators, 
laboratory support, technical consultation, 
regulatory support, and media relations; 
policy, technical, and scientific support to 
foodborne disease outbreak investigations 
provided by FDA’s Center for Food Safety 
and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN); education 
materials for the public.
•	 Contribution to outbreak investigation  
 and response
Once an FDA-regulated product is 
strongly suspected as the cause of  an 
outbreak, identification of  product source 
and extent of  its distribution; testing 
of  product obtained from commerce 
or production; traceback and factory 
investigations; prevention of  further 
exposure to contaminated product; and 
initiation of  regulatory action, including 
requesting recalls if  indicated; assistance 
to the Federal Bureau of  Investigation 
(FBI) when deliberate contamination of  
food is suspected by providing technical, 
investigatory, and laboratory support for 
FDA-regulated products.
3.1.2.7. Federal agencies—U.S. Department of  
Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service
•	 Roles	and	responsibilities
Ensures the nation’s commercial supply of  
meat, poultry, and pasteurized egg products 
is safe, wholesome, and correctly labeled and 
packaged through a national program of  
inspection, investigation, and enforcement; 
provides data analysis, advice, and 
recommendations on food safety; conducts 
microbiologic testing of  meat and poultry 
products; responds to foodborne illnesses, 
intentional food contamination, and major 
threats to FSIS-regulated products, including 
overseeing recalls for contaminated meat 
and poultry products; conducts audits to 
determine the equivalency of  foreign food-
safety systems and re-inspecting imported 
meat, poultry, and egg products; develops 
public information and education programs 
for consumers.
•	 Resources
Approximately 7600 inspection program 
personnel in more than 6000 federally 
regulated establishments nationwide 
coordinated by 15 district offices; three 
field laboratories, including the Outbreaks 
Section of  Eastern Laboratory in Athens, 
Georgia; field investigators with expertise 
in inspection, traceback, and enforcement; 
personnel with expertise in food-safety 
science; educational materials and guidance 
for consumers.
•	 Contribution	to outbreak investigation  
 and response
Assistance, traceback coordination, 
and epidemiologic consultation during 
investigations involving FSIS-regulated 
meat, poultry, and egg products; testing of  
product from commerce or production; 
ability to take enforcement and regulatory 
control actions against food manufacturers 
and distributors; assistance in working 
with international food manufacturers and 
distributors; consultation to public health 
and state agriculture agencies.
























Outbreaks can occur in facilities or 
communities managed by agencies that have 
some level of  autonomy and operate their own 
public health programs. Such agencies include 
tribes, the military, and the U.S. Department 
of  the Interior (National Park Service [NPS]). 
Local, state, and federal public health agencies 
need to understand the jurisdictional issues 
involved in outbreaks in these settings, these 
groups’ resources, and establishment of  
relationships with them.
Outbreaks also can be associated with 
intentional contamination. If  that is suspected, 
the FBI has a role in the investigation.
3.1.3.1. Tribes
•	 Jurisdiction
Varies by tribal organization, but in general 
the tribes have complete sovereignty and are 
completely autonomous. Investigations may 
be conducted by tribal health staff, Indian 
Health Services (IHS) staff, or state or local 
health departments, but nontribal entities 
can become involved in an investigation only 
at the tribe’s request. No legal requirement 
exists for reporting a foodborne disease 
outbreak to any public health officials. 
Control measures typically are implemented 
by IHS staff  in cooperation with tribal 
government but can be implemented only 
when authorized by tribal government.
•	 Relationships
Outbreaks may be detected by IHS staff  
or by tribal members and reported to IHS. 
IHS notifies the appropriate state and local 
health departments. Some tribes also may 
notify the local or state health department 
or CDC. State and local health department 
staff  need to develop relationships with 
IHS public health staff, tribal health staff  
(if  any), and tribal leadership in tribal areas 
within or adjacent to the public health 
agency’s jurisdiction. During an outbreak, 
communication should be ongoing not only 
between state or local health department 
and IHS but also directly with tribal 
government. IHS has developed tribal 
epidemiology centers to provide regional 
epidemiology capacity for multiple tribes. 
These centers are run by tribal boards 
and focus on health issues selected by the 
boards. They may become involved in 
outbreak investigations and are a good 
place to promote routine communication. 
IHS is a good source of  information about 
coordinating public health issues with tribes.
•	 Resources	for	outbreak	investigation  
 and response
IHS has many public health staff, including 
sanitarians and public health nurses, at 
clinics on many tribal lands. These staff  most 
likely would handle an outbreak and would 
request help from IHS, the state, or CDC if  
needed. Some tribes have public health staff, 
but most do not have public health laws or 
capacity to respond to outbreaks.
3.1.3.2. Military
•	 Jurisdiction
Autonomous authority over all military 
bases, facilities (including food-production 
and food-service facilities and health-
care service facilities), and vehicles. The 
particular branch of  the military involved 
and the U.S. Department of  Defense 
maintain public health responsibility.
•	 Relationships
Military public health personnel 
communicate with local and state health 
agencies for outbreaks that might involve 
civilians. Local and state health agencies 
should establish communication with the 
public health staff  of  any military facilities 
within or adjacent to their jurisdiction 
before any outbreaks. Other branches of  
the military and other federal agencies 
communicate through the Foodborne 
Outbreak Response Coordinating Group.























•	 Resources	for outbreak investigation  
 and response
Military agencies conduct training in 
food safety and epidemiology; inspect 
and test food-production and food-
processing facilities and delivered food 
products; and coordinate these programs 
with other military and federal agencies. 
Preventive Medicine and Environmental 
Health Officers in each branch direct and 
conduct epidemiologic investigations of  
foodborne disease outbreaks and make 
recommendations. Veterinary Officers 
conduct traceback investigations. The 
Department of  Defense has officers trained 
in public health, environmental health, 
epidemiology, microbiology, toxicology, 
pathology, and food technology who 
can coordinate and support outbreak 
investigations.
3.1.3.3. National Park Service
•	 Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction in National Parks is a function 
of  the legislation designating the specific 
park. Three types of  jurisdiction exist: (a) 
exclusive federal jurisdiction; (b) concurrent 
jurisdiction with state and local agencies; 
and (c) proprietary (owned by the federal 
government but sometimes operated by  
local entity and depending on support from 
local police, fire departments, and others  
for services).
•	 Relationships
Notifies relevant local and state health 
departments of  suspected outbreaks. Notifies 
appropriate federal agency if  commercial 
product is suspected. Works closely with 
CDC. Relies on CDC or state health 
departments for laboratory testing. Local 
and state health agencies whose jurisdiction 
contains or is adjacent to a national park 
should establish communication with the 
NPS Office of  Public Health before any 
outbreaks. Where appropriate, local and 
state health departments should include 
questions about visiting parks when they 
conduct interviews during an investigation 
and notify NPS if  a park might be involved.
•	 Resources	for	outbreak investigation  
 and response
Epidemiology expertise including a medical 
epidemiologist in the NPS Office of  Public 
Health; U.S. Public Health Service staff  
assigned to NPS to conduct investigations 
(including regional public health consultants 
based around the country); park rangers 
who have extensive knowledge of  their 
jurisdiction and the population that visits 
that jurisdiction; scientists in the NPS 
system with a wide range of  expertise (e.g., 
veterinarians, water specialists); contractors 
who run park operations on behalf  of  NPS.
3.1.3.4. Other federal lands
•	 Jurisdiction
NPS jurisdiction is described above. Public 
health jurisdiction on other types of  federal 
land is not always easy to determine. On 
many federal lands (e.g., national forests, 
Bureau of  Land Management land), state 
laws apply, but federal agencies may have 
overlapping jurisdiction. State laws generally 
do not apply to federal prisons. Each public 
health agency that contains federal lands 
within its jurisdiction should identify the 
responsible local, state, and federal agencies 
before an outbreak.
3.1.4. Industry—Food Manufacturers, 
Distributors, Retailers, and Trade 
Associations
• Roles and responsibilities
Growing, raising, processing, manufacturing, 
packaging, distributing, storing and selling 
food using practices that protect the public’s 
health; withdrawing or recalling products 
from the market place when they have been 
identified as the source of  a foodborne disease 
outbreak; communicating with the public 
about outbreaks associated with food products.
























Knowledge of  and information about 
product identities, formulations, processing 
practices and distribution patterns to 
assist with outbreak hypothesis testing and 
product/ingredient tracing. Some industry 




Source of  information about the products 
and practices under investigation, including 
customers that have purchased the products; 
outbreak hypothesis testing; mechanisms for 
withdrawing/recalling products from the 
marketplace.
3.2. Outbreak Investigation and Control Team
3.2.1. Overview
The responsibility for investigating foodborne 
disease outbreaks and implementing control 
measures falls on a team of  people who each 
contribute different knowledge and skills. 
Depending on the size and scope of  the 
investigation, the size of  the team varies from 
1 or 2 to hundreds. In smaller investigations, 
individuals may wear many hats concurrently.  
A team is more likely to effectively and efficiently 
respond to the outbreak if  team members 
combine their strengths and collaborate.
Team members’ assigned tasks and their 
knowledge and skills define their roles. Job 
titles alone may not accurately indicate 
who does what. Members may come from 
different programs within an agency or 
from different agencies. Membership in the 
outbreak response team may vary depending 
on the specifics of  the outbreak—for example, 
different disease organisms or different 
outbreak settings require different skills or 
agency associations. In many investigations, 
roles are defined relatively informally and may 
change as the investigation unfolds.
The composition of  foodborne disease outbreak 
response teams should be determined before any 
outbreaks. Team members should be preassigned 
specific tasks and should receive training if  
necessary to ensure they know how to carry out 
those tasks. They also should understand the 
roles of  the other team members.
Most importantly, team members should work 
closely as a team. Their roles are not mutually 
exclusive—for example, epidemiologists 
can help laboratorians; environmental 
health specialists can help enpidemiologists. 
Furthermore, the work of  1 team member 
often builds on the work of  others. The 
team cannot succeed without a strong 
working relationship and ongoing, effective 
communication among its members.
3.2.2. Roles of Core Team Member
The same individual(s) may play many of  these 
roles, depending on the size of  the investigation.
3.2.2.1. Team leader
•	 Responsibilities
Sets and enforces priorities; coordinates all 
activities associated with the investigation; 
serves as the point of  contact about the 
investigation; coordinates content of  
messages to the public through the public 
information officer (PIO); communicates 
with other organizations involved in the 
investigation; communicates recommended 
course of  action determined by team to 
agency decision-makers.
•	 Desirable	skills
Should include organization of  investigation 
information; general knowledge of  all 
elements of  an outbreak investigation and the 
roles of  each team member; specific expertise 
with outbreak investigation methods and 






















3.2. Outbreak Investigation and Control Team
with foodborne infections; understanding of  
roles of  all agencies involved in investigation; 
ability to communicate; leadership skills.
3.2.2.2. Epidemiologic investigator
•	 Responsibilities
Identifies cases; develops hypotheses 
and strategies to test them; interviews 
both cases and healthy controls; plans 
epidemiologic studies; collects and analyzes 
investigation data using statistical analyses 
or in collaboration with a statistician; 
reports results; collects clinical specimens; 
coordinates testing of  clinical specimens 
and environmental samples; consults 
and coordinates with environmental and 
laboratory investigators.
•	 Desirable	skills
Ability to rapidly assess a situation; 
interpret surveillance information; design 
epidemiologic studies (e.g., case-control 
studies, cohort studies, and surveys) 
and develop questionnaires; conduct 
epidemiologic studies; conduct interviews, 
including hypothesis-generating interviews; 
with assistance from the laboratory 
investigator, identify appropriate clinical 
tests for suspected pathogens; and 
analyze and interpret data using standard 
epidemiologic methods as defined in the 
Applied Epidemiology Competencies, 
including measures of  association and tests 
of  statistical significance (www.cste.org).
3.2.2.3. Environmental investigator
•	 Responsibilities
Investigates food-preparation sites, including 
sites involved with growing, raising, 
processing, manufacturing, packaging, 
storing, and preparing food; collects 
environmental and food samples; reports 
results; arranges for testing of  samples; 
coordinates food sampling, management 
and testing procedures with laboratory 
investigator; interviews food workers 
and managers; reviews food-preparation 
and food-handling records; reviews food 
inventory and distribution records, food 
flow, and contributing factors; consults 
with epidemiologic and laboratory 
investigators. May also interview cases, 
collect stool samples, and conduct traceback 
investigations.
•	 Desirable	skills
Ability to investigate food-production and 
preparation processes; conduct interviews; 
and collect food and environmental 
samples. Knowledge about causative 
agent (e.g., likely sources, optimum growth 
conditions, inhibitory substances, means 
of  inactivation), factors necessary to cause 
illness (e.g., infectious dose, portal of  entry), 
and implicated vehicle (e.g., physical and 
chemical characteristics of  the vehicle that 
might facilitate or inhibit growth, methods 
of  production, processing, and preparation).
3.2.2.4. Laboratory investigator
•	 Responsibilities
Analyzes clinical specimens, food and 
environmental samples (depending on the 
state, the food and environmental samples 
may be tested in different laboratories than 
the clinical specimens); interprets test results 
and suggests follow-up testing; reports results; 
coordinates testing among laboratories; 
advises other team members about laboratory 
testing, including collection, handling, 
storage, and transport of  specimens.
•	 Desirable	skills
Varies with the suspected outbreak agent(s) 
but may include knowledge of  classical 
or molecular microbiology and organic 
or inorganic chemistry or radiochemistry. 
Whether testing food and environmental 
samples, clinical specimens, or both, the 
laboratory investigator should be familiar 
with optimal specimen or sample types 
and with transport and storage conditions, 
including chain of  custody, testing 
methodologies, and relevant laboratory-
based networks (e.g., PulseNet).






















3.2.2.5. Public information officer
•	 Responsibilities
Develops general and specific messages for 
the public through the media; responds 
to media inquiries or identifies the 
appropriate spokesperson; coordinates 
communication with multiple agencies; 
disseminates information about outbreak 
status and overall policies, goals and 
objectives to widespread and diverse 
audiences that include the executive and 
legislative branches of  the government; local 
governments; the general public; and the 
local, state, and national news media.
•	 Desirable	skills
Ability to prepare health education messages 
and press releases using best practices in 
health education and risk communications; 
and speaking and presentation skills. 
Understanding of  mechanisms and protocol 
for relating to the news media, including 
press, radio and television. Ability to 
communicate with a diverse audience with 
limited scientific knowledge.
3.2.2.6 Additional team members 
Additional team members with other expertise 
may be needed, depending on the unique 
characteristics of  the disease or outbreak. Such 
individuals, might include public health nurses 
to assist in conducting interviews; statisticians 
to assist in designing investigation studies and 
analyzing data in large or complex outbreaks; 
health-care providers to discuss laboratory 
results with patients and to administer 
treatment and prophylactic medications; and 
health educators to help craft communications 
for the public.
3.2.3. Outbreak Investigation and Control 
Teams—Model Practices
These model practices are all recommended; 
however, full implementation of  all these 
practices might not be possible in many 
jurisdictions because of  resource limitations 
and competing priorities. Implementing as 
many as possible and as completely as possible 
will improve the effectiveness of  outbreak 
control teams.
3.2.3.1. Emergency response unit 
If  the population covered is large enough and 
the number of  foodborne disease outbreaks is 
high enough, consider establishing a dedicated 
emergency response unit. This team of  senior 
epidemiologists, environmental scientists, and 
laboratorians can train and work together and 
respond to all outbreaks, giving consistency to 
investigations and allowing development of  
advanced expertise.
3.2.3.2. Additional support for large-scale outbreaks 
Some outbreaks are too large for one agency to 
manage independently. Advance preparations 
can help mitigate the impact of  a large-scale 
outbreak and ensure effective response.
• Identify individuals within the agency or  
 from other organizations—such as other  
 branches of  government, university students, 
 volunteers (e.g., Medical Reserve Corp)— 
 who would have minimal skills or knowledge  
 and would be willing to help conduct  
 interviews or provide other support during a  
 large-scale outbreak.
• Develop a contact list and protocol  
 for contacting these individuals when  
 needed. Ensure the list includes after-hours  
 and weekend contact information, and assign  
 an individual or group to update it regularly.
• Develop training and job description(s) for  
 these individuals. If  possible, provide on-the- 
 job training specific to their assigned tasks  
 and their roles in the overall investigation.  
 Such training could occur shortly before  
 performance of  the necessary task.
3.2.3.3. Agency-specific response protocol and  
other resources 
At a minimum, the outbreak control 
team should have been trained in specific 
3.2. Outbreak Investigation and Control Team






















3.2. Outbreak Investigation and Control Team
preidentified protocols. The team also needs 
access to additional resources that can help 
answer questions and provide information for 
decision-making during an outbreak. These 
protocols and resources should be assembled 
before an outbreak.
• Prepare a response protocol based on the  
 CIFOR guidelines but customized to the  
 agency’s needs with specific information  
 relevant to the agency.
• Prepare a list of  people in the agency  
 who should be contacted in the event of   
 an outbreak, including backups, and contact  
 people in external agencies (state, adjacent  
 local health, and federal agencies). Ensure  
 the list includes after-hours and weekend  
 contact information, and update it regularly.
• Assemble a reference library (including  
 online resources) with information about  
 foodborne diseases, enteric illnesses, and  
 control measures. Where possible include  
 electronic resources that can be accessed by  
 laptop computers during field investigations.  
 Regularly review and update the contents of   
 this reference library.
• Assemble a list of  resource persons who  
 have expertise in specific disease agents and  
 investigation methodologies.
3.2.3.4. Training for the team 
Ongoing training is critical for members of  the 
outbreak control team. The training should 
include continuing education to maintain and 
improve skills within their specialty and specific 
training in the agency’s outbreak response 
protocols and the member’s team role. For a 
larger agency that investigates a large number 
of  outbreaks, this may be on-the-job training. 
For a smaller agency with a limited number 
of  outbreak investigations, special training 
opportunities should be arranged.
• Ensure all team members have a common  
 understanding of  the primary goal for  
 outbreak response, which is to implement  
 control measures as quickly as possible to  
 prevent illness.
• Provide team members with continuing  
 education and training opportunities.
• Exercise teams together to ensure each team  
 member understands and can perform his or 
 her role according to agency-specific  
 protocols and legal authorities and  
 understands the roles and responsibilities  
 of  other team members. These exercises also 
 can identify likely problem areas and gaps  
 in resources.
• Conduct regional training with multiple  
 agencies, including table-top exercises. This  
 can help identify problems that might arise  
 during a multijurisdictional outbreak.
• Make training interesting, covering not just  
 methods and statistics but also outcomes  
 of  the people in the outbreak and the  
 investigation.
• Outbreaks themselves provide training  
 opportunities. If  an agency does not  
 frequently have outbreaks, team members  
 may be able to assist in responses to  
 outbreaks in other jurisdictions. This can  
 help promote learning and provide valuable  
 insights an agency can use to refine its own  
 protocols.
• Conduct a debriefing following each  
 outbreak to identify lessons learned and  
 refine the agency’s response protocols.
• Foodborne disease outbreaks provide a  
 good training ground for any epidemiologic  
 investigation. Involving other agency  
 staff  in investigations, even if  their regular  
 job is not related to food safety, can both  
 support the current investigation and render  
 these staff  better prepared to assist in future  
 investigations.























Part of  preparing for investigation of  a 
foodborne disease outbreak is assembling the 
necessary resources—supplies, equipment, 
and people—to support the outbreak response 
team and ensure that everything needed 
in the investigation and response is quickly 
available. Having a complete set of  supplies 
and equipment at hand allows the outbreak 
response team to move rapidly into the field. 
Having support personnel available ensures 
that phone calls can be answered and data can 
be entered quickly into databases for analysis, 
reducing wasted time. Procedures for routinely 
reviewing and replacing missing or outdated 
supplies and equipment should be part of  an 
agency’s outbreak response protocol.
3.3.2. Recommended Resources
3.3.2.1. Administrative staff  
• Support personnel to make phone calls,  
 answer incoming calls from concerned  
 members of  the public, enter data into  
 a database, copy paperwork, and other  
 administrative work.
3.3.2.2. Legal counsel 
• Legal counsel to prepare public health  
 orders, review and recommend revisions in  
 agency procedures and control measures,  
 ensure confidentiality of  health data, and  
 address legal issues.
3.3.2.3. Equipment 
• Sterilization equipment for sample collection 
 tools and temperature probes
• Temperature-checking probes and backups
• Equipment to determine food characteristics 
 (e.g., pH, water content, sugar content)
• Capabilities and equipment for conference calls
• Multiple phone lines
• Computers, laptops, software (e.g., data  
 entry, statistical), portable printers, paper,  
 graph paper, pens, clipboards
• Camera
3.3.2.4. Supplies 
Keep food sample containers and investigation 
equipment and clinical specimen kits, 
including stool specimen and blood drawing 
kits, available at all times (Box 3.1). Foodborne 
disease outbreak investigation kits should be 
maintained in ready-to-use condition, with 
sampling containers and implements kept 
sterile. Establish, maintain, and review or 
verify inventory regularly (at least twice a 
year and preferably quarterly), particularly 
during and after an incident. Replace missing 
and expired materials and resterilize existing 
equipment. Detailed information about kits 
and sample lists are included at the CIFOR 
Clearinghouse.
3.3. Resources
Box 3 .1 .  Example supplies for food and  
 water sampling kits
• Sterile sample containers (e.g., plastic bags,  
 wide-mouth plastic and glass jars with screw  
 caps, bottles, whirlpack bags) and mailing  
 instructions
• Sterile and wrapped sample-collection  
 implements (spoons, scoops, tongue- 
 depressor blades, spatulas, swabs, knives)
• Sterilizing and sanitizing agents (e.g., 95%  
 ethyl alcohol, sodium or calcium hypochlorite, 
 alcohol swabs), hand sanitizers, and sanitizer  
 test strips
• Refrigerants (e.g., ice packs), thermometer  
 (0º–220ºF), insulated containers
• Labeling and sealing equipment (e.g., fine- 
 point felt-tip marking pen, roll of adhesive  
 or masking tape, waterproof labels or tags,  
 custody tape)
• Forms, including sample collection and blank  
 laboratory submission forms, chain-of-  
 custody and other forms for documenting  
 activities
• Clothing (e.g., disposable plastic gloves, hair  
 restraint, laboratory coat)
• Personal protective equipment (gloves  
 and masks)
• Cell phones or other means to communicate  
 in the field























3.3.2.5. Outbreak investigation documents
Note: These and other sample documents are available 
from the CIFOR Clearinghouse at www.cifor.us.
• Chain-of-custody forms
• Food illness complaint worksheets
• Blank disease-specific case report forms
• Laboratory test requisition forms
• Standardized outbreak questionnaires  
 (available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
 foodborneoutbreaks/standard_ques.htm)
• Environmental assessment forms such as  
 hand hygiene assessment (examples available 
 at http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/EHSNet/)
3.3.2.6. Reference materials
• Books, Web resources for support during  
 outbreak (e.g., CDC’s Diseases and  
 Conditions A–Z index)
• Latest version of  the American Public  
 Health Association’s Control of  Communicable  
 Diseases Manual
• Procedures to Investigate Foodborne Illness, by the  
 International Association for Food Protection
3.4. Complaint Processing
Establish a formal process for receiving 
complaints from the public. Use a standard 
process to collect information, including 
a standard intake form. Collect as much 
information as possible at the initial call. If  
possible, a single person should receive or 
process all illness complaints so patterns can 
be identified quickly. Alternatively multiple 
staff  could take the calls using standardized 
data collection forms, which are then 
reviewed by one individual. Staff  receiving 
calls and backup staff  should be trained 
to give appropriate instructions to callers 
about prevention of  secondary spread and 
seeking health-care services. Further detail on 




Records management is an important element 
of  successful outbreak investigation and 
response. Appropriately managed records 
support the outbreak investigation and 
response team by giving all team members 
quick access to needed information. Requiring 
team members to use standard protocols 
for collecting and organizing information 
associated with an outbreak can serve a quality 
assurance role and help ensure that important 
investigation and response steps are followed. 
Finally, maintaining good records for each 
outbreak can help staff  identify what went 
wrong or worked well during the outbreak 
and can provide valuable information for 
improving outbreak investigation and response 
protocols. All information collected about an 
outbreak should be organized in an electronic 
database to allow easy searching and analysis.
3.5.2. Recommended Records 
Management Practices
3.5.2.1. Information collection and sharing
• Identify standardized forms, including illness 
 complaint forms, disease-specific report  






















 forms, and trawling interview questionnaires, 
 for recording information about potential  
 cases (examples of  such forms are available  
 through the CIFOR Clearinghouse). These  
 forms may need to be modified in response  
 to the specifics of  the current outbreak.
• Train staff  in the use of  standardized forms  
 to ensure proper completion by all members  
 of  the investigation team.
• Determine how and what information from  
 forms and questionnaires can be properly  
 and efficiently shared within the  
 investigation team.
• Determine when and how to share outbreak  
 information with the person or organization  
 in charge of  the facility implicated in an  
 outbreak.
3.5.2.2. Data tracking and analysis 
• Establish an enteric illness log or database 
to track all illness complaints. A database 
with templates for rapid data entry 
and analysis will streamline the data-
management process.
• Identify the tools used to analyze outbreak 
data (e.g., Epi Info, SAS). Ensure staff  are 
trained to use these tools.
• Ensure that appropriate electronic records-
management procedures are in place, 
including routine data backups, off-site 




Good communication is one of  the most 
important factors in successful outbreak control. 
At all points in the outbreak continuum—from 
detection through investigation and response to 
debriefing—communication is critical. Without 
good communication, investigations and 
responses can be delayed, uncoordinated, and 
ineffective. Furthermore, good communication 
can help allay public concerns and improve 
industry support for actions to control 
outbreaks. To promote better outcomes, the 
time before and between outbreaks should be 
used to lay the groundwork for communication. 
This includes developing and updating contact 
lists, defining communication processes, and 
establishing relationships with key individuals 
both internal and external to your agency.
3.6.2. Communication—Model Practices
Although these model practices for 
communication are all recommended, full 
implementation of  all of  these practices 
may not be possible in many jurisdictions 
because of  resource limitations and competing 
priorities. Implementing as many and as 
completely as possible will improve the 
effectiveness of  communication.
3.6.2.1. Contact lists 
Establish and frequently update a contact 
list (primary phone numbers and alternates, 
cell phone numbers, 24-hour numbers, home 
numbers, pagers, e-mail, fax numbers, and 
addresses) of
• Core members of  the outbreak control team;
• Other officials inside the agency, such as the chief 
 of  the epidemiology unit, director of  the public 
 health laboratory, and the agency director;
• Critical contacts in other government  
 agencies;
• Important food industry contacts, including  
 trade associations;
• Key health-care provider contacts; and
• Primary media contacts.
3.6. Communication























Ensure the contact list is updated at least twice 
yearly and, when feasible, made available to all 
stakeholders by electronic (e.g., e-mail updates, 
shared and secure website) and hard copy 
(e.g., laminated contact card) formats. This is 
usually much more difficult than expected and 
requires tenacity, but it is critical for mobilizing 
resources in emergencies.
3.6.2.2. Communication among the agencies and units 
of  the outbreak control team (e.g., among epidemiology, 
environmental health, and laboratory)
• Ensure everyone who may be involved in  
 outbreak response knows the other team  
 members.
• Decide on the basis of  roles who will be  
 notified when an outbreak is suspected,  
 including any changes in notification  
 according to the nature of  the outbreak  
 (e.g., pathogen type, involvement of   
 commercial product) and timing (weekends  
 and holidays versus week days).
• Identify the persons who will be responsible  
 for communication on behalf  of  their  
 organizational unit (epidemiology,  
 environmental health, laboratory) and for the  
 outbreak control team.
• Determine how confidential information will be 
 stored and whether and how it can be shared.
• Determine who will receive copies of   
 written reports.
• Establish routine communication among  
 the outbreak control team members before  
 an outbreak.
• Define a formal communication process  
 for agencies of  the outbreak control team  
 for use during outbreaks. Options include  
 daily phone calls and routine e-mail alerts.  
 Developing a consistent approach to internal 
 communications during an outbreak helps  
 everyone on the team know what to expect.
3.6.2.3. Communication with other local, state,  
and federal authorities
• Distribute a list of  your agency’s contacts to  
 other agencies, and obtain their contacts.
• Develop standardized templates and processes 
 (including notification triggers and timelines)  
 for sharing information with other agencies,  
 including who will be responsible for notifying 
 the next level of  public health agency.
• Foster working relationships with other  
 agencies, holding joint meetings and  
 planning sessions before any outbreaks.
• Establish processes for participating in  
 multiagency, multijurisdiction conference  
 calls, and train staff  in appropriate  
 conference call etiquette.
• Determine how confidential information  
 will be stored and whether and how it can  
 be shared.
3.6.2.4. Communication with local organizations, 
food industry, and other professional groups (including 
health-care providers)
• Create templates for communications with  
 each group (e.g., press releases, fact sheets),  
 focusing on the most common foodborne  
 diseases and customizing by group (e.g.,  
 health-care providers, school officials,  
 restaurant managers). Sample materials are  
 available at the CIFOR Clearinghouse.
• Create and test tools for rapid communication 
 with each group (e.g., blast e-mails, blast faxes, 
 Web-based survey instruments).
• Establish routine communications with each  
 group (e.g., newsletters, e-mails), ensuring  
 they will know with whom to communicate,  
 triggers for reporting, and source of   
 information during a foodborne disease  
 outbreak. Be aware that recipients may  
 ignore such communications, so try to make  
 the communications interesting, relevant,  
 succinct, and infrequent.






















• Determine who will communicate with  
 which groups during an outbreak.
3.6.2.5. Communication with the public
• Create templates for communications with  
 the public (e.g., press releases, fact sheets),  
 focusing on the most common foodborne  
 diseases. Sample materials are available at  
 the CIFOR Clearinghouse.
• Create and test Web-based tools for  
 communication with the public (e.g., blast  
 e-mails, survey instruments).
• Establish relationships with consumer  
 groups that may be helpful in disseminating  
 information about foodborne disease  
 outbreaks and disease prevention messages.
• Periodically issue foodborne disease  
 prevention messages or press releases to the  
 public to reduce illness and ensure the public 
 knows with whom to communicate (often  
 their primary-care provider) and from where 
 information will come during a foodborne  
 disease outbreak.
• Establish standard channels of   
 communication (e.g., website, telephone  
 number), and use those same channels each  
 time a public health issue arises about which  
 the public may seek information. Make  
 sure the public knows the source, or publish  
 it where the public is likely to access it.
• Guide staff  on how to respond to and  
 communicate with angry food-service workers, 
 managers, or members of  the public.
3.6.2.6. Communication with cases and family members
• Identify individuals with clinical training,  
 such as public health nurses or medical  
 epidemiologists, to communicate with cases  
 about the outbreak and actions they should  
 take to protect their health and their family’s  
 health. Provide these individuals with training 
 in communication for high stress/high outrage 
 situations. Establish policies for communication 
 with cases and family members, to ensure they 
 get consistent and appropriate messages.
3.6.2.7. Communication with the media
• Identify an agency lead on media  
 interactions, ideally someone trained as a  
 public information officer. Establish  
 procedures for coordinating communication  
 with the media.
• Obtain media training for primary agency  
 spokespersons.
• Identify contact persons from major local  
 media outlets.
• Periodically hold a media education event to  
 teach new media professionals in the  
 community’s media market about public  
 health and response to foodborne disease  
 outbreaks.
• Identify routine deadlines and time frames for 
 reporting news through major local media  
 outlets (e.g., the deadline for having news  
 from a press release appear in the evening  
 newspaper).
• Establish standard channels of   
 communication (e.g., website, telephone  
 number), and use those same channels each  
 time a public health issue arises about which  
 the public might seek information.
3.6. Communication
3.7. Planning for Recovery and Follow-Up
3.7.1. Overview
Part of  preparing for outbreak response is 
planning for the recovery and follow-up stages. 
Make sure your agency’s protocols include 
standardized processes for recovery and follow-
up; these will help guarantee the appropriate 
actions are taken after each outbreak and 
investigation difficulties are identified and 
rectified before the next outbreak.






















3.7. Planning for Recovery and Follow-Up
3.7.2. Recommended Preparations for 
Recovery and Follow-Up
• Establish standard protocols for actions that  
 must be taken or results that must be  
 achieved before an implicated facility or food 
 source can resume normal operations.
• Establish standard protocols for monitoring  
 an implicated facility or food source if   
 monitoring postoutbreak should be deemed  
 necessary.
• Establish a process for creating after-action  
 reports following investigations, with lessons  
 learned and action items for follow-up and  
 quality improvement.
Detailed information about model practices for 
recovery and follow-up is included in Chapter 6.
3.8. Legal Preparedness
Ensuring that a given state or local public 
health agency has developed full legal 
preparedness for outbreak response provides 
a foundation for effective response efforts. 
In this context, a legally prepared health 
department has (a) the laws and legal 
authorities needed to support all relevant 
surveillance, detection, investigation, and 
control activities; (b) professional staff  who 
understand and are competent in using their 
legal authorities; (c) memoranda of  agreement 
and other legal agreements in place for 
coordinated implementation of  laws across 
jurisdictions and sectors; and (d) information 
about best practices in using law for outbreak 
response. See Chapter 9 for details about legal 
preparedness and ways an agency can develop 




Even though a single agency is likely to be 
able to independently manage most outbreaks, 
in other instances the agency will need 
to—and should—ask for help. In addition, 
many outbreaks will become part of  a 
multijurisdictional investigation.
A cardinal rule for all foodborne disease 
response programs: Ask for help earlier 
rather than later. Don’t let the trail grow 
cold before getting help on the scene. Affected 
persons recover and forget details, labs destroy 
specimens, and food establishments throw out 
product. As noted at the beginning of  this 
chapter, the primary goal of  investigations of  
foodborne disease outbreaks is implementation 
of  control measures as quickly as possible to 
prevent further illness. To fulfill this goal, an 
investigation may need to be escalated and 
to involve multiple agencies. Members of  the 
outbreak control team should frequently ask 
themselves whether escalation is advisable and 
be ready to bring in outside help quickly.
Even an apparently local outbreak may 
herald part of  a much bigger problem. 
This is especially true of  an outbreak that 
appears to be associated with a facility 
that is part of  a regional or national chain 
or when the suspected food is in general 
commercial distribution. Other indications 
of  multijurisdictional outbreaks are listed in 
Chapter 8.






















3.9.2. When to Ask for Help
• Scale or complexity of  outbreak seems likely  
 to overwhelm agency resources.
• Outbreak is known or suspected to affect  
 multiple counties, states, or countries.
• Investigation points to a commercially  
 distributed product.
• Nature of  outbreak (e.g., likely causative  
 agent, affected population, scale) or response 
 is beyond the experience of  agency staff.
• Specific technical support is needed that  
 requires expertise not available in the agency.
3.9.3. How to Obtain Help
• Steps in asking for help vary by agency  
 seeking help and for what purpose.
• At the local level, call the State Epidemiologist 
 or his/her surrogate. Most state  
 epidemiology offices have a 24-hour number 
 and someone on 24/7 call.
• At the state level, call the most appropriate  
 office at CDC or the CDC emergency  
 response number, which is staffed 24/7.  
 Emergency response staff  will contact the  
 appropriate office at CDC.
• If  the suspected product falls under the  
 jurisdiction of  one of  the food-regulatory  
 agencies, call that agency using its 24-hour  
 contact number.
• Be prepared to share as much information  
 about the outbreak as possible including  
 setting of  the outbreak, population at risk,  
 suspected etiologic agent, suspected source  
 and agencies involved.
3.9. Escalation
3.10.1. Overview
Increasingly, agencies responding to a public 
health emergency, occasionally including 
foodborne disease outbreaks, consider using 
an Incident Command System (ICS) to help 
coordinate response.1 ICS are structures that 
provide for internal communications within 
a government system between primary event 
responders, public information officers, and 
security and safety officers and for external 
liaison with various organizations. In concept, 
the ICS structures provide for communication 
and coordination among agencies involved 
with responding to a multijurisdictional 
outbreak of  foodborne disease.
The role of  an ICS response in outbreak 
investigations varies and is not without 
controversy. Even within a single investigation, 
some agencies may use an ICS structure 
while others do not. In some states and 
local jurisdictions ICS are formal structures 
controlled by public safety officials with no 
other jurisdiction for food safety or outbreak 
control, which can distract from the conduct 
of  a public health investigation. However, 
some public health and food-safety agencies 
are starting to embrace ICS and adapting the 
ICS structure to meet their needs.
3.10.2. Definition and History of ICS
The ICS originally was developed in the 
1970s to coordinate activities to control 
wildfires in California. The system has been 
expanded and integrated into the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency’s National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) to aid 
intra-agency and interagency coordination, 
especially during large-scale emergencies that 
involve multiple jurisdictions. The ICS features 
a clearly defined chain of  command with 
common nomenclature for key management 
positions; defined management sections; 
and a modular organizational structure; and 
uses specifically defined emergency response 
function roles.
3.10. Incident Command System






















3.10. Incident Command System
ICS, as an integral part of  NIMS, is a widely 
applicable management system designed to 
enable effective, efficient incident management 
by integrating a combination of  facilities, 
equipment, personnel, procedures, and 
communications operating within a common 
organizational structure. ICS is a fundamental 
form of  management established in a 
standardized format, with the purpose of  
enabling incident managers to identify the key 
concerns associated with the incident—often 
under urgent conditions—without sacrificing 
attention to any component of  the command 
system.
The ICS organizational structure develops 
in a modular fashion according to the size 
and complexity of  the incident, as well as 
the specifics of  the hazard environment 
created by the incident. Responsibility for 
the establishment and expansion of  the ICS 
modular organization ultimately rests with 
the Incident Commander, who bases the 
ICS organization on the requirements of  the 
situation. As incident complexity increases, the 
organization expands from the top down as 
functional responsibilities are delegated.
3.10.3. Context for Use
Agencies involved in foodborne disease 
outbreak investigation and response should 
decide in advance whether and how to apply 
an ICS, and, if  applicable, incorporate the 
ICS structure into their response planning. 
Such planning should be coordinated with 
all other agencies that may be drawn into the 
investigation and response over time. Most 
foodborne disease outbreak investigations do 
not require formal activation of  ICS, but may 
benefit from application of  ICS principles and 
methods.
If  someone who claims to have tampered with 
food contacts an agency, or in any outbreak in 
which intentional contamination is suspected, 
notification of  law enforcement officials and 
assessment of  the credibility of  the threat are 
essential. If  the threat is credible, the outbreak 
would move into a law enforcement realm with 
activation of  the ICS.
Early inclusion of  ICS principles and methods 
can prevent problems over the long term. 
Trying to pick up and implement ICS after 
an incident has expanded creates many 
organizational issues for all responders 
involved. In recent years, federal departments 
and agencies have begun moving toward 
making adoption of  NIMS by state, tribal, 
and local organizations a condition for federal 
preparedness assistance, including grants and 
contracts.
3.10.4. Training
If  an agency elects to apply the ICS structure 
to its foodborne disease outbreak response, 
then ICS training should be provided to the 
outbreak response team before any outbreaks. 
Ideally that ICS training would use foodborne 
disease outbreak examples so all team 
members clearly understand how to use the 
ICS structure in an outbreak situation.
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he term “foodborne disease surveillance” generally refers 
to the routine monitoring in a population for enteric disease 
for which a food vehicle may be involved. The actual vehicle 
usually is not known during the surveillance process, and transmission 
ultimately could be due to food, water, person-to-person spread, or 
other vehicles.
One of the primary functions of foodborne disease surveillance 
and outbreak investigation is to detect problems in food and water 
production and delivery systems that might otherwise have gone 
unnoticed. Rapid detection and investigation of outbreaks is a critical 
first step to abating these active hazards and preventing their further 
reoccurrence (discussed further in Chapter 5). Broader goals of 
surveillance include defining the magnitude and burden of disease 
in the community, providing a platform for applied research, and 
facilitating understanding of the epidemiology of foodborne diseases.
Foodborne Disease Surveillance 
and Outbreak Detection
















































Unlike food-monitoring programs, which seek 
to identify problems in food production and 
correct them before illnesses occur, foodborne 
disease surveillance cannot prevent initial 
cases of  disease. Nevertheless, surveillance is 
the most sensitive tool available for identifying 
failures anywhere in our food supply systems. 
Food monitoring must concentrate on 
monitoring the effectiveness of  risk reduction 
procedures at critical control points in the 
production of  food. However, the range 
of  potential vehicles detectable through 
foodborne disease surveillance includes all 
food or other substances contaminated at any 
link in the chain from production to ingestion. 
Foodborne disease surveillance complements 
regulatory and commercial monitoring 
programs by providing primary feedback on 
the effectiveness of  prevention programs.
Over the years, foodborne disease surveillance, 
coupled with outbreak investigation, has 
remained among the most productive 
public health activities, resulting in the 
recall of  hundreds of  millions of  pounds 
of  contaminated products and prompting 
numerous large and small changes in food-
production and food-delivery systems. Many 
improvements in food safety during the last 
100 years directly or indirectly resulted from 
outbreak investigations. However, current 
surveillance practices vary widely, are unevenly 
resourced, and generally exploit only a fraction 
of  the system’s potential.
When a potential foodborne disease outbreak 
is first detected or reported, investigators will 
not know whether the disease is foodborne, 
waterborne, or attributable to other causes. 
Investigators must keep an open mind in the 
early stages of  the investigation to ensure that 
potential causes are not prematurely ruled 
out. While the focus of  these Guidelines is 
foodborne disease, many of  the surveillance and 
detection methods described in this chapter and 
the investigation methods described in Chapter 
5 apply to a variety of  enteric and other 
illnesses, regardless of  source of  contamination.
4.0. Introduction
4.1. Overview
Disease surveillance is used to identify clusters 
of  potential foodborne illness. Investigation 
methods (Chapter 5) then are used to identify 
common exposures of  ill persons in the cluster 
that distinguish them from healthy persons. 
Although, in practice, detecting individual 
foodborne disease outbreaks involves multiple 
approaches, three general methods are used in 
outbreak detection (Table 4.1):
•	 Pathogen-specific	surveillance:
Health-care providers and laboratorians 
report individual cases of  disease when 
selected pathogens, such as Salmonella enterica 
or Escherichia coli O157:H7, are identified in 
specimens from patients. This surveillance 
method also includes specific clinical 
syndromes with or without laboratory 
confirmation, such as hemolytic uremic 
syndrome (HUS) and botulism. Exposure 
information is gathered by interviews with 
cases. Data and pathogens collected as part 
of  food, animal, or environmental monitoring 
programs enhance this surveillance method. 
The national PulseNet system is an example 
of  pathogen-specific surveillance.
•	 Notification/complaint	systems:
Health-care providers or the public identify 
and report suspected disease clusters or  
independent complaints. Exposure infor-
mation is acquired by interviews of  cases.
•	 Syndromic	surveillance:
This surveillance method generally involves 
systematic (usually automated) gathering of  
data on nonspecific health indicators that 
may reflect increased disease occurrence, 
such as use of  Immodium®, visits to 
emergency departments for diarrheal 
complaints, or calls to poison control 
hotlines. Exposure information is not 
routinely collected.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To systematically collect, analyze, and 
disseminate information about laboratory-
confirmed illnesses or well-defined syndromes 
as part of  prevention and control activities.
4.2.2. Background
Surveillance for typhoid fever began in 1912 
and was extended to all Salmonella in 1942. 
National serotype-based surveillance of  
Salmonella began in 1963, making it one of  the 
oldest pathogen-specific surveillance programs 
and the oldest public health laboratory subtype-
based surveillance system. The usefulness of  
pathogen-specific surveillance is related to 
the specificity with which agents are classified 
(i.e., use of  subtyping and method), permitting 
individual cases of  disease to be grouped with 
other cases most likely to share a common 
food source or other exposure. This type of  
surveillance greatly expanded during the 
1990s with the development of  PulseNet and 
molecular subtyping of  selected foodborne 
diseases, including Salmonella, Escherichia coli 
O157:H7, Shigella, Listeria, and Campylobacter.
4.2.3. Case Reporting and Laboratory 
Submission Process
Most diseases included under pathogen-
specific surveillance are reportable (i.e., 
notifiable) diseases. State or local health 
agencies establish criteria for voluntary or 
mandatory reporting of  infectious diseases, 
including those that might be foodborne (Box 
4.1). These criteria describe the diseases to 
report, to whom, how, and in what time frame. 
For this type of  surveillance, diseases are 
defined by specific laboratory findings, such 
as isolation of  Salmonella enterica, or by well-
defined syndromes, such as HUS. Diseases are 
reported primarily by laboratories, medical 
staff  (e.g., physicians, infection-control 
practitioners, medical records clerks), or both. 
Diseases can be reported by telephone, mail, or 
fax; through a secure website; or automatically 
through reports generated from an electronic 
medical record or laboratory information 
4.1. Overview
Box 4 .1 .  Selected nationally notifiable  







• Hemolytic uremic syndrome, postdiarrheal
• Hepatitis A infection, acute
• Listeriosis
• Salmonellosis






From CDC. Nationally Notifiable Infectious 
Diseases. United States 2008. Revised.  
Available at:  http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/
disss/nndss/phs/infdis.htm.
This chapter reviews major features, strengths, 
and limitations of  each surveillance method 
and provides recommendations for increasing 
the effectiveness of  each. Because many agents 
transmitted by food also can be transmitted 
by water and from person to person, animal 
to person, or other mechanisms, outbreaks are 
not considered “foodborne” until determined 
by investigation to be so. 
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system. In addition, isolates or other clinical 
materials are forwarded from laboratories 
serving primary health-care facilities to public 
health laboratories for confirmation and 
further characterization, as required by state 
laws or regulations or as requested by the local 
jurisdiction. CDC works with states to compile 
national surveillance data. Requirements for 
individual states are available at http://www.
cste.org/nndss/reportingrequirements.htm.
4.2.4. Epidemiology Process
Information received by the public health 
agency through multiple avenues, including 
basic clinical and demographic data from 
individual cases of  specific laboratory-
confirmed illness or well-defined syndromes, is 
reconciled and associated with case isolates or 
other clinical materials received in the public 
health laboratory. Reconciled case reports are 
forwarded to higher jurisdictional levels (local 
health agency to state agency, state agency to 
federal agency) by a variety of  mechanisms. 
In general, records are redacted (stripped 
of  individual identifiers) when they are sent 
outside the reporting states.
Cases may be interviewed one or more times 
about potential exposures and additional 
clinical and demographic information. 
The scope of  these interviews may vary by 
jurisdiction. Interviews typically cover basic 
descriptive information and exposures of  local 
importance, such as attendance at a child-
care facility, occupation as a food worker, 
and medical follow-up information. Whereas 
many local agencies collect information about 
a limited set of  high-risk exposures, detailed 
exposure interviews usually are reserved for 
investigating clusters or recognized outbreaks 
(Chapter 5). However, routine collection of  
detailed exposure information can provide a 
basis for the evaluation of  clusters as they are 
detected (“real time”) and may be justified for 
enteric pathogens of  sufficient public health 
importance, such as E. coli O157:H7 and 
Listeria monocytogenes. (See Chapter 5 for further 
discussion.)
Agent, time, and place are examined 
individually and in combination to identify 
potentially significant clusters or trends. This is 
the critical first step in hypothesis generation. 
Clusters of  unusual exposures, abnormal 
exposure frequencies, or unusual demographic 
distributions (e.g., predominance of  cases in 
a particular age group) may be identified. 
Clusters of  cases are examined as a group 
and, if  a common exposure seems likely, 
investigated further (Chapter 5).
Hypotheses to explain the cluster can be 
developed in several ways. If  trawling 
questionnaires are routinely administered after 
a case is reported, hypotheses can be generated 
through examination of  previously obtained 
exposure data for commonality or trends and 
may be followed by an iterative follow-up 
interview (see below). In jurisdictions where 
trawling questionnaires are not used routinely, 
extensive hypothesis-generating interviews 
may be used only for cases suspected to be 
part of  a common-source cluster. Unless these 
interviews identify an obvious exposure leading 
to direct public health intervention, hypotheses 
are tested during the ensuing investigation (see 
Chapter 5).
Questionnaire data are not the sole source 
of  information available to investigators. 
They also should take advantage of  product 
distribution data obtained from the food 
distributors or noteworthy “coincidences,” 
such as the occurrence of  a majority of  
cases among children, which might point 
to a product targeted at children. The most 
successful investigators develop and consider 
information from as wide a variety of  sources 
as possible.
4.2.5. Laboratory Process
For some foodborne pathogens, clinical 

















































diagnostic laboratories forward case isolates 
or other clinical materials to public health 
laboratories as part of  mandated or voluntary 
reporting rules. Problems such as mislabeling, 
broken-in-transit, or quantity-not-sufficient 
are resolved. Receipt of  specimens is recorded, 
and specimen information is entered into the 
Laboratory Information Management System 
before or concurrently with testing. Patient 
information submitted with the sample may 
be provided to the epidemiology department 
for comparison with cases already reported 
and to allow reconciliation of  case reports 
and laboratory samples and identification of  
previously unreported cases.
The agent identification is confirmed, and 
tests (such as serotyping, molecular subtyping, 
or antimicrobial susceptibility assays) are 
conducted to further characterize the 
agent. Reports are issued either singly or in 
consolidation to the epidemiology department. 
Reports also may be issued to submitters as 
permitted by local policies, and specimen 
data (including detailed subtyping results) 
are uploaded to national systems such as the 
Public Health Laboratory Information System 
(PHLIS) and PulseNet. Clusters of  cases 
identified by the public health laboratory are 
reported to the epidemiology department. 
For suspected multijurisdictional outbreaks, 
national notification or inquiries can be 
conducted through PulseNet.
For an individual case of  botulism, and 
occasionally for an individual case of  other 
infections, testing food or other environmental 
specimens is useful (e.g., pet reptiles for 
Salmonella or frozen ground beef  for an E. 
coli O157:H7 infection) but is otherwise not 
advised. This testing may be conducted at 
a state or local public health laboratory or 
at a state food testing regulatory laboratory. 
Without strong epidemiologic data or 
environmental information, microbiologic 
screening of  food to investigate clusters 
generally is unproductive and always is 
resource-intensive. However, this approach 
occasionally is warranted when only a few 
foods are suspected, reasonable samples are 
available, and other investigation approaches 
do not appear to be working.
4.2.6. Timeline for Case Reporting and 
Cluster Recognition
Pathogen-specific surveillance requires a 
series of  events to occur between the time a 
patient is infected and the time public health 
officials determine the patient is part of  a 
disease cluster. This delay is one of  the limiting 
factors of  this type of  surveillance. Minimizing 
delay by streamlining the individual processes 
improves the likelihood of  overall success. A 
sample timeline for Salmonella case reporting is 
presented in Figure 4.1.
1.	Incubation	time:
The time from ingestion of  a contaminated 
food to beginning of  symptoms. For Salmonella, 
this typically is 1–3 days, sometimes longer.
2. Time to contact with health-care  
	 provider	or	doctor:
The time from the first symptom to medical 
care (when a diarrhea sample is collected 
for laboratory testing). This time may be an 
additional 1–5 days, sometimes longer.
Figure 4 .1 .  Sample Salmonella case  
 reporting timeline
Case Confirmed

















Time to contact with healthcare 
system = 1-3 days
Time to diagnosis = 1-3 days
Shipping time = 1-3 days
Serotyping and *DNA
fingerprinting* = 2-10 days

















































The time from provision of  a sample to lab 
identification of  the agent in the sample as 
Salmonella. This may be 1–3 days from the 
time the lab receives the sample.
4.	Sample	shipping	time:
The time required to ship the Salmonella 
bacteria from the lab to the state public 
health authorities who will perform 
serotyping and DNA fingerprinting. This 
usually takes 0–7 days, depending on 
transportation arrangements within a state 
and distance between the clinical lab and the 
public health department. Diagnostic labs 
are not required by law in many jurisdictions 
to forward Salmonella isolates to public health 
labs, and not all diagnostic labs forward any 
isolates unless specifically requested to do so.
5.	Time	to	serotyping	and	DNA	fingerprinting:
The time required for the state public health 
authorities to serotype and to perform 
DNA fingerprinting on the Salmonella and 
compare it with the outbreak pattern. 
Serotyping typically takes 3 working days 
but can take longer. DNA fingerprinting 
can be accomplished in 2 working days (24 
hours). However, many public health labs 
have limited staff  and space and experience 
multiple emergencies simultaneously. In 
practice, serotyping and PFGE subtyping 
may take several days to several weeks; faster 
turnarounds are obviously highly desirable.
The time from onset of  illness to confirmation 
of  the case as part of  an outbreak is typically 
2–3 weeks. Case counts in the midst of  an 
outbreak investigation are therefore always 
preliminary and must be interpreted within 
this context.
4.2.7. Strengths of Pathogen-Specific 
Surveillance for Outbreak Detection
• Permits detection of  widespread disease  
 clusters initially linked only by a common  
 agent. Most national and international  
 foodborne disease outbreaks are detected in  
 this manner.
• When combined with specific exposure  
 information, is arguably the most sensitive  
 single method for detecting unforeseen  
 problems in food and water supply systems  
 caused by the agents under surveillance. The 
 specificity of  agent or syndrome information 
 combined with specific exposure information 
 obtained by interviews allows the positive  
 association of  small numbers of  cases with  
 exposures.
4.2.8. Limitations of Pathogen-Specific 
Surveillance
• Works only for diseases detected by  
 routine testing and reported to a public  
 health agency.
• Is relatively slow because it requires that (a)  
 patients seek medical attention; (b) tests are  
 ordered; (c) samples are collected,  
 transported, and tested; and (d) isolates are  
 forwarded to public health laboratories for  
 further characterization.
4.2.9. Key Determinants of Successful 
Pathogen-Specific Surveillance
The following interrelated factors are critical 
to understanding the use of  surveillance data 
to identify potential outbreaks and form the 
basis for best practices of  cluster investigations 
(Chapter 5).
4.2.9.1. Sensitivity of  case detection 
Surveillance represents a sampling of  the 
true population of  affected persons because 
most cases of  foodborne disease are not 
diagnosed and reported. The completeness 
of  the reporting and isolate submission 
processes affects the representativeness 
of  the reported cases and the potential 
number and size of  outbreaks detected. 
If  the percentage of  cases reported or isolates 
submitted is low (i.e., sensitivity is low), small 
outbreaks, or outbreaks spread over space and 
4.2. Pathogen-Specific Surveillance

















































time are likely to be missed. Furthermore, 
if  sensitivity is low, reported cases might 
differ significantly from cases not reported. 
Therefore, care must be taken in using 
characteristics of  reported cases to develop 
hypotheses about the outbreak (see Chapter 5).
4.2.9.2. Prevalence of  the agent and specificity  
of  agent classification 
The more common the agent, the more 
difficult it is to identify outbreaks and the 
more likely sporadic (unrelated) cases are 
to be misclassified with outbreak cases. 
This obscures trends and dilutes outbreak 
measures of  association (type 2 probability 
error or the possibility of  missing an exposure–
disease association when one truly exists). 
Consequently, a larger number of  outbreak 
cases are needed to significantly associate 
illness with exposure.
Examination of  subsets of  cases using 
case definitions based on specific agent 
classifications (e.g., inclusion of  subtyping 
results) or restricting cases using certain 
time, place, or person characteristics 
can minimize this impact. For example, 
Salmonella enterica serotype Typhimurium, a 
common serotype, provides the opportunity for 
misclassification (i.e., grouping together cases 
resulting from different exposures). However, 
Salmonella Typhimurium cases that are part of  
a common-source outbreak are more likely 
than cases not associated with the outbreak 
to share a PFGE subtype. Therefore, using 
the PFGE subtype in the case definition will 
decrease misclassification (i.e., exclude cases 
not related to the outbreak) and increase the 
chance of  finding a statistically significant 
association between illness and exposure. This 
is the basic principle behind PulseNet.
Increasing the specificity of  strain classification 
is useful only to a point. Because truly 
associated cases with different subtypes (or 
no subtyping at all) also can be eliminated 
from the study, increasing strain classification 
specificity may become problematic when the 
number of  cases is small. For this reason, use 
of  several different levels of  agent specificity 
during the investigation might be helpful.
4.2.9.3. Sensitivity and specificity of  interviews  
of  cases 
One reason an ill person seeks medical attention 
is his or her suspicion that he or she might have 
been part of  a foodborne disease outbreak. 
Routine case interviews should always identify 
group exposures, such as a banquet, after which 
other persons may have been ill. For these 
cases, the event itself  largely (but not entirely) 
defines the exposures of  interest. However, 
exposures that otherwise need to be considered 
in pathogen-specific surveillance usually are 
open-ended; they include all exposures in a time 
frame appropriate to the disease.
As noted above, many local agencies collect 
information about a limited set of  high-risk 
exposures, and routine collection of  detailed 
exposure information can provide a basis for 
“real-time” evaluation of  clusters that may 
be justified for enteric pathogens of  sufficient 
public health importance. Lack of  a list of  
specific exposures, such as a menu, makes 
prompting cases during the interview more 
difficult. Furthermore, cases identified through 
pathogen-specific surveillance usually are 
interviewed later after the exposure than are 
those reported as part of  specific events. Thus, 
greater attention must be paid to interview 
timing and content.
4.2.9.3.1. Timing 
To decrease the time between exposure to 
the disease-causing agent and interview of  
the case, reporting of  cases by health-care 
providers and laboratories should be as easy as 
possible. Patients should be interviewed as soon 
as possible because recall will be better closer 
to the time of  the exposure and cases will be 
more motivated to share information with 
investigators closer to the time of  their illness.

















































In pathogen-specific surveillance, the interview 
form itself  must include a broader range of  
potential exposures than interview forms for 
event-driven investigations. Interview forms 
that use of  a combination of  question types 
will increase the likelihood of  detecting the 
desired exposure information and should 
be used, as appropriate to the outbreak and 
surrounding circumstances. Interview forms 
can include questions that:
• Collect information about specific  
 exposures, such as a broad range of  specific  
 food items and nonfood exposures previously 
 (or plausibly) associated with the pathogen  
 through close-ended questions;
• Prompt cases to further describe exposures,  
 such as brand information and place of   
 purchase or consumption; and
• Enable cases to identify unanticipated  
 exposures through open-ended questions  
 (“At which restaurants did you eat?”).
Questionnaire design involves balancing a 
number of  competing demands; the end result 
is always a compromise. Questionnaires with 
lots of  open-ended questions require more 
highly trained and skilled personnel than 
interviews using more pre-defined lists of  
exposures. Longer questionnaires can cover 
more potential exposures, but may task the 
patience of  both subject and interviewer; cases 
may quit the interview before it is completed. 
Open-ended questions generally are more 
difficult and time-consuming to abstract and 
keypunch.
No one questionnaire will work for all 
investigations or surveillance systems. 
Investigators should consider the specifics of  
the outbreak and setting, the importance of  
collecting the information, and the likely trade-
offs before deciding on the content of  the 
interview form.
Regardless of  interview content, use of  a 
standardized interview form, with which the 
interviewer is familiar, will decrease time spent 
on staff  training and decrease errors in data 
collection. In addition, use of  standardized 
“core” questions (i.e., questions that use the 
same wording for collecting information about 
certain exposures) and data elements will 
enhance data sharing and allow comparisons 
among jurisdictions in multijurisdictional 
outbreaks.
4.2.9.4. Overall speed of  the surveillance and 
investigation processes 
As described in section 4.2.6 above, time 
delays are inherent in pathogen-specific 
surveillance. The usefulness of  pathogen-
specific surveillance in preventing ongoing 
transmission of  disease from contaminated 
food, especially perishable commodities, is 
directly related to the speed of  the process.
Once an outbreak investigation is under way, 
“routine” surveillance practices and work 
schedules must be changed to match the 
urgency of  the investigation (Chapter 5).
4.2.10. Routine Surveillance—Model 
Practices
This section lists model practices for routine 
surveillance programs. Practices used in 
any particular situation depend on a host of  
factors, including circumstances specific to 
the outbreak (e.g., the pathogen and number 
and distribution of  cases), staff  expertise, 
structure of  the investigating agency, and 
agency resources. For example, aggressive 
case identification and investigation of  E. coli 
O157:H7 cases can identify outbreaks and lead 
to abatement steps that may minimize serious 
illness and death, whereas investigation of  
more numerous Campylobacter cases is unlikely 
to lead to public health interventions. Although 
a systematic evaluation under different 
circumstances had not been performed on 
these practices, experiences from successful 
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investigations support their value. Investigators 
are encouraged to use a combination of  
practices as appropriate to the specific 
outbreak.
4.2.10.1. Reporting and isolate submission 
Encourage health-care providers to test 
patient specimens as part of  the routine 
diagnostic process for possible foodborne 
diseases. Increase reporting and isolate 
submission by clinical laboratories and health-
care providers through (a) education about the 
value of  testing and reporting mechanisms; 
(b) regulatory action (such as modifying 
reporting rules to mandate isolate submission); 
(c) laboratory audits; and (d) provision of  
easier methods for compliance, such as 
automated or Web-based reporting, isolate-
transport systems, more consistent reporting 
across reporting areas, and limitation of  the 
amount of  information initially requested. 
Educate physicians, laboratorians, and medical 
records clerks by workshops or conferences, 
newsletters, electronic health alerts, and 
regular feedback from public health agencies.
The medical rationale and specific 
recommendations for testing can be found in 
Practical Guidelines for the Management of  Infectious 
Diarrhea1 and “Diagnosis and management of  
foodborne illnesses: a primer for physicians 
and other health-care professionals.”2 The 
latter document provides a series of  tables 
giving useful information about major food 
pathogens, including signs and symptoms, 
incubation periods, and appropriate laboratory 
tests and describes sample patient scenarios to 
help with the diagnostic process.
4.2.10.2. Isolate characterization 
Confer with the laboratory to determine 
subtyping methods available for the 
pathogen under study. Undertake subtyping 
as the specimens are submitted—don’t wait for 
a specific number of  specimens to accumulate 
before testing them. Tests such as PFGE and 
serotyping ideally are performed concurrently 
to reduce turnaround time. Recommended 
turnaround times are described in the 
Association of  Public Health Laboratories/
CIFOR “yardstick” project. Post results to 
national databases as quickly as possible.
4.2.10.3. Case interviews 
Quality exposure information usually is 
difficult to obtain and often is the major 
limiting factor of  pathogen-specific 
surveillance. Interview all patients with 
laboratory-diagnosed cases of  potentially 
foodborne disease as soon as case reports 
or laboratory isolates are received, when 
patient recall and motivation to cooperate 
with investigators is the greatest.
Obtain an exposure history consistent with the 
incubation period of  the pathogen identified 
(see http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks/
guide_fd.htm for a table of  incubation for the 
most common foodborne agents).
As appropriate to circumstances, construct 
the interview to include a mix of  question 
types that will collect the desired exposure 
information including 
• Specific close-ended questions about  
 exposures as a priori hypotheses to be  
 tested (including specific food items that  
 have been linked to previous outbreaks or  
 that could plausibly be associated with the  
 specific pathogen);
• Broad open-ended questions to capture  
 exposures that might not have been  
 considered; and
• Questions that elicit additional details,  
 such as brand and place of  purchase  
 or consumption, for some of  the highest  
 likelihood exposures.
Where possible, use standardized “core” 
questions and data elements used by other 
investigators to enhance data sharing and 
comparisons across jurisdictions. Experience 
can make one a better and more efficient 
















































interviewer. If  investigations are infrequent, 
achieving and maintaining proficiency 
can be difficult; centralizing the interview 
process reduces these problems and makes 
questionnaires easier to modify on the fly.
The CIFOR Clearinghouse (http://www.
cifor.us/clearinghouse/index.cfm) provides 
examples of  questionnaires used by various 
health departments to collect exposure 
information for different pathogens. Questions 
with a yes/no check-box format are efficient 
for collecting information about variables for 
which the expected frequency of  exposure 
is low. For example, because less than 20% 
of  the population is expected to eat raw 
spinach, asking only whether a case ate raw 
spinach should be sufficient to identify raw 
spinach as a potential vehicle. However, 
because more than 75% of  the population is 
expected to eat chicken, additional brand or 
source information is needed. Thus, using a 
hybrid approach for collecting basic exposure 
information about low-frequency exposures 
and more specific information about high-
frequency exposures may be the most effective 
approach. The use of  open-ended questions 
complicates electronic data entry and analysis. 
For jurisdictions that rely on electronic data 
entry at the local public health level for rapid 
communication with the state, answers to 
open-ended questions may need to be captured 
as text fields that can be reviewed as needed.
Routine collection of  detailed exposure 
information allows for the evaluation of  
clusters in “real time.” However, most public 
health agencies do not have sufficient resources 
to conduct such interviews for every case. 
Given the reality of  these resource limitations, 
a two-step interviewing process may represent 
the best alternative approach. When first 
reported, all cases should be interviewed 
with a standardized questionnaire to collect 
exposure information about limited high-
risk exposures specific to the pathogen. 
When the novelty of  the subtype pattern, 
geographic distribution of  cases, or ongoing 
accumulation of  new cases indicate the 
cluster represents a potential outbreak 
associated with a commercially distributed 
food product, all cases in the cluster should 
be interviewed using a detailed exposure 
questionnaire as part of  a “dynamic cluster 
investigation” (see Chapter 5).
4.2.10.4. Data analysis 
Use daily, automated laboratory reporting 
and analysis systems, where possible, to 
compare disease agent frequencies at multiple 
levels of  specificity (e.g., species, serotype 
or other subtype, more stringent subtype) 
and in subgroups of  the population (defined 
by selected demographic characteristics) to 
historical frequencies and national trends.
Determine a “cluster” on the basis of  the 
novelty of  a subtype pattern; determine 
increased occurrence of  a relatively common 
subtype on the basis of  geographic spread, 
temporal distribution, or demographic pattern 
of  cases. The number of  cases needed to form 
a cluster cannot be absolutely defined; this is a 
area of  active public health research.
4.2.10.5. Communication 
Establish and use routine procedures for 
communicating among epidemiology, 
laboratory, and environmental health branches 
within an agency and between local and state 
agencies. Rapidly post subtyping results to 
PulseNet, and note the detection of  clusters 
to PulseNet and Foodborne Outbreak 
listserves to improve communication and 
cooperation within and among local, state, 
and federal public health agencies. Poor 
coordination within and among agencies 
limits the effectiveness of  pathogen-specific 
surveillance.
4.2.11. Multijurisdictional Considerations 
for Pathogen-Specific Surveillance
Because pathogen-specific surveillance does 
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Notification or complaint systems are intended 
to receive, triage, and respond to reports from 
the community about possible foodborne 
disease events to conduct prevention and 
control activities. Programs range from ad 
hoc response to unsolicited phone reports to 
systematic solicitation and interview of  and 
response to community reports.
4.3.2. Background
Receiving and responding to reports of  disease 
in the community has been a basic function of  
public health agencies since their inception. 
Whereas reports of  diseases caused by specific 
pathogens generally follow specific disease 
reporting rules, complaints of  illnesses by 
consumers associated with specific events or 
establishments generally have been referred 
to the agency responsible for licensing the 
establishment. These consumer complaints 
lead to the identification of  most localized 
foodborne disease outbreaks and are the only 
method for detecting outbreaks caused by 
agents, such as norovirus, for which there is no 
pathogen-specific surveillance.
4.3.3. Group Illness/Complaint Reporting
Group illness/complaint reporting involves 
passive collection of  reports of  possible 
foodborne illness from individuals or groups. 
Reporting is of  two basic types, each with its 
own dynamics and requirements:
• Reports from any individual or group  
 who observes a pattern of  illness affecting a  
 group of  people, usually following a  
 common exposure. Examples include  
 reports of  illness among multiple persons  
 eating at the same restaurant or attending  
 the same wedding and reports from health- 
 care providers of  unusual patterns of  illness,  
 such as multiple patients with bloody  
 diarrhea in a short time span.
• Multiple independent complaints about  
 illness in single individuals.
Group illness and independent complaints may 
be used together and linked with data obtained 
through pathogen-specific surveillance. In 
contrast to pathogen-specific surveillance, 
reporting does not require identification of  a 
specific agent or syndrome or contact with the 
health-care system.
4.3.4. Epidemiology Process
Notification of  group illnesses or independent 
complaints can occur at the local, regional, 
state, or national level. Some jurisdictions 
mandate reporting of  “unusual clusters of  
disease.” Reports from health-care providers of  
unusual clusters are triaged; occurrence of  the 
same disease is confirmed; data are analyzed; 
investigations are initiated; and control 
measures are implemented as appropriate. 
For reports of  group illness associated with an 
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not depend on geographic clustering, it is 
more sensitive to detection of  widespread, 
low-level contamination events than 
surveillance through notification/complaint 
systems. Outbreaks detected by pathogen-
specific surveillance are more likely to span 
multiple jurisdictions. See Chapter 7 for 
Multijurisdictional Investigation Guidelines.
4.2.12. Indicators/Measures for Pathogen-
Specific Surveillance
The success of  pathogen-specific surveillance 
at detecting and resolving common-source 
outbreaks depends on multiple interrelated 
processes. Indicators for assessing and 
improving surveillance programs can be found 
in Chapter 8.

















































event or venue, investigation generally involves 
obtaining lists of  attendees, confirming ill 
persons have the same disease, obtaining 
menus, interviewing cases, performing a cohort 
or case-control study, and collecting food and 
patient specimens (see Chapter 5). Outbreaks 
detected in this manner may be linked to other 
outbreaks or to other cases in the community 
by a variety of  processes, such as PulseNet 
or eFORS, and communication conducted 
through Epi-X or OutbreakNet.
Two or more individuals with a common 
exposure identified through interview of  
independent complaints are used to identify 
clusters of  illness in much the same manner as 
common agents are used in pathogen-specific 
surveillance. Exposure information captured 
in the initial complaint generally is limited and 
biased toward exposures shortly before onset 
of  symptoms. Therefore, routine interviews 
are needed for this process to be robust. In 
the absence of  common, suspicious exposures 
shared by two or more cases, complaints of  
individual illness with nonspecific symptoms, 
such as diarrhea or vomiting generally are not 
worth pursuing.
4.3.5. Public Health Laboratory Process
Laboratory activities are not essential for 
primary detection of  outbreaks by this 
process but are essential for determining 
etiology, linking separate events during the 
investigation, and monitoring the efficacy of  
control measures (see chapters 5 and 6). Due 
to public health laboratory testing, links may 
be seen across jurisdictional boundaries, and 
broader, even national outbreaks may then be 
detected. For instance, an outbreak associated 
with a particular restaurant may come to the 
attention of  authorities solely on the basis of  
a report by a customer who observed illnesses 
among multiple fellow patrons. Laboratory 
testing and identification of  Salmonella 
Typhimurium as the causative agent can result 
in refinement of  the case definition used in 
this investigation, in additional testing and 
restrictions for workers found to be carriers, 
or in connection of  this outbreak with other 
outbreaks from a contaminated commodity.
4.3.6. Strengths of Notification/Complaint 
Systems for Outbreak Detection
• Because detection does not depend on  
 identification of  an agent, this system is able  
 to detect outbreaks from any cause, known  
 or unknown. Thus, the notification/ 
 complaint system is one of  the best methods  
 for detecting non-reportable pathogens and  
 new or emerging agents.
• For event-related notifications only: recall of   
 food items eaten and other exposures by  
 cases is usually good for reported events  
 because specific exposures associated with  
 the event (such as menus) can normally be  
 determined and specifically included in the  
 interview.
• Notification and complaint surveillance  
 systems are inherently faster than pathogen- 
 specific surveillance because the chain  
 of  events related to laboratory testing and  
 reporting is not required.
4.3.7. Limitations of Notification/
Complaint Systems
• Notification of  illness in groups generally
is less sensitive to widespread low-level 
contamination events than is pathogen-
specific surveillance because recognition 
by an individual of  a person-place-time 
connection among cases is required.
• The value of  complaints about single 
possible cases of  foodborne disease in 
detecting outbreaks is limited by the 
exposure information used to link cases, 
and by the lack of  specific agent or disease 
information to exclude unrelated cases. 
The illness reported by individuals might 
or might not be foodborne, and illness 
presentation might or might not be typical. 

















































For any true outbreak, the inability to 
identify an agent makes misclassification 
of  cases more likely. Misclassification of  
cases makes identification of  an association 
between an outbreak and an exposure more 
difficult.
• Without a detailed food history (either 
in the initial report or follow up interview), 
surveillance of  independent complaints is 
sensitive only for short incubation (generally 
chemical or toxin-mediated) illness or illness 
with unique symptoms because most persons 
associate illness with the last meal before 
onset of  symptoms, and are thus unlikely 
to identify the correct exposure. This is 
not a limitation if  routine interviews are 
conducted.
4.3.8. Key Determinants of Successful 
Notification/Complaint Systems
The following factors drive interpretation of  
notification/complaint surveillance data, affect 
the success of  investigations, and form the 
basis for best practices.
4.3.8.1. Sensitivity of  case or event detection 
The dynamics of  outbreak detection differ 
somewhat for notification involving groups 
of  illnesses and collection of  independent 
complaints. Detection of  outbreaks by 
notification of  group illness is limited 
only by the severity of  the illness, public 
awareness of  where to report the illness, 
ease and availability of  the reporting 
process, and investigation resources (to 
determine whether the clusters are in fact 
outbreaks). In contrast, detection of  clusters 
of  illnesses from independent complaints 
relies on analysis by the public health 
agency of  an entire group of  complaints 
collected over time. As with pathogen-specific 
surveillance, the size and number of  outbreaks 
detectable using independent complaints 
as primary surveillance data are driven by 
the number of  individual cases reported, 
uniqueness of  the illness or reported exposure, 
sensitivity and specificity of  the interview 
process, and methods used to evaluate 
exposure data.
4.3.8.2. Background prevalence of  disease— 
group complaints 
When a group illness is reported, some 
of  the cases may be ill for a reason other 
than a common group exposure. The 
likelihood of  this occurring depends on 
the background prevalence of  the disease 
or complaint. For example, unrelated cases 
of  diarrhea may inadvertently be grouped 
with true outbreak-related cases because at 
any one time a substantial proportion of  
the population “normally” has diarrhea. 
Inclusion of  misclassified cases (i.e., cases 
not associated with the outbreak) hinders the 
detection of  associations between exposures 
and disease, thus decreasing the likelihood 
of  discovery of  a common source. When 
reported clusters are small, the possibility 
must be considered that the reported cluster 
results from coincidence rather than causal 
association (type I probability error—i.e., 
detection of  an association between an 
exposure and a disease where one does not 
exist). With unusual syndromes, such as 
neurologic symptoms associated with botulism 
or ciguatera fish poisoning, the likelihood of  
misclassification and type 1 probability error is 
low. The system specificity may be increased by 
identifying a specific agent or disease marker 
or by increasing the specificity of  the symptom 
information (e.g., bloody diarrhea or specific 
mean duration of  illness) or by obtaining 
exposure information.
4.3.8.3. Sensitivity and specificity of  case interviews—
group complaints 
Interviews of  cases for group complaints 
capture two types of  information:
• Specific exposures associated with the  
 reported event and
• Individual food histories to rule out alternate 
 hypotheses and exclude misclassified cases.
















































Because exposures associated with 
group events are relatively few and can 
be described specifically, recall tends to 
be good and timing is less an issue than 
with pathogen-specific surveillance or 
independent complaints. In studies of  food 
recall accuracy, the positive predictive value 
of  individual food items ranged from 73% 
to 97%.3,4 The negative predictive value 
ranged from 79% to 98%. Highly distinctive 
foods tended to be more accurately reported. 
Nonetheless, the more specific exposure-
related questions are, the better recall will be. 
For example, cases asked whether they “ate 
German potato salad” at a particular event 
are more likely to remember than if  they 
were asked whether they ate “salad” or asked 
to list the foods they ate. Interviews of  food-
preparation staff  additionally provide valuable 
information because they can list ingredients 
that cases are not likely to recall or even know 
about and that a standardized questionnaire 
would not include. A good example is the 1998 
international outbreak of  shigellosis associated 
with parsley added as a garnish to restaurant-
served meals.
The second type of  information gathered 
in the investigation of  group complaints, 
individual food histories, has the same 
challenges as information collected for 
outbreaks detected through pathogen-specific 
surveillance (i.e., includes a broad range 
of  potential exposures among cases and is 
associated with difficulties in recall). The 
problems may be even greater because no 
causative agent has been identified that would 
allow investigators to focus on exposures 
previously associated with that pathogen. 
Hence, interviews must be done promptly for 
this aspect of  the case interview to be effective.
4.3.9. Notification/Complaint Systems—
Model Practices
This section lists model practices for 
notification and complaint systems. The 
practices used in any particular situation 
depend on a host of  factors, including the 
circumstances specific to the outbreak (e.g., 
the pathogen and number and distribution 
of  cases), staff  expertise, structure of  the 
investigating agency, and agency resources. 
For example, reports of  bloody diarrhea 
may warrant aggressive case identification 
and investigation to minimize serious illness 
and death. A cluster of  potential norovirus 
infections may be investigated less aggressively 
or not investigated at all. Although these 
practices have not been systematically 
evaluated under different circumstances, 
experiences from successful investigations 
support their value. Investigators are 
encouraged to use a combination of  these 
practices as is appropriate to the specific 
outbreak.
4.3.9.1. Interviews related to individual complaints 
Detection of  outbreaks based on multiple 
individual complaints requires a system for 
recording complaints and comparing food 
histories reported by the individuals.
A detailed 5-day exposure history is essential 
for individual complaints because common 
exposures are the sole mechanism to link 
cases. Although outbreaks caused by agents 
with short incubation periods may be able 
to be identified on the basis of  information 
provided during initial complaints only, 
the signal-to-noise ratio would be low, and 
investigations would tend to be nonproductive. 
Therefore, a detailed interview, using a 
standardized form that includes both food and 
nonfood exposures, is preferred.
When beginning an investigation based on 
multiple individual complaints, the best 
approach is to collect a 5-day exposure history. 
Given the ubiquity of  norovirus infections, the 
investigator should pay particular attention 
to exposures in the 24–48 hours before onset 
whenever norovirus is suspected. As more 
information about the likely etiologic agent 
4.3. Notification/Complaint Systems

















































is collected, this approach can be modified. 
The complaint and subsequent interviews can 
lead to a hypothesis about the pathogen that 
leads to a different time frame for the exposure 
history (e.g., vomiting leads to a different 
hypothesis and exposure history time frame 
than does bloody diarrhea).
Health departments may choose to collect 
specimens from independent complaints or 
encourage patients to seek health care.
4.3.9.2 Follow-up of  commercial establishments 
named in individual complaints of  potential  
foodborne illness 
Health department staff  might be required 
by local or state statute to investigate any 
commercial food establishment named by a 
person reporting a potential foodborne illness. 
However, because complainants often focus 
on foods prepared or eaten at commercial 
food establishments or the last meal eaten 
rather than other meals, investigation of  the 
named establishment might not contribute to 
identifying the source of  the reported illness or 
be the best use of  limited health department 
resources.
In jurisdictions where visits are not required 
to every restaurant named in illness 
complaints, health department staff  must 
decide whether investigation of  a commercial 
food establishment is likely to be beneficial. 
To make this decision, investigators should 
consider details of  the complainant’s illness 
and the foods eaten at the establishment. In 
the following situations, investigation of  a 
named commercial food establishment might 
be warranted:
• The confirmed diagnosis and/or clinical
symptoms are consistent with the foods eaten 
and the timing of  illness onset (e.g., a person 
in whom salmonellosis is diagnosed reports 
eating poorly cooked eggs 2 days before 
becoming ill).
• The complainant observed specific food 
preparation or serving procedures likely 
to lead to a food-safety problem at the 
establishment.
• Two or more persons with a similar illness
or diagnosis implicate a food, meal, or 
establishment and have no other shared food 
history or evident source of  exposure.
As noted below in Section 4.3.9.6, regular 
review of  individual complaints is critical 
in recognizing that multiple persons have 
a similar illness or diagnosis and share a 
common exposure.
Clues that a follow-up investigation of  a food 
establishment is unlikely to be productive 
include:
• Confirmed diagnosis and/or clinical
symptoms that are not consistent with the 
foods eaten at the establishment and/or 
the onset of  illness (e.g., bloody diarrhea 
associated with a well-cooked hamburger 
eaten the night before illness onset).
• Signs and symptoms (or confirmed
diagnoses) among affected individuals that 
suggest they might not have the same illness.
• Ill persons who are not able to provide
adequate information for investigation 
including date and time of  onset of  illness, 
symptoms, or complete food histories.
• Repeated complaints by the same
individual(s) for which prior investigations 
revealed no significant findings.
4.3.9.3. Interviews related to reported illnesses in 
groups 
“Complaints” of  illness among groups 
often are tantamount to outbreak reports. A 
report of  illness among 8–12 people who ate 
together merits a different response than an 
isolated report of  diarrhea.
Focus interviews on the event shared by 
members of  the group. However, be aware 
they may have more than one event in 
















































common, and explore that possibility. For 
example, an outbreak associated with a wedding 
reception might actually result from the 
rehearsal dinner, which involves many of  the 
same people. Interviews should ask about other 
potential exposures either for the interviewee 
or for others he or she might have contacted, 
such as child-care attendance, employment as 
a food worker, or ill family members.
4.3.9.4. Clinical specimens and food samples  
related to group illness 
Obtain clinical specimens from members 
of  the ill group. If  the presumed exposure 
involves food, collect and store—but do not 
test—food from the implicated event. Store 
the food appropriately, but generally test the 
food only after epidemiologic implication. 
Food samples that are frozen when collected 
should remain frozen until examined. Samples 
should be analyzed within 48 hours after 
receipt. If  sample analysis is not possible 
within 48 hours, then perishable foods should 
be frozen (–40 to –80oC). Storage under 
refrigeration can be longer than 48 hours, 
if  necessary, but the length of  the storage 
period is food dependent. Because certain 
bacteria (e.g., Campylobacter jejuni) die when 
frozen, affecting laboratory results, immediate 
examination of  samples without freezing is 
encouraged. Food samples can be collected as 
part of  the process of  removing suspected food 
from service.
Note: Food testing has inherent limitations 
because most testing is agent-specific, and 
demonstration of  an agent in food, especially 
viruses, is not always possible or necessary 
before implementation of  public health action. 
Detection of  microbes or toxins in food is 
most important for outbreaks involving 
preformed toxins such as enterotoxins of  
Staphylococcus aureus or Bacillus cereus, 
where detection of  toxin or toxin-producing 
organisms in clinical specimens frequently 
is problematic. In addition, organisms such 
as S. aureus and Clostridium perfringens, which are 
commonly found in the human intestinal tract, 
can confound interpretation of  culture results.
Specific contaminants or foods might require 
special collection and testing techniques 
and demonstration of  an agent in food is 
not always possible. Furthermore, results of  
testing are often difficult to interpret. Because 
contaminants in food change with time, 
samples collected during an investigation 
might not be representative of  those ingested 
when the outbreak occurred. Subsequent 
handling or processing of  food might result in 
the death of  microorganisms, multiplication 
of  microorganisms originally present in low 
levels, or introduction of  new contaminants. If  
contamination of  the food is not uniform, the 
sample collected might miss the contaminated 
portion. Finally, because food usually is not 
sterile, microorganisms can be isolated from 
samples but not be responsible for the illness 
under investigation. As a result, food testing 
should not be undertaken as a matter of  
routine, but based on meaningful associations.
If  food testing is determined to be 
necessary—for example if  a food has been 
epidemiologically implicated—official reference 
testing methods must be used at a minimum 
for regulated products (e.g., pasteurized eggs or 
commercially distributed beef).
4.3.9.5. Establishment of  etiology through  
laboratory testing 
Even though the etiology is not essential for 
primary linkage of  cases, as it is for pathogen-
specific surveillance, information about 
agents is important for understanding the 
outbreak and for implementation of  rational 
intervention and facilitates establishing 
links to other outbreaks or sporadic cases 
by PulseNet and eFORS. Further information 
about investigation methods and establishing 
etiology is available in Chapter 5.
4.3.9.6. Regular review of  interview data 
Review interview data regularly to look for 
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trends or commonalities. Compile interview 
data in a single database, and examine daily 
for exposure clustering. Comparison with 
exposure data obtained through pathogen-
specific surveillance interviews might reveal a 
potential connection among cases and increase 
the sensitivity of  both surveillance systems for 
detecting outbreaks.
4.3.9.7. Improvement of  interagency cooperation and 
communication 
Improve cooperation among agencies that 
receive illness complaints (e.g., agriculture 
agencies, facility licensing agencies, poison 
control centers). Regularly communicate 
with these agencies, and ensure they have 
current contact information for your staff. 
Because complaints might be made to multiple 
agencies, having a robust method of  sharing 
information is important.
4.3.9.8. Other potentially useful tools 
Check complaint information against 
national databases, such as the USDA/FSIS 
Consumer Complaint Monitoring System 
(CCMS).
4.3.9.9. Simplification of  reporting process 
To increase surveillance sensitivity, make the 
reporting process as simple as possible for 
the public. For example, provide one 24/7 toll-
free telephone number or one website. Such 
systems allow callers to leave information that 
public health staff  can follow up.
4.3.9.10. Increased public awareness of   
reporting process 
Promote reporting by routine press releases 
that educate the public about food safety, 
and advertise the contact phone number or 
website for reports of  illness. Use a telephone 
number that easily can be remembered or 
found in the telephone directory. Train food 
managers and workers about the importance 
of  reporting unusual patterns of  illness 
among workers or customers and food code 
requirements for disease reporting.
4.3.9.11. Centralized reporting or report review process 
Set up the reporting process so all reports 
go through one person or one individual 
routinely reviews reports. Centralization 
of  the reporting or review process increases 
the likelihood that patterns among individual 
complaints and seemingly unrelated outbreaks 
will be detected.
4.3.9.12. Maintenance of  contact with other 
organizations that might receive complaints 
Consumers may submit complaints to multiple 
organizations, such as poison control centers 
or grocery stores. Identify the organizations 
in your community that are likely to receive 
complaints, and maintain routine contact 
with them. Ideally, set up a database that 
public health agencies can access and review.
4.3.10. Multijurisdictional Considerations 
for Notification/Complaint Systems
Outbreaks discovered through notification/
complaints might span multiple jurisdictions, 
as evidenced by the 1998 parsley-associated 
shigellosis outbreak and the 2006 multistate 
lettuce-associated E. coli O157:H7 outbreak 
in taco restaurants. See Chapter 7 for 
Multijurisdictional Investigation Guidelines.
4.3.11. Indicators/Measures
The success of  notification/complaint-based 
surveillance systems at detecting and resolving 
common-source outbreaks depends on 
multiple interrelated processes. Indicators for 
assessing and improving surveillance programs 
can be found in Chapter 8.

















































The utility of  syndromic surveillance has not 
been established. In theory, the electronic 
collection of  nonspecific health indicators 
could permit rapid detection of  significant 
trends, including outbreaks. In practice, the 
right mix of  sensitivity and specificity has 
proven difficult to find, and the utility of  such 
systems may be marginal.
4.4.2. Background
Syndromic surveillance is a relatively new 
concept, developed in the 1990s and expanded 
after the 2001 postal anthrax attacks in an 
attempt to improve readiness for bioterrorism. 
One of  the first systems implemented was in 
New York City in 2001.
4.4.3. Reporting
Syndromic surveillance typically relies on 
automated extraction of  health information:
• Preclinical (i.e., not dependent on access 
to health care, consequently less specific 
and potentially less useful)—school and 
work absenteeism, nurse help-lines, sales of  
over-the-counter drugs, complaints to water 
companies, calls to poison control centers.
• Clinical prediagnostic (i.e., requires contact 
with the health-care system but does not rely 
on a full workup or laboratory confirmation 
and, therefore, takes less time)—emergency 
department chief  complaint, ambulance 
dispatch, lab test orders.
• Postdiagnostic data—hospital discharge
codes (ICD-9, ICD-10).
4.4.4. Epidemiology Process
Epidemiology or emergency preparedness 
groups evaluate alerts triggered by the 
syndromic surveillance system. The 
effectiveness of  syndromic surveillance 
in detecting outbreaks has not been 
demonstrated. Presumably, cases would be 
interviewed and exposures determined if  an 
alert were determined likely to represent a true 
outbreak.
4.4.5. Laboratory Process
Laboratories do not play a direct role in 
syndromic surveillance. Laboratories would be 
involved during epidemiologic investigations 
triggered by a syndromic surveillance signal.
4.4.6. Strengths of Syndromic Surveillance
• In theory, syndromic surveillance has 
the potential to identify clusters of  disease 
before definitive diagnosis and reporting, 
thus generating a faster signal than can be 
expected with pathogen-specific surveillance.
• As with notification/complaint systems, 
outbreaks from any cause, known or 
unknown, potentially can be detected. 
Included are clusters of  cases identified with 
discharge diagnoses that include specific 
agents not part of  standard surveillance.
• Syndromic surveillance may be able to 
detect large, undiagnosed events, such as 
an increase in gastrointestinal illness among 
persons of  all ages consistent with norovirus, 
an increase in diarrheal illness among young 
children consistent with rotavirus, and the 
arrival of  epidemic influenza.
• Most syndromic surveillance systems have 
been built with automated electronic data 
transfer. This infrastructure should be useful 
for other types of  surveillance and public 
health activities.
4.4.7. Limitations of Syndromic 
Surveillance
• Lack of  specificity for most syndromic 
surveillance indicators in the area of  
foodborne disease makes for an unfavorable 
signal-to-noise ratio, meaning that only the 
largest events would be detected, and many 
false-positive signals would be expected. 
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Responding to false-positive signals drains an 
agency’s resources substantially.
• Evaluating a signal usually means cross-
checking it with routine surveillance 
reports, meaning it cannot replace routine 
surveillance.
• More specific signals, such as discharge 
diagnoses, are less timely and do not appear 
to offer advantage over standard surveillance 
methods.
• The usefulness of  syndromic surveillance has
not been demonstrated for foodborne 
disease. After examination of  2.5 million 
patient records in its first year of  operation, 
the New York City surveillance system 
identified 18 diarrhea or vomiting alerts 
during 3 outbreak periods. Five institutional 
outbreaks were identified during one of  
these periods, but whether the data were 
sufficiently specific to allow for public health 
intervention is not clear.5,6,7
• The cost of  developing syndromic 
surveillance systems is substantial, and 
if  development occurs at the expense 
of  maintaining or upgrading routine 
surveillance, degraded, rather than 
enhanced, surveillance results.
4.4.8. Key Determinants of Successful 
Syndromic Surveillance Systems
The following factors drive the interpretation 
of  syndromic surveillance data, affect the 
success of  investigations, and form the basis for 
best practices.
4.4.8.1. Specificity and speed 
Although the potential speed of  syndromic 
surveillance is its chief  strength, speed is 
inversely proportional to the specificity of  
the indicator disease information. Preclinical 
information, such as sales of  over-the-counter 
drugs is generally available sooner and is less 
specific than clinical, prediagnostic signals 
(such as laboratory test orders). Prediagnostic 
signals, in turn, are available sooner and are 
less specific than postdiagnostic signals (such as 
hospital discharge data).
Lack of  specificity at any level results in both 
type 1 probability error (the suggestion of  an 
association between a signal and a significant 
health event when, in fact, none exists) and 
type 2 probability error (the lack of  signal 
suggests a disease event is not occurring, 
when, in fact, it is). Less specificity means 
that more cases are needed to overcome 
background noise and that false-positive 
alerts are likely.
The most specific signals—hospital discharge 
data—include both nonspecific diagnoses (e.g., 
diarrhea of  infectious origin, ICD-9 009.3) 
and diagnoses based on identification-specific 
agents (e.g., Salmonella gastroenteritis, ICD-9 
003.0). Discharge signals for reportable disease 
such as salmonellosis should not offer any time 
advantage over standard methods because
• The diagnoses requires agent identification 
and would have the same limitations as 
pathogen-specific surveillance,
• Standard investigation probably would be 
required for public health action, and
• Identification of  illness may precede 
 discharge.
Signals from rare, specific syndromes without 
laboratory confirmation, such as botulism-like 
syndrome, should be as effective as pathogen-
specific surveillance. This is the basis for the 
national botulism surveillance program at 
CDC, which provides emergency clinical, 
epidemiologic, and microbiologic consultation 
and antitoxin treatment for people with 
suspected botulism because of  the extremely 
serious nature of  that illness and the possibility 
that one case might herald other cases from the 
same exposure8 (http://www.cdc.gov/nczved/
dfbmd/disease_listing/files/botulism.pdf).

















































4.4.8.2. Personal information privacy issues 
In a survey on implementation of  syndromic 
surveillance systems, more than half  (54.2%) 
of  respondents reported some or substantial 
problems caused by real or perceived patient 
confidentiality concerns and the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA). Respondents noted that many 
health-care providers and medical staff  did 
not understand HIPAA and so tended to 
give minimal patient information. Questions 
also were raised about whether syndromic 
surveillance falls under the same regulations 
as reports of  diagnosis-related disease. For 
example, whether health departments have the 
legal authority to collect these data is not always 
clear. Most respondents were using current 
disease reporting regulations to cover syndromic 
surveillance. Many respondents believed more 
specific syndromic indicators are needed 
to incorporate them into regulations. Most 
agencies that had implemented a syndromic 
surveillance system used deidentified data, 
which slows investigations of  positive signals 
from the surveillance system.9 
4.4.9. Practices for Improving Syndromic 
Surveillance
Because the usefulness of  syndromic 
surveillance for detecting foodborne 
disease events has not been demonstrated, 
the need for additional investment is not 
clear, especially if  these systems compete 
for resources with under-resourced 
standard surveillance systems. If  an agency 
implements or seeks to improve a syndromic 
surveillance system, it needs to consider the 
following practices:
• Better electronic and process integration 
with standard surveillance systems may 
improve usefulness.
• Syndromic surveillance data are most useful 
when corroborated with data from multiple 
sources (e.g., increased sales of  over-the-
counter diarrheal medicines associated 
with rise in emergency department chief  
complaints of  diarrhea). As historical data 
accumulate, fine-tuning detection algorithms 
to reduce false-positive signals might be 
possible.
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Chapter
5
Investigation of Clusters 
and Outbreaks
B
efore development of pathogen-specific surveillance, 
foodborne disease outbreaks were typically recognized 
because of the occurrence of large numbers of illnesses 
among persons with a known common exposure. The development 
of pathogen-specific surveillance through public health laboratories 
has allowed the detection of widely dispersed outbreaks caused by 
commercially distributed food products. Outbreaks identified through 
pathogen-specific surveillance are initially recognized as clusters of 
cases defined by subtype characteristics. Distribution of these cases 
by time, space, and personal characteristics provides important clues 
about whether the cases are likely to represent an outbreak from a 
common source of exposure. However, only a systematic investigation 
of the cluster can confirm whether it actually is an outbreak and, if so, 
whether it is a foodborne disease outbreak. Many agents responsible 
for outbreaks of foodborne disease also can be transmitted by other 
routes, such as water and animals, and from person to person.


































Identifying the route of  transmission is 
important to many outbreak investigations 
and critical for implementing effective control 
measures (see Chapter 6) but is not always 
possible through agent identification or clinical 
presentation.
When a potential foodborne disease outbreak 
is first detected or reported, investigators will 
not know whether the disease is foodborne, 
waterborne, or attributable to other causes. 
Investigators must keep an open mind in the 
early stages of  the investigation to ensure that 
potential causes are not prematurely ruled 
out. Even though these Guidelines focus on 
foodborne disease, many of  the investigation 
methods described in this chapter apply to a 
variety of  enteric and other illnesses, regardless 
of  source of  contamination.
5.0. Introduction
5.1.1. Importance of Speed and Accuracy
Speed and accuracy are the two key qualities 
of  all outbreak investigations. The investigation 
team cannot afford to sacrifice one for the 
other. The team motto should be Fast and Right. 
The importance of  speed and accuracy are 
illustrated below.
•	 “Removing	the	pump	handle.” 
Stopping an outbreak in its tracks and 
preventing illnesses are the most obvious 
goals of  outbreak investigations. From this 
perspective, there are 3 types of  outbreaks.
o A localized one-time event, such as a specific food-
preparation error or ill food worker at a food-
service establishment. By the time these 
outbreaks are recognized, the event may 
be over. However, ensuring an ill worker 
does not continue to spread disease or 
preventing secondary spread of  cases 
might be possible.
o Widespread distribution of  a perishable 
commodity, such as spinach or tomatoes. Because 
product may still be in the marketplace 
when the outbreak is detected, the faster 
the source can be identified, the more likely 
illness from exposure to that source will 
be prevented. Given the large quantities 
of  contaminated product often involved 
in these events, even a limited recall could 
significantly benefit public health.
o Contamination of  shelf-stable commodities, 
such as canned or frozen foods or peanut butter, or 
persistent environmental contamination at a farm, 
food-processing facility, or restaurant. The speed 
with which the source is identified and 
the effectiveness of  a recall are directly 
related to the number of  people exposed 
to the contaminated commodity and the 
ultimate size of  the outbreak.
•	 Preventing future outbreaks by identifying  
 the circumstances that led to contamination.
Without a prompt, complete, and accurate 
investigation, the circumstances that led to 
contamination may not be identified, and 
the opportunity to prevent future outbreaks 
will be lost.
•	 Identifying	new	hazards.	
Outbreak investigations identify new 
agents, new food vehicles, new agent–food 
interactions, and other unsuspected gaps 
in the food-safety system. Prompt and 
thorough investigations while memories 
are fresh and specimens are available are 
much more likely to successfully rule out 
known hazards and identify new hazards. 
Presenting the information to the sector of  
the food industry involved can be critical for 
encouraging changes in procedures.
•	 Maintaining	the	public’s	confidence.	
Foodborne disease outbreaks undermine the 
public’s confidence in the food supply and in 
5.1. Characteristics of Outbreak Investigations


































5.1. Characteristics of Outbreak Investigations
the public health system established to ensure 
food safety. Rapidly identifying outbreaks, 
determining their source, and limiting their 
scope are critical to restoring confidence in 
the food supply and food-safety system. On 
the other hand, inaccurate conclusions about 
the source undermine public confidence 
and harm food producers not involved in 
the cause of  the outbreak. For example, 
strawberries from California were implicated 
as the source of  a multistate outbreak of  
cyclosporiasis that actually was caused by 
raspberries from Guatemala. Media reports 
based on the erroneous conclusions led to 
millions of  dollars in lost strawberry sales, 
even though the error was rapidly corrected. 
This situation probably could have been 
avoided if  investigators had considered 
results from simultaneous investigations 
in other localities. Maintaining close 
communication and coordination among 
members of  the investigation team and with 
other public health officials is the best way to 
avoid this type of  error without delaying the 
investigation. See section 6.6.1 for additional 
discussion about the importance of  collecting 
sufficient information before taking action.
•	 Empowering	the	public.	
Even though releasing premature and 
incorrect conclusions to the public can be 
disastrous, and alerting the public about 
food-safety concerns too often can lead to 
warning fatigue, withholding or delaying the 
release of  information the public may need 
to protect itself  is inadvisable. Public health 
agencies are obligated to inform the public 
or others who need to know as quickly as 
possible. Generally, ask yourself,
o “Will the release of  this information 
allow consumers to take steps to protect 
themselves?”
o “If  the wrong product is identified, what 
will the negative impact be on public 
health, as well as on the industry and 
consumer confidence?”
and ultimately
o “Would I want my mother or 
grandmother to know about this hazard?”
5.1.2. Principles of Investigation
5.1.2.1. Outbreak detection 
Outbreaks typically are detected through 
three general methods: pathogen-specific 
surveillance, notification/complaint systems, 
and syndromic surveillance (see Chapter 
4). After receipt of  a suspicious foodborne 
illness complaint associated with a particular 
event or establishment or the detection of  an 
unusual cluster of  isolates through pathogen-
specific surveillance, conduct a preliminary 
investigation to determine whether the 
reported illnesses may be part of  an outbreak. 
Preliminary investigations need to assess the 
epidemiologic context of  the reported illnesses 
to determine whether they might be part of  an 
outbreak.
5.1.2.2. Investigation leadership 
Leadership of  the investigation should reflect 
the focus of  investigation activities and may 
change over time.
During an investigation, the focus of  activities 
may shift among the following:
• Laboratory studies to identify an agent, 
including microbiologic studies and applied 
food-safety research;
• Epidemiologic studies to identify 
transmission routes, exposure sources, or 
food vehicles and risk factors for disease;
• Regulatory investigations of  food-production 
sources and distribution chains to identify 
where, during production of  the food, 
contamination occurred and facilitate recall 
of  food items;
• Environmental evaluations of  food 
production, processing, and service facilities 
to identify routes of  contamination and 
contributing factors; and


































• Communication of  investigation findings 
to the public and the food industry to 
support control and prevention measures.
5.1.2.3. Communication and coordination 
Coordinate activities and set up good lines 
of  communication between individuals 
and agencies involved in the investigation. 
Guidelines for coordinating multijurisdictional 
investigations are summarized in Chapter 
7. Investigations are rarely linear. Although 
most procedures for investigating outbreaks 
follow a logical process—from determining 
whether an outbreak is occurring to identifying 
and controlling the source—most actual 
investigations feature multiple concurrent 
steps. Maintaining close communication and 
coordination among members of  the outbreak 
investigation team is the best way to ensure 
concurrent activities do not interfere with each 
other and important investigation steps are  
not forgotten.
5.1.2.4. Hypothesis generation 
To narrow the focus of  an investigation 
and most effectively use time and resources, 
investigators should begin to generate 
hypotheses about potential sources of  the 
outbreak during the earliest stages of  the 
investigation and refine them as they receive 
information. Key steps in this process include 
the following:
• Review previously identified risk factors and 
exposures for the disease;
• Examine the descriptive epidemiology 
of  cases to identify person, place, or 
time characteristics that might suggest a 
particular exposure;
• Interview in detail the affected persons or a 
sample of  affected persons to identify 
unusual exposures or commonalities among 
cases. These interviews can be conducted 
by a single interviewer or by multiple 
interviewers using standardized forms and 
interview techniques. Although a single 
interviewer might recognize uncommon 
exposures mentioned by multiple cases, 
completing these hypothesis-generating 
interviews might take several days. 
Multiple interviewers can interview cases 
simultaneously, but they then need to 
compare notes to recognize uncommon 
exposures mentioned by multiple cases. This 
latter process forms the basis of  the dynamic 
cluster investigation described below.
On the basis of  this information, investigators 
can identify possible exposures for further 
evaluation by epidemiologic, laboratory, 
or environmental studies. In practice, the 
generation and testing of  hypotheses is an 
iterative process, with the hypothesis modified 
as more information is obtained. For example, 
an outbreak involving a high proportion 
of  cases among preschool-aged children 
might suggest exposure to a food product 
marketed to young children, such as a cereal 
product or snack food. Identification of  a 
specific product, such as a certain vegetable 
powder-coated snack, by several cases should 
prompt re-interview of  other cases to identify 
unrecognized exposures to the product. 
Concordance of  exposures among a substantial 
proportion of  the cases could lead directly 
to product testing and recall or to a focused 
epidemiologic study to establish the association.
5.1.2.5. Standardized data collection forms 
The use of  standardized forms for collecting 
exposure histories ensures that pertinent 
information is collected from all cases. In 
addition, use of  standardized “core” questions 
(i.e., questions that use the same wording for 
collecting information about certain exposures) 
and data elements (e.g., same variable names 
and attributes) will enhance data sharing and 
comparisons of  exposures across jurisdictions. 
Both will aid in the investigation of  multistate 
outbreaks. Similarly, use of  standardized forms 
for environmental investigations provides 
comparable data for investigations that may 
involve multiple establishments. Standardized 
forms enable investigators to become proficient 
5.1. Characteristics of Outbreak Investigations


































5.1. Characteristics of Outbreak Investigations
with the forms and reduce time and effort to 
develop and train staff  on new forms during 
the investigation.
Because good forms take time to develop and 
format, developing templates before a crisis is 
critical to their rapid deployment (see also 
model practices for case interviews, Chapter 4, 
section 4.3.9.3). The CIFOR Clearinghouse 
(http://www.cifor.us/clearinghouse/index.cfm) 
provides examples of  questionnaires used by 
various health departments to collect exposure 
information for different pathogens and may 
be useful in the development of  templates. The 
Environmental Health Specialists Network 
(EHS-Net) website (http://www.cdc.gov/
nceh/ehs/EHSNet/) can be referenced for 
models of  environmental assessment forms as 
well as consumer complaint forms.
5.1.2.6. Privacy of  individuals, patients and  
their families. 
All outbreak investigations involve collection 
of  private information, such as names and 
symptoms that must be protected from public 
disclosure to the extent allowed by law. All 
members of  the investigation team, including 
epidemiologists, laboratorians, environmental 
health specialists, and food-safety personnel, 
need to be familiar with and to follow 
relevant state and federal laws and practices, 
including the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA).
5.2. Cluster and Outbreak Investigation Procedures
5.2.1. Conduct a Preliminary Investigation
5.2.1.1. For complaints of  illness attributed to a 
particular event or establishment, the following questions 
should be answered:
• Are the incubation period and symptoms 
(or specific agent, if  one or more cases has 
been diagnosed) consistent with an illness 
resulting from the reported exposure?
• Are multiple cases being attributed to the 
same exposure?
• Are all of  the illnesses similar (suggesting all 
are the same disease)?
• Could these illnesses be reasonably 
explained by other common exposures?
If  multiple cases of  illness have incubation 
period and symptoms consistent with an illness 
resulting from the reported exposure, the 
complaints may represent an outbreak and 
need to be investigated.
5.2.1.2. For case clusters identified through pathogen-
specific surveillance, the following questions should be 
answered:
• Is the number of  cases with the cluster 
characteristics clearly more than should be 
expected during this time frame?
• Does the distribution of  cases by 
demographics (e.g., age, sex, and ethnicity) 
or geography suggest a common source of  
exposure?
• Do cases share any unusual exposures?
• Do new cases continue to be detected, 
suggesting the potential for ongoing 
transmission and the need for abatement 
procedures?
If  the number of  cases in a cluster clearly 
exceeds an expected value, if  the demographic 
features or known exposures of  cases suggest 
a common source, or if  new cases continue 
to be detected, the cluster may represent an 
outbreak and needs to be investigated. (See 
model practices for cluster investigation, 
below).


































5.2. Cluster and Outbreak Investigation Procedures
5.2.2. Assemble the Outbreak 
Investigation and Control Team  
(See also Chapter 3, Planning and Preparation)
5.2.2.1. Alert outbreak investigation and control team 
Alert outbreak investigation and control 
team leaders as soon as the potential 
outbreak is identified. Review descriptive 
features of  the outbreak setting and relevant 
background information about the etiologic 
agent, establishment, or event.
5.2.2.2. Assess the priority of  the outbreak investigation 
On the basis of  the outbreak setting 
and descriptive epidemiology, outbreak 
investigation and control team leaders 
should assess the priority of  the outbreak. 
Give highest priority for investigation to 
outbreaks that
• Have a high public health impact:
 o Cause severe or life-threatening illness, 
such as infection with E. coli O157:H7, 
hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS), or 
botulism;
 o Affect populations at high risk for 
complications of  the illness (e.g., infants  
or elderly or immunocompromised 
persons); or
 o Affect a large number of  persons.
• Appear to be ongoing:
 o Outbreak may be associated with food-
service establishment in which ill food 
workers provide a continuing source of  
infection.
 o Outbreak may be associated with 
commercially distributed food product 
that is still being consumed.
 o Outbreak may be associated with 
adulterated food.
5.2.2.3. Assemble and brief  the outbreak investigation 
and control team 
On the basis of  the priority given the 
outbreak and on the nature of  the outbreak, 
investigation and control team leaders should 
assess the availability of  staff  to conduct the 
investigation. In particular, the team leader 
should ensure the presence of  adequate 
staffing to interview cases within 24–48 
hours, and solicit controls as needed. If  
sufficient staff  are not available, request 
external assistance to conduct interviews.
Outbreak investigation staff  should be briefed 
on the outbreak, the members of  the outbreak 
control team, and their individual roles in the 
investigation.
For outbreaks involving multiple jurisdictions, 
the outbreak investigation and control team 
should include members from all agencies 
participating in the investigation (see also 
Chapter 7, Guidelines for Multijurisdictional 
Investigations).
If  an agency does not believe it can manage 
an outbreak (e.g., the scale or complexity is 
likely to overwhelm agency resources, the 
nature of  the outbreak is beyond the expertise 
of  agency staff), help should be requested as 
soon as possible (see also Chapter 3 section on 
Escalation).
5.2.3. Establish Goals and Objectives for 
the Investigation
5.2.3.1. Goals 
• Obtain sufficient information to implement 
specific interventions that will stop the 
outbreak.
• Obtain sufficient information to prevent a 
similar outbreak from occurring in the future.
• Increase our knowledge of  the epidemiology 
and control of  foodborne diseases. 
Unanswered questions about the etiologic 
agent, the mode of  transmission, or 
contributing factors should be identified and 
included in the investigation to add to the 
public health knowledge base.


































5.2. Cluster and Outbreak Investigation Procedures
5.2.3.2. Objectives 
For outbreaks associated with events or 
establishments (Table 5.1)
• Identify the etiologic agent.
• Identify persons at risk.
• Identify mode of  transmission and vehicle.
• Identify source of  contamination.
• Identify contributing factors.
• Determine potential for ongoing transmission 
 and need for abatement procedures.
For outbreaks identified by pathogen-specific 
surveillance (Table 5.2):
• Identify mode of  transmission and vehicle.
• Identify persons at risk.
• Identify the source of  contamination.
• Identify contributing factors.
• Determine potential for ongoing transmission 
 and the need for abatement procedures.
5.2.4. Select and Assign investigation 
Activities
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 outline objectives and 
investigation activities that can be conducted 
during epidemiologic, environmental health, 
and public health laboratory investigations 
of  foodborne disease outbreaks. The table 
format highlights the major objectives of  
the investigation to help ensure coordination 
among epidemiologists, environmental health 
specialists, and laboratorians in meeting each 
objective. The assignment of  investigation 
responsibilities to a particular discipline within 
each table is not intended to be prescriptive. 
The actual responsibilities for an individual 
will vary depending on the practices of  the 
jurisdiction responsible for the investigation, 
roles defined in the outbreak investigation and 
control team, and resources.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.2. Cluster and Outbreak Investigation Procedures
5.2.4.1. Cluster investigations—model practices 
This section lists model practices for cluster 
investigations. The practices used in any 
particular situation depend on a host of  factors 
including the circumstances specific to the 
outbreak (e.g., the pathogen and number and 
distribution of  cases), staff  expertise, structure 
of  the investigating agency, and the agency’s 
resources. Although a systematic evaluation 
under different circumstances had not been 
performed on these practices, experiences 
from successful investigations support their 
value. Investigators are encouraged to 
use a combination of  these practices as is 
appropriate to the specific outbreak.
5.2.4.1.1. Use interview techniques to improve  
food recall 
In general, to help improve food recall when 
collecting exposure information for a cluster 
investigation:
• Question subjects as soon as possible after  
 reporting.
• Do not share information about suspected 
food items or working hypotheses with 
interviewees. However, do ask specifically 
about suspected item(s), as described in the 
dynamic cluster investigation model.
• Encourage interviewees’ to remember 
information by asking them to elaborate 
on where they ate, with whom they ate, 
and events associated with the meals. Ask 
interviewees to look at a calendar from the 
appropriate time periods to jog their memory.
• Enlist the help of  those preparing meals 
during the period of  interest
• Ask if  the subject keeps cash register or 
credit card receipts that might indicate 
where or what they ate.
• If  the subject uses a grocery store shopper 
card, ask permission to get purchase records 
for a specified time period. Some grocery 
chains readily cooperate with these requests; 
others do not.
• Use a structured list of  the places where 
people might get food to get them thinking 
about exposures other than just restaurants 
and grocery stores. The list could include 
food pantries, farmers markets, conferences 
and meetings, and caterers.
5.2.4.1.2. Use a dynamic cluster investigation process 
to generate hypotheses 
In the dynamic cluster investigation model, 
initial cases within a recognized cluster 
are interviewed with a detailed exposure 
history questionnaire. As new exposures are 
suggested during case interviews, the initial 
cases are systematically re-interviewed to 
uniformly assess exposure to the exposures 
suggested by subsequent patient interviews. 
Newly reported cases also will be asked 
specifically about these exposures. See Figure 
5.1 for a visual representation of  this process. 
Ideally, interviews of  the first few (five to ten) 
cases will produce a relatively short list of  
suspicious exposures—suspicious because they 
involve commodities that are not commonly 
eaten or involve specific brands of  a commonly 
eaten food item. Because these exposures 
may not have been uniformly assessed on 
the original questionnaire, specific questions 
regarding the newly suspected exposures 
should be added to the questionnaire for 
future use. Re-interviews of  cases, combined 
with interviews of  new cases in the cluster, 
can result in rapid identification of  a unique 
exposure shared among multiple cases. 
Occasionally, this evidence is so specific and so 
obviously unlikely to have occurred by chance 
alone that it can lead to direct public health 
intervention. More frequently, the various 
hypotheses will need to be tested with a case-
control study in the ensuing investigation.
As the number of  cases and jurisdictions 
increases, strict application of  this approach 
may be come infeasible. In any event, clear 
and timely communication with other 
investigators are critical to adequately  


































5.2. Cluster and Outbreak Investigation Procedures
Figure 5 .1 .  Dynamic cluster investigation.













consider suspicious new exposures that may be 
reported elsewhere.
5.2.4.1.2.1. Dynamic cluster investigation with  
routine interview of  cases 
For agencies with resources sufficient to 
routinely interview cases with a detailed 
exposure questionnaire as the cases are 
reported, dynamic cluster investigation can be 
initiated with recognition of  the cluster. This 
increases the sensitivity and speed of  outbreak 
identification and resolution in several ways.
•	 Increased	recall: 
Recall is amplified by what is essentially a 
group dynamic. Individuals are less likely 
to recall exposures when asked in general 
about their exposure history and more likely 
to remember when questioned about specific 
exposures that other cases have identified. 
For example, in the 2007 multistate outbreak 
of  Salmonella Wandsworth associated with 
a vegetable powder-coated snack, cases 
were less likely to report its consumption 
when asked to list all foods eaten during the 
period of  interest but were highly likely to 
remember when asked specifically whether 
they had eaten the particular snack. (This 
same principal underlies an advantage of  
questionnaires with longer lists of  specific 
exposure questions.)
•	 Compressed	time	frame: 
This process also increases recall and the 
likelihood of  meaningful intervention 
because of  its shortened time frame. 
Standard investigation methods often involve 
sequential attempts at hypothesis generation, 
In this model, cases are interviewed with a detailed exposure history questionnaire. Specific exposures 
shared by multiple cases may surface that are suspicious because they involve commodities not 
commonly eaten or involve specific brands of a commonly eaten food item. Because these exposures 
may not be uniformly ascertained with the original questionnaire, specific questions should be added 
to the questionnaire for future use and to systematically re-interview cases to uniformly assess exposure 
to the suspicious sources discovered during the investigation process “Novel exposure” refers to 
individuals who are newly exposed.


































5.2. Cluster and Outbreak Investigation Procedures
followed by hypothesis testing. In this model, 




In jurisdictions that routinely conduct 
interviews using trawling questionnaires, 
case-to-case comparison studies offer an 
efficient tool to evaluate exposures as part of  
cluster investigations. Cases with microbial 
agents other than the agent under 
investigation, ideally from the same time 
period, are used as “controls” to identify 
risk factor differences. This requires that 
the cases in the cluster and cases used 
for comparison have been interviewed 
using the same form. However, because 
some microbial agents have common food 
vehicles, case-to-case comparisons might 
lead investigators to overlook the source of  
an outbreak.
5.2.4.1.2.2. Dynamic cluster investigation without 
routine interview of  cases 
Because most public health agencies do not 
have sufficient resources to conduct detailed 
exposure history interviews for every case, a 
two-step interviewing process may represent the 
best alternative approach. All cases should be 
interviewed with a standardized questionnaire 
to collect exposure information about limited 
high-risk exposures specific to the pathogen. 
When it becomes apparent based on the novelty 
of  the subtype pattern, geographic distribution 
of  cases, or ongoing accumulation of  new cases 
that the cluster represents a potential outbreak 
associated with a commercially distributed 
food product, all cases in the cluster should 
be interviewed using a detailed exposure 
questionnaire as part of  a dynamic cluster 
investigation as described above.
If  investigators use the trawling questionnaire 
on cases only after a cluster is identified, they 
can either a) use the results for hypothesis 
generation with subsequent testing of  those 
hypotheses in a controlled study or b) they 
can use the trawling questionnaire on an 
appropriate set of  controls, thereby combining 
hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing.
5.2.4.1.3. Use standard cluster investigation 
The conventional cluster investigation process 
includes (a) waiting until a sufficient number 
of  cases are identified, making obvious the 
occurrence of  a common source outbreak, (b) 
conducting hypothesis-generating interviews 
using a trawling interview form with a subset 
of  these cases, and (c) developing and testing 
hypotheses in a static manner. Limitations of  
this method include diminished investigation 
sensitivity and specificity, as well as significant 
delays.
The following guidance might be used to 
interpret the results of  hypothesis-generating 
interviews and focus the list of  exposures for 
subsequent study:
• If  none of  the cases involved in the 
interviews report a specific exposure, the 
hypothesis is no longer viable and most likely 
can be dropped from subsequent study.
• If  more than 50% of  cases interviewed 
report an exposure, that exposure should be 
studied further.
• If  fewer than 50% of  cases report an 
exposure, that exposure still may be 
of  interest, particularly if  it difficult to 
recognize or unusual.
5.2.4.1.4. Use the FoodNet Atlas of  Exposures 
Short of  conducting a formal case-control 
study, exposure frequency data can be 
used to evaluate the significance of  shared 
exposures. The FoodNet Atlas of  Exposures 
is a compilation of  the results of  periodic 
population-based surveys undertaken at 
selected sites in the United States. The Atlas 
of  Exposures includes information about 
exposures that might be associated with 
foodborne illnesses and can be used as a crude 
estimate of  the background rate of  different 


































5.2. Cluster and Outbreak Investigation Procedures
food exposures in the community to highlight 
increased rates of  exposure among cases. 
These rates can even be compared statistically 
by using a standard binomial model (e.g., the 
one available at http://www.oregon.gov/
DHS/ph/acd/keene.shtml.
For example, bagged spinach was first 
identified as the source of  the 2006 E. coli 
O157:H7 outbreak on the basis of  only six 
structured interviews (with five reporting 
consumption of  bagged, prewashed spinach). 
FoodNet survey data suggested that only about 
17% of  the US population recalled eating any 
kind of  fresh spinach within a given week. 
Combined with similar findings from other 
states conducting case investigations, these 
collective observations led to prompt action 
and further investigations, which rapidly 
identified the location, date, and even shift of  
contaminated spinach production.
Of  course, comparisons with FoodNet survey 
results do not always yield such obvious 
associations with a single food item, but they 
still may suggest findings that can be tested in a 
controlled study. For example, use of  a trawling 
interview form among Salmonella Tennessee 
cases in 2007 identified consumption rates 
for peanut butter (and several other foods) 
that were considerably higher than would be 
expected from FoodNet survey data. This in 
turn led to a focused case-control study with 
more detailed questions about those relatively 
few products, and a specific peanut butter brand 
then was readily identified as the source of  the 
outbreak (Bill Keene, Oregon Public Health 
Services, personal communication, 2008).
Because the Atlas is based on surveys at 
selected sites at certain times, the findings must 
be extrapolated carefully to other populations 
and seasons. Results from the most recent 
FoodNet population survey are available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/foodnet/studies_pages/
pop.htm.
Even in the absence of  survey data, common-
sense estimates of  the prevalence of  a given 
exposure can be used to identify exposures of  
interest more quickly. For example, although 
not included in the FoodNet surveys, the 
significance of  finding five of  five Salmonella 
Enteritidis cases reporting consumption of  
shelled almonds of  a single brand was readily 
apparent not only to epidemiologists but to 
regulators and distributors as well, particularly 
because the Salmonella Enteritidis subtype had 
previously been implicated as the etiology of  a 
large international outbreak traced to shelled 
almonds.
5.2.4.1.5. Conduct an environmental health assessment 
When investigating a food-production or 
food-service establishment implicated in 
an outbreak, conduct an environmental 
health assessment. An environmental health 
assessment is a systematic, detailed, science-
based evaluation of  environmental factors that 
contributed to transmission of  a particular 
disease in an outbreak. It differs from a general 
inspection of  operating procedures or sanitary 
conditions used for the licensing or routine 
inspection of  a restaurant or food-production 
facility. An environmental health assessment 
focuses on the problem at hand and considers 
how the causative agent, host factors, and 
environmental conditions interacted to result in 
the problem.
The goals of  an environmental health 
assessment are to identify
• Possible points of  contamination of  the 
implicated food with the disease agent,
• Whether the causative agent could have 
survived (or, in the case of  a toxin, not been 
inactivated),
• Whether conditions were conducive for 
subsequent growth or toxin production by 
the disease agent, and
• Antecedents that resulted in the conditions 
allowing the outbreak to happen.


































5.2. Cluster and Outbreak Investigation Procedures
Although the primary goals of  an 
environmental health assessment are to 
identify possible points of  contamination, 
survival, or growth of  the disease agent, 
to be most valuable, investigators need to 
identify “antecedents” that resulted in these 
conditions. Antecedents are the circumstances 
behind the problem and include inadequate 
worker education, behavioral risk factors, 
management decisions, and social and cultural 
beliefs. Only by identifying the problem behind 
the problem can investigators to develop 
effective interventions to prevent the problem.
The timing of  the environmental health 
assessment depends largely on the specifics 
of  the outbreak and available information. 
If  you have a common location and a profile 
of  symptoms among ill persons that indicates 
whether the disease agent is likely to be viral, 
bacterial, toxin, or chemical, then you can 
begin an environmental assessment. Early 
investigation and collection of  specimens, if  
possible, will best reflect the conditions at the 
time of  the outbreak. In addition, possible 
food vehicles can be discarded or grow old, 
and individuals involved in the production, 
processing, storage, transportation, or 
preparation of  the item can change their 
practices and procedures.
5.2.4.1.5.1. Sources of  information and activities 
included in an environmental health assessment 
Epidemiologic information is necessary to 
initiate an environmental assessment and 
guides the assessment as it progresses. Once an 
investigation begins, sources of  information for 
an environmental health assessment include 
product information (e.g., chemical and 
physical characteristics and source); written 
policies or procedures; direct observations and 
measurements; interviews with employees and 
managers; and lab testing of  suspected foods, 
ingredients, or environmental surfaces.
The specific activities included in an 
environmental health assessment will differ on 
the basis of  the causative agent, the suspected 
vehicle, and the setting but usually include the 
following:
• Describing the implicated food,
• Observing procedures to make food,
• Talking with food workers and managers,
• Taking measurements (e.g., temperatures),
• Developing a flow chart or food flow 
diagram for the food item or ingredient 
implicated to capture detailed information 
about each step in the food handling process, 
including storage, preparation, cooking, 
cooling, reheating, and service.
• Collecting food specimens and occasionally 
clinical specimens from people in contact 
with the suspected food vehicle or the 
environment in which it was produced or 
used, and
• Collecting and review documents on source 
of  food.
These activities provide information needed to 
develop the most likely environmental picture 
of  the facility before the exposures that led 
to the outbreak. Once a complete picture 
has been developed, contributing factors and 
antecedents can be determined.
5.2.4.1.5.2. Qualifications to conduct an 
environmental health assessment 
To accurately relate the opportunities for 
contamination, survival, and growth of  a 
disease agent in a food to a specific outbreak, 
the investigator needs a good understanding of
• Agent (e.g., likely sources, optimum growth 
conditions, inhibitory substances, means of  
inactivation),
• Factors necessary to cause illness (e.g., 
infectious dose, portal of  entry), and
• Implicated vehicle (e.g., physical and 
chemical characteristics of  the vehicle that 
might facilitate or inhibit growth, methods 
of  production, processing, preparation).
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Critical thinking skills also are needed to 
analyze information that evolves from an 
environmental assessment and identify the 
likely source of  the problem and how the 
disease agent, host factors, and environmental 
conditions interacted to support a specific 
outbreak. This level of  knowledge and skill 
requires someone with special training in this 
field of  investigation, such as a sanitarian or 
environmental health specialist.
5.2.4.1.6. Conduct informational tracebacks/
traceforwards of  food items under investigation. 
Tracing the source of  food items or ingredients 
through distribution to source of  production 
can be critical to identifying epidemiologic 
links among cases or ruling them out. For 
nonbranded commodities, such as produce 
items, the convergence of  multiple cases 
along a distribution pathway may identify the 
source of  contamination. Conversely, failure to 
identify common suppliers may indicate that 
the food item in question is not a likely vehicle. 
Informational tracebacks of  this type need to 
be conducted quickly to be incorporated into 
the epidemiologic studies. Formal regulatory 
tracebacks may be subsequently needed to 
confirm the distribution of  implicated products.
5.2.5. Coordinate Investigation Activities
Whether the outbreak is restricted to one 
jurisdiction or involves multiple jurisdictions, 
notification and updates should be provided 
to other interested agencies following the 
Guidelines for Multijurisdictional Investigations.
Arrange for outbreak control team to meet 
daily and to regularly update the entire 
outbreak control team. In particular, if  the 
outbreak has gained public attention, the 
public information officer needs to prepare a 
daily update for the media.
During investigation of  outbreaks involving 
events or establishments, maintaining 
close collaboration between epidemiology 
and environmental health is particularly 
important. Interview results from persons 
who attended the event or patronized the 
establishment will help environmental health 
specialists focus their environmental assessments 
by identifying likely agents and food vehicles. 
Similarly, results of  interviews of  food workers 
and reviews of  food preparation can identify 
important differences in exposure potential 
that should be distinguished in interviews of  
persons attending the event or patronizing the 
establishment. For example, environmental 
health investigators might determine that food 
items prepared only on certain days or by 
certain food workers are likely to be risky. These 
refinements also can help establish the need 
for or advisability of  collecting stool samples 
from food workers or food and environmental 
samples from the establishment.
During the earliest stages of  the investigation, 
patrons need to be interviewed rapidly. 
However, the focus of  outbreak activities 
is likely to shift to interviews of  food 
workers, environmental evaluations of  the 
establishment, and review of  food-preparation 
procedures as the investigation progresses.
During investigation of  outbreaks detected 
by pathogen-specific surveillance, the public 
health laboratory needs to immediately 
forward case information to epidemiologists 
for every new potentially outbreak-
associated case they receive. This will ensure 
rapid enrollment of  new cases in the outbreak 
investigation studies. Similarly, as investigators 
acquire information from cases about 
exposures in restaurants and other licensed 
facilities, they should rapidly forward that 
information to environmental health specialists 
to ensure rapid identification of  commodity 
ingredients and their distribution sources.
During the early stages of  an investigation, 
efforts to identify mode of  transmission and 
food vehicle require close coordination of  
the outbreak team under the leadership 


































5.2. Cluster and Outbreak Investigation Procedures
of  epidemiology. After identification of  a 
likely food vehicle, efforts to identify the 
source of  contamination and contributing 
factors require engagement of  local, state, 
or federal food-regulatory programs. As the 
investigation proceeds, the outbreak control 
team should always consider whether any 
information indicates the outbreak might 
be multijurisdictional. See Chapter 7 for 
information about identifying and responding 
to multijurisdictional outbreaks.
5.2.6. Compile Results and Reevaluate 
Goals for Investigation (see also Chapter 6, 
Control Measures)
Compile results of  outbreak investigations 
in a manner that allows comparisons with 
the original goals for the investigation. State 
the original goals of  the investigation and 
demonstrate how each goal was achieved; if  
the goal was not achieved, explain why. For 
example, in an investigation of  an outbreak 
of  vomiting and diarrhea associated with 
a restaurant, document the steps taken to 
identify the agent. These could include 
identifying the number of  stool specimens 
collected, determining the intervals between 
onset of  symptoms and collection of  stool and 
between collection of  stool and processing by 
the public health laboratory, identifying the 
methods used to culture or test the specimens, 
and determining the results of  the tests.
Prepare epidemic curves, and update them 
daily to depict the beginning and end of  the 
outbreak. Continued motion of  successive 
epidemic curves, day by day over time, clearly 
indicates continuation of  the outbreak (Box 
5.1). Select time scales for the epidemic curve 
to highlight the agent, mode of  transmission, 
and duration of  the outbreak. Notable 
events, such as changes in food-processing 
methods or personnel or implementation of  
control measures, can be noted on the curve. 
Generating an accompanying timeline of  the 
investigation’s events as they happen often can 
be helpful.
Novel questions or opportunities to address 
Box 5 .1 .  Interpretation of epidemic curves during an active outbreak
The epidemic curve (epi curve) shows progression of an outbreak over time. The horizontal axis is the 
date a person became ill (date of onset). The vertical axis is the number of persons who became ill on 
each date. These numbers are updated as new data come in and thus are subject to change. The epi 
curve is complex and incomplete. Several issues are important in understanding it.
• There is an inherent delay between the date of illness onset and the date the case is reported to public 
health authorities. This delay typically is 2–3 weeks for Salmonella infections. Therefore, someone 
who got sick last week is unlikely to have been reported yet, and someone who got sick 3 weeks ago 
may just be reported now. See the Salmonella Outbreak Investigations: Timeline for Reporting Cases, 
http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/reportingtimeline.html.
• Some background cases of illness are likely that would have occurred even without an outbreak; there-
fore, determining exactly which case is the first in an outbreak is difficult. Epidemiologists typically focus 
on the first recognized cluster or group of cases rather than on the first case. Because of the inherent 
reporting delay, a cluster sometimes is not detected until several weeks after people became ill.
• For some cases, date of illness onset is not known because of the delay between reporting and case 
interview. Sometimes an interview never occurs. If the date is known that an ill person brought his or 
her specimen to the laboratory for testing, date of illness onset is estimated as 3 days before that.
• Determining when cases start to decline can be difficult because of the reporting delay but becomes 
clearer as time passes. 
• Determining the end of an outbreak can be difficult because of the reporting delay. The curve for the 
most recent 3 weeks always makes the outbreak appear to be ending, even when it’s ongoing. The full 
shape of the curve is clear only after the outbreak is over.


































5.2. Cluster and Outbreak Investigation Procedures
fundamental questions about foodborne 
disease transmission can develop during the 
outbreak investigation. The opportunity to 
address these issues might require reevaluation 
of  the investigation’s goals.
5.2.7. Interpreting Results
The outbreak investigator’s job is to use all 
available information to construct a  
coherent narrative of  what happened and 
why. This begins with the initial detection of  
the outbreak and formation of  hypotheses 
based on the agent’s ecology, microbiology, 
and mechanisms of  transmission in addition 
to the descriptive epidemiology of  reported 
cases. Results of  subsequent analytic studies 
(e.g., cohort or case-control study results) must 
be integrated with results of  informational 
product tracebacks, food worker interviews, 
environmental assessments, and food product 
and environmental testing. When all of  these 
data elements support and explain the primary 
hypothesis very strong conclusions can be 
drawn.
Identifying and exploiting less-obvious data 
sources may require some imagination. 
Interview questionnaires are a critical starting 
point, but often do not provide all the answers. 
For example, when cases are associated with 
institutional settings or restaurants, it may be 
necessary to use the institution rather than 
the case as the unit of  observation. Cross-
referenced lists of  suppliers and food items 
at different institutions may be more difficult 
to assess statistically because of  their small 
numbers, but they can help focus commercial 
product-type investigations. Similarly, relevant 
restaurant records include much more than 
menu lists.
Investigators should consider their data 
critically and question the strength of  the 
association, timing, dose-response, plausibility, 
and consistency of  findings when implicating 
a food item (Box 5.2). Questionnaire data 
are often faulty: collected long after the fact, 
perhaps by proxy, and sometimes tainted by 
biases known and unknown. Investigators 
can create or compound errors during 
transcription, keypunching, or analysis. Records 
are often incomplete or unavailable. Without a 
systematic bias, larger data sets tend to be more 
robust; and minor errors may be cancelled out 
(or ignored), but the size of  the data set is often 
beyond one’s control. Statistical association 
between exposure and illness may reflect a 
causal link but also may reflect confounding, 
bias, chance, and other factors. If  three food 
items on a questionnaire have a P value <0.05, 
for example, it does not mean that all three 
(or indeed, any of  them) are “implicated” as a 
vehicle. Conversely, the failure to achieve a P 
value <0.05 cannot rule out a causal role for a 
particular food item. As noted above, observed 
associations have to be placed in the context of  
the other investigation results.
Although epidemiologists should be open 
to new developments and new twists to old 
problems, they should be wary of  explanations 
that depend on implausible scenarios. For 
example, truly localized outbreaks are unlikely 
to result from manufacturing defects in 
nationally distributed products. Outbreaks that 
differentially affect young children are unlikely 
to be caused by salad items. Salmonellosis 
cases are unlikely to become symptomatic 
within 12 hours of  exposure. Minor 
inconsistencies are common and may be 
ignored, but large numbers of  inconsistencies 
might indicate that alternate hypotheses need 
to be considered.
General principles underlie successful 
investigations; however, no one specific method 
works best in all situations. Investigators need 
to be flexible and innovate as circumstances 
demand. On one point we can agree: 
investigations that are never begun or that are 
haphazardly carried out are unlikely to yield 
satisfactory results. “Eighty percent of  success 
is showing up,” said Woody Allen—and 


































Box 5 .2 .  Questions to consider when associating an exposure with an outbreak
Strength of association
•	 How strong was the association between illness and implicated item? (The strength of the association 
increases with the size of the odds ratio or relative risk: 1= no association; <5 = relatively weak 
association; 5–10 = relatively strong association; >10 = very strong association.) 
•	 Was the finding statistically significant? ( A P value of <0.05 is a traditional cutoff value, but in small 
studies, even relatively strong associations may not reach this level of significance. Conversely, in large 
studies examining many exposures, relatively weak associations may reach this level of significance by 
chance or as an effect of confounding.) 
•	 Were the majority of ill persons exposed to the implicated item? (This is desirable but may not always 
be apparent if the implicated item is an ingredient in multiple food items.) 
Timing
•	 Did the exposure to the implicated item precede illness by enough time to allow for a reasonable 
incubation period? 
•	 Do the time windows obtained during traceback and traceforward investigations correlate with 
reported dates of production, distribution, and purchase of the implicated item?
Dose-response effects
If assessed, were persons with greater exposure to the implicated item more likely to become ill or have 
more severe clinical manifestations? 
Plausibility 
•	 Is the association consistent with historical experience with this or similar pathogens? Can investigators 
develop a rational explanation for opportunities for contamination, survival, and proliferation of 
the pathogen in the implicated item? (If otherwise strong and consistent results cannot be readily 
explained, the outbreak may herald emergence of a new hazard, which will require additional studies 
to confirm.)
•	 Is the geographic location of ill persons consistent with the distribution of the implicated item? 
(Discrepancies might be explained by gaps in surveillance, product distribution data or by involvement 
of additional food products).
Consistency with other studies 
Studies associated with current investigation
•	 Do the results of traceback and traceforward investigations suggest a common source?
•	 Have environmental health assessments identified problems in the production, transport, storage, or 
preparation of the implicated item that would allow for contamination, survival, and proliferation of the 
pathogen in that item?
•	 If the pathogen was isolated both from ill persons and the implicated item, do subtyping results 
(e.g., PFGE analysis) confirm the association? 
Studies not associated with current investigation
Is the association between the pathogen and the implicated item consistent with other investigations of 
this pathogen?
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that applies to outbreak investigations too. 
Jurisdictions that cannot commit resources to 
outbreak investigations themselves should do 
whatever they can to facilitate follow-up of  
their cases by other agencies (e.g., counties to 
states; states to other states or CDC).
Experience reminds us—again and again, 
unfortunately—that even seemingly well-
executed investigations can be inconclusive. 
Small sample sizes, multivehicle situations, 
“cryptic” food items, foods with high 
background rates of  consumption are only 
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some of  the factors that can reduce the 
effectiveness of  standard epidemiologic 
methods and make investigations extremely 
difficult. The decision to stop an investigation 
depends on the gravity and scope of  the 
outbreak and on the likelihood that it reflects 
an ongoing public health threat. Before giving 
up, extraordinary measures, such as home 
visits and mass testing of  leftover products, 
may be worth considering.
5.2.8. Conduct a Debriefing at End of 
Investigation
Encourage a postoutbreak meeting among 
investigators to assess lessons learned and 
compare notes on ultimate findings. This 
is particularly important for multiagency 
investigations but also is important for single-
agency investigations.
5.2.9. Summarize Investigation Findings, 
Conclusions, and Recommendations
At a minimum, document every outbreak 
investigation using a standardized form 
to facilitate inclusion in state and national 
outbreak databases (e.g., CDC’s form 52.13  
or its equivalent).
Summary data should be reported nationally 
to CDC’s National Outbreak Reporting 
System (NORS) database. The usefulness 
of  the reports depends on the quality and 
quantity of  information submitted. Make 
every effort to complete both Part 1: Basic 
Information, and Part 2: Additional 
Information, and submit the information as 
soon as possible.
In addition, investigators are encouraged to 
submit preliminary reports of  outbreaks while 
the investigation is ongoing. If  submission 
is timely, these reports can help identify 
potentially related outbreaks occurring 
simultaneously in multiple places and facilitate 
further investigation of  the outbreaks.
Routinely review and summarize data 
from these reports (e.g., in annual outbreak 
summaries) at the state and national level.
Larger or more complex investigations or 
investigations with significance for public 
health and food-safety practice demand a more 
complete narrative report and, potentially, 
publication in a peer-reviewed journal. Written 
reports should include the following:
•	 Background, including information about 
the outbreak setting, timing, and manner of  
detection, and an explicit statement of  the 
goals of  the investigation.
•	 Methods, including other agencies involved 
in the investigation, investigation methods, 
case definition, number of  people exposed, 
number interviewed, number ill, number of  
stool samples collected, pathogens tested for 
in stools, and a high-level summary of  the 
laboratory methods used.
•	 Results, including percentages of  cases with 
fever, diarrhea, vomiting, and bloody 
diarrhea; median and range of  incubation 
period and duration of  illness; results 
of  stool testing; food items or events 
associated with illness and odds ratio(s) 
or relative risks and confidence intervals 
for implicated food(s); all relevant findings 
from environmental investigations of  
establishments and food-preparation 
reviews; results of  food worker interviews; 
and food worker stool culture results.
•	 Conclusions, including etiologic agent, 
discussion of  transmission route, 
contributing factors, justifications for 
conclusions, and limitations of  the study.
•	 Recommendations, including all specific 
recommendations for abatement of  
this outbreak and prevention of  similar 
outbreaks.
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5.2.10. Distribute Report
Make copies of  the report available to all 
persons involved with the investigation, 
including
• Investigation team members and their 
supervisors;
• Health department officials and press officers;
• Food-safety and regulatory agency officials  
 and press officers;
• Health-care providers who reported cases; 
and
• Laboratorians who performed tests.
Also distribute copies of  the report to persons 
responsible for implementing control measures, 
including
• Owners and managers of  establishments 
identified as the source of  the outbreak;
• Program staff  who might oversee 
implementation of  control measures or 
provide technical assistance; and
• Organizations or regulatory agencies that 
might develop or implement policies and 
regulations for which the investigation might 
have implications.
The report is a public record and should also 
be made available to members of  the public 
who request it.
5.3. Multijurisdictional Considerations for Outbreak Investigations
Increased reliance of  the United States on 
large-scale food distribution systems and 
international food sources has increased 
the likelihood of  outbreaks in multiple 
jurisdictions. Local and state health agencies 
always need to be sensitive to the potential for 
rapid escalation of  any outbreak to a regional 
or national event. (See Chapter 7).
5.4. Indicators/Measures
Key indicators and measures to assist in 
assessing investigation processes and the overall 






he purpose of outbreak investigations is to stop the current 
outbreak, determine how the contamination occurred, and 
implement prevention-based approaches to minimize the 
risk for future outbreaks. Whereas the investigation is critical for 
understanding the cause, effective control measures are critical for 
actually stopping the outbreak .
Specifically, the objectives of control measures are to
	 •	Prevent	additional	exposures,	and
	 •	Alert	the	public,	and	tell	people	how	to	protect	themselves.
In addition, investigation into the circumstances likely to have 
contaminated the food will lead to long-term prevention efforts. 
The objectives of this phase of the investigation are to
	 •	Prevent	 future	 outbreaks	 from	 the	 same	 uncorrected	 practices,	 
  and
	 •	 Identify	changes	 in	policy	or	practice	changes	 that	will	prevent	 
  future outbreaks from similar causes.


















Rapid response is key. Rapidly assess 
information to identify suspected food or 
facilities, and send investigators into the field 
as soon as possible. Contaminated food may 
be served at the next meal, or an ill employee 
may repeatedly contaminate food products. 
Practices that led to the outbreak are likely 
to continue unless an intervention stops 
them. The source of  the outbreak could be 
a nationally distributed food product, and a 
recall might be necessary to prevent additional 
illnesses across the country.
Jurisdictional differences determine when 
staff  are sent to an implicated site. Some 
jurisdictions have policies of  sending staff  
out immediately after a complaint about a 
food establishment. Others require multiple 
complaints about a site or wait until a specific 
food is implicated. Any time an outbreak 
is identified and potentially linked to a site, 
immediate response is critical.
The two major types of  foodborne disease 
outbreaks—those originating from food-
service establishments or home processing 
and those originating from commercial 
processors/producers—require two different 
types of  control measures. However, early 
in an outbreak, investigators are unlikely to 
know the actual cause of  the problem. Some 
type of  poor food handling practices can be 
found at any time in most restaurants. Going 
to a restaurant and identifying these poor 
food handling practices may distract from the 
outbreak investigation, if  the outbreak is not 
local. Control measures will vary according 
to setting and time and might change as more 
information becomes available.
Communication is critical in determining 
what control measures to implement and 
when to change an intervention’s focus. Field 
staff  implementing control measures must 
constantly communicate with epidemiologists 
and laboratorians, who might uncover a 
different potential cause for the outbreak. 
Information gathered by field staff  also can 
lead epidemiologists in a new direction.
6.1. Information-Based Decision-Making
6.1.1. Concurrent Interventions and 
Investigations
Control measures can be implemented 
concurrently with investigations. Waiting 
for laboratory results, confirmed medical 
diagnosis, or results of  all investigations is not 
necessary before implementing initial control 
measures. Sometimes nonspecific control 
measures can be implemented immediately 
to prevent further transmission of  disease, 
regardless of  the type of  disease or source (see 
section 6.2.1 below).
Sending at least two investigators to a food 
establishment implicated in an outbreak is best. 
One investigator can make certain food about 
to be served is safe (e.g., no implicated leftovers 
are served, foods are at proper temperature, 
food was prepared without contact by bare 
hands, no ill food workers are preparing 
food). The second investigator conducts the 
investigation (e.g., obtains the menu to review 
everything served to cases, identifies persons 
who prepared suspected items, determines 
how the foods were prepared, determines what 
other groups were served the same foods). (See 
Chapter 5 for additional information about 
investigation steps.)
6.1.2. Considerations When Implementing 
Control Measures
Interventions such as recalling food or 
closing food premises can have major legal 
or economic consequences, just as inaction 


















or delayed actions can have important public 
health consequences. The outbreak control 
team must balance potential consequences 
against the likelihood that any actions taken 
will prevent further cases of  disease. Issues 
to be considered when deciding whether to 
implement an intervention include
•	 The	quality	of	information. Does evidence 
implicating a particular source include 
results of  a controlled study (e.g., case-
control study or cohort study)? If  so, was 
the study well-designed and executed and 
of  sufficient size to detect differences? What 
is the likelihood of  information or selection 
bias or confounding? Are the findings of  
different studies consistent, e.g., several case-
control studies undertaken at different sites 
or among epidemiologic, environmental, 
and microbiologic studies? Is the implicated 
source biologically plausible? Is the 
implicated source new or novel?
•	 The	outcome	of	the	environmental	
assessment. Do the findings from the 
environmental assessment support the 
conclusions drawn by the epidemiologic 
or laboratory team members? Does the 
environmental assessment establish a  
picture of  events that could logically  
support the overall epidemiologic picture  
of  the outbreak? 
•	 The	balance	between	consequences	of	
taking and not taking action For example, 
one is more likely to take action if  the illness 
is serious or life-threatening (e.g., botulism 
or E. coli O157:H7), the population affected 
is at high risk for serious complications, 
or exposure is thought to be ongoing. 
Consider the potential impact on business or 
industry. Does taking action present a minor 
inconvenience or will it have resounding and 
lasting effects on the business or industry? 
Will the actions affect only one business or 
an entire industry? What is the burden on 
the involved public of  taking action?
These considerations can add confidence to 
decision-making, but no one person should 
make decisions alone unless an imminent 
danger is obvious (e.g., an ill food worker 
is found preparing food and is excluded). 
Decisions about implementing, or waiting 
to implement, an intervention require input 
from the entire investigation team, including 
epidemiology, laboratory, and environmental 
health specialists, and may need input from 
companies or trade associations.
6.2. Control of Source
6.2.1. Nonspecific Control Measures
6.2.1.1. Neither food nor facility has been implicated 
If  the pathogen causing an outbreak is known, 
limited control measures might be possible 
even before the mode of  transmission is clear 
or a food or facility have been implicated. 
Control measures, at this point, will be 
nonspecific (i.e., not aimed at the definitive 
source of  the outbreak) and focus on 
prevention of  secondary spread among known 
cases and communications with health-care 
providers and the public.
Communications with health-care providers 
might include advice about specific treatment 
and follow-up of  cases, instructions to cases 
on personal hygiene and ways to avoid 
spreading the infection to others, and infection 
control precautions for hospitalized and 
institutionalized patients. Communications 
with the public include practical measures 
to decrease risk for illness (e.g., avoidance of  
known high-risk foods or special instructions 
for their preparation) as well as basic food-
safety messages and information about how 
to contact public health authorities to report 
suspected related illnesses.

















6.2. Control of Source
Alerting the public about an outbreak early in 
an investigation, when little is known (or can 
be done) about it, is not without controversy. 
Announcements about an outbreak (and even 
implication of  a food without information 
about its origin) can alarm (and even panic) 
the consumers who can do little to protect 
themselves and cause them to undertake 
unnecessary or irrational actions. Such 
announcements can also negatively effect 
industry as the public strives to avoid all foods 
(or other products) possibly related to the 
outbreak.
The balance between possible harm to 
consumers and industry and likely benefit 
of  such announcements must be carefully 
weighed. However, if  such communications 
could prevent additional cases of  the disease, 
they should be considered when the disease is 
serious, life-threatening, or widespread and/or 
may particularly affect individuals at high risk 
for poor health outcomes from the disease.
6.2.1.2. Facility has been implicated 
Nonspecific control measures can be 
implemented when a facility has been 
implicated, even though a specific food has 
not yet been identified. These steps are good 
public health practice and generally are 
effective, regardless of  disease. These critical 
first actions include
• Properly holding the leftovers for further  
 laboratory analysis, if  warranted;
• Stopping bare-hand contact;
• Emphasizing hand washing;
• Monitoring time and temperature control  
 of  food;
• Excluding employees ill with gastrointestinal  
 symptoms (e.g., nausea, vomiting, diarrhea,  
 stomach cramps); and
• Prohibiting serving of  uncooked foods if   
 any possibility of  norovirus exists.
In deciding what control measures to 
implement, check with epidemiologists and 
laboratory team members to determine 
the type of  pathogen thought to be the 
cause of  the outbreak if  the specific cause 
is not known. For example, on the basis 
of  the symptoms of  ill persons, these team 
members can characterize the type of  agent 
involved—e.g., viral, bacterial, chemical. 
This information can assist in identifying and 
prioritizing control measures.
Check the history of  the establishment 
for previous outbreaks or food-safety 
problems. What is the establishment’s history 
of  correcting violations? A history of  serious 
hazards or of  not correcting violations might 
warrant closure.
While taking these first actions, be sure to 
collect samples for laboratory analyses. 
Discarding suspected food can help stop the 
outbreak, but isolating the etiologic agent from 
the food provides additional evidence of  a 
particular food as the outbreak’s source. It is 
important to collect food samples as early in 
the outbreak investigation as possible. Whether 
to analyze these samples can be decided later 
when more information is available. Storage 
capacity for samples collected for later analysis 
should be considered before an outbreak. 
Contact your public health laboratory to find 
out how much food to collect, how to collect it, 
and how to store it.
6.2.2. Specific Control Measures
When a specific food(s) has been implicated, 
specific control measures can be implemented. 
Although all of  the following control measures 
are recommended, full implementation of  all 
these practices might not be possible in many 
jurisdictions because of  limited resources 
and competing priorities. Implementing as 
many as possible and as completely as possible 
will improve the effectiveness of  the control 
measures.

















6.2. Control of Source
Control measures to be implemented vary 
depending on whether the implicated food is 
associated with food-service establishments 
(whether single or multliple facilities) or 
home processing or is processor/producer-
based. The outbreak response team must 
initially determine whether a single facility or 
multiple facilities are involved.
6.2.2.1. Foods associated with food-service 
establishments or home processing
6.2.2.1.1. Removing food from consumption
• Samples should be collected of  any foods 
discarded by the owner of  an establishment 
or foods embargoed by public health 
officials.
• Ask that the owner discard or hold and 
discontinue serving all implicated food. 
If  a facility, but no specific food, has been 
implicated, ask that the owner discard or 
hold and discontinue serving all food for 
which a link to the outbreak is biologically 
plausible. Before making this request, 
consider the severity of  the illness and the 
nature of  the implicated pathogen. For 
example, this action may be appropriate 
for E. coli O157:H7, but not for suspected 
norovirus. Reserve samples for testing.
• If  the owner will not discard or hold and 
discontinue serving the food voluntarily, the 
agency might need to issue a public health 
order to require action. (This varies by 
jurisdiction; some agencies might be able to 
embargo food without a public health order.) 
In investigation and enforcement matters, 
issuing a written hold or embargo order 
establishes a clear expectation for holding 
the food. This will prevent the owner from 
destroying the food before the investigation 
is complete.
• Fully document the information that led 
to the decision (whether to remove or not 
remove food) and the process used to make 
the decision.
6.2.2.1.2. Cleaning and sanitizing
• Ensure the facility is thoroughly cleaned and 
sanitized, followed by microbial verification 
of  the effectiveness of  the cleaning 
and sanitizing processes. This includes 
disassembling all equipment and retraining 
staff  on proper cleaning and maintenance 
procedures for the equipment. The cleaning 
and sanitizing process is particularly 
important if  norovirus is suspected.
6.2.2.1.3. Training
• Require training of  staff  on general 
practices of  safe food preparation and, if  the 
specific pathogen is known, practices specific 
to control of  that pathogen
• Require the facility manager to document 
training of  both current and newly hired 
staff.
6.2.2.1.4. Modifying a food-production or food-
preparation process
• Ensure that food-production or food-
preparation processes are appropriate and 
adequate to prevent further contamination 
of  food or survival and growth of  microbes 
already present in food.
• Modify processes if  needed to reduce risk, 
such as changing a recipe, changing 
a process, reorganizing preparation 
processes, changing storage temperatures, 
or modifying instructions to consumers. 
Evaluate the proposed times, temperatures, 
pH, and water activity level for controlling 
the pathogen of  interest, on the basis of  
sufficient scientific evidence.
• Conduct follow-up monitoring to ensure that
 modified processes have been implemented 
and are effective in addressing the food-
safety problem.
• Put in place a Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Point (HACCP) system or other 
preventive controls.

















6.2. Control of Source
6.2.2.1.5. Modifying the menu
• Eliminate implicated foods from the menu 
until control measures are in place. For 
example, if  shell eggs are implicated, 
remove all foods that contain shell eggs, and 
substitute pasteurized egg product until the 
investigation is complete and proper controls 
are in place.
6.2.2.1.6. Removing infected food workers
• Ensure that infected food workers are 
removed from the workplace (see section 
6.3.3).
6.2.2.1.7. Closing food premises
• If  the facility has multiple problems, and 
if  the owner is unable or unwilling to take 
immediate corrective action, closing the 
premises might be necessary. The facility 
must meet closure requirements as defined 
in local regulations, such as lack of  hot 
water, vermin infestation, or raw surfacing 
sewage, or be determined from observation 
or evidence that disease could be spread due 
to increased risk factors.
• Ask “If  this place is not closed, are more 
people highly likely to become ill? Would I 
let a family member eat here?”
• If  the food premises are in an institution in 
which residents have no alternatives, work 
with institution staff  either to identify 
options for bringing in food or to leave food 
premises open but eliminate high-risk items 
from the menu.
• If  the facility owner will not act voluntarily, 
employ other control measures, such as 
cease-and-desist orders, permit action, and 
hearing in front of  a judge.
• Follow local regulations when requiring 
closure of  food premises. Reopen only when 
risk factors have been eliminated and testing 
indicates the problem has been eliminated.
6.2.2.1.8. Communication with the public
• If  the outbreak involves only one facility, 
determine whether public notification is 
necessary. All members of  the outbreak 
response team (epidemiology, environmental 
health, and laboratory) should be involved 
in making this decision. Ask the following 
questions:
 o Is medical treatment necessary for persons 
who may have been exposed to the 
etiologic agent? If  so, public notification  
is critical.
 o Is public reporting of  suspected illness 
necessary to determine the scope of  the 
outbreak? If  so, public notification might 
be appropriate.
 o Is the outbreak short-term so no 
further risk exists to the public? If  so, 
public notification generally is not 
necessary.
 o Does risk for exposure still exist? People 
take food home from restaurants, so public 
notification still might be appropriate.
• Prepare communication following the 
agency’s risk communication protocols. 
Seek assistance from the agency Public 
Information Officer or the Public 
Information Officer at another agency if  the 
agency with jurisdictional responsibility does 
not have this resource.
6.2.2.2. Foods associated with a processor/producer 
Implication of  multiple food establishments in 
an outbreak or receipt of  multiple, seemingly 
unrelated reports of  illness from consumers 
eating the same type of  food suggest an 
outbreak caused by food contaminated at 
the processor/producer-level. Traceback 
investigations can help identify the point 
in the production and distribution process 
at which the implicated food most likely 
became contaminated and allow for targeted 
environmental health assessments to determine 
how the food became contaminated and to 
recommend specific interventions.

















6.2. Control of Source
Depending on the outbreak and probable 
point of  contamination, most of  the specific 
control measures listed above (6.2.2.1. Food 
associated with food-service establishments, 
or home processing) will also be appropriate 
once the point of  contamination is identified. 
However, food implicated in these outbreaks 
might be more likely to be in distribution, 
at retail establishments or in the homes of  
consumers. Therefore, public health and food-
regulatory agencies also will need to decide 
whether to remove the suspected food from 
the market using the procedures defined in 
6.2.2.2.1 below.
Questions to ask in considering whether to 
remove food from the market
• Is risk to consumers ongoing?
• Is the product still on the market?
• Is the product likely to be in the homes of   
 consumers?
• Does the information justify removing food  
 from the market? Remove the food if
 o Definitive lab results show the outbreak 
pathogen is present in the product. The 
results must be based on a food sample 
that is representative of  the food eaten by 
the cases and has been handled properly 
to avoid cross-contamination.
 o The illness and consumption of  that food 
show a strong epidemiologic association 
(e.g., through a case-control or cohort 
study), even if  the pathogen has not 
been isolated from the food. Strong 
epidemiologic association requires a good 
quality analytic study that definitively links 
the implicated food to the cases.
 o Epidemiologic association is not strong, 
but pathogen is so hazardous that the risk 
to the public is very high. Under these 
circumstances, there may be no analytic, 
controlled studies, but the descriptive 
epidemiology suggests an association 
between the disease and the suspected food.
Fully document the information that led to 
the decision (whether to remove or not remove 
food) and the process used to make the decision.
6.2.2.2.1. Procedures for removing food from  
the market
Once a decision is made to remove food 
from the market, the goal is to remove it as 
quickly and efficiently as possible. Foods 
with short shelf  lives (e.g., fresh produce, meat, 
dairy products) generally are consumed or 
discarded within 7–10 days and already may 
have been disposed of. Foods with longer 
shelf  lives most likely will still be around. Try 
to prevent additional exposure by ensuring 
suspected food is not eaten.
Contact the federal or state regulatory 
agency that has jurisdiction over the 
product. The Food and Drug Administration 
regulates the safety of  most foods, except 
meat, poultry, and pasteurized egg products 
which are regulated by the U.S. Department 
of  Agriculture. FDA (or USDA) will contact 
the manufacturer about the decision to 
remove the product from the market and 
will obtain the manufacturer’s cooperation. 
The manufacturer may decide to issue a 
food recall. In addition, ask retailers within 
your jurisdiction to voluntarily remove the 
product from their shelves and distributors 
to voluntarily withhold the product from 
distribution.
Recall of  food at the processor level generally 
requires federal and/or state action. In some 
jurisdictions, the local health jurisdiction 
will embargo (impound) the food (tagging 
the food to make sure it is not moved or sold 
or ordering it destroyed). USDA or FDA do 
not have authority to mandate such action 
without court order, so they may ask a state 
or local health jurisdiction to embargo the 
food temporarily. However, state and local 
jurisdictions must evaluate the merits of  an 
embargo independently, according to their 
statutes or ordinances.

















6.2. Control of Source
The following recommendations for 
manufacturers and retail establishments can 
help ensure the recall is effective:
Manufacturers
Recall preparedness (before an outbreak 
occurs):
• Maintain product source and shipping 
information for quick access in conducting 
tracebacks and traceforwards during an 
investigation and/or recall.
• Develop the ability to rapidly notify all 
customers of  a recall through blast 
e-mail and fax, calls, and mail to retail 
establishments who purchased recalled 
foods.
• Identify and develop procedures to prevent 
common errors that lead to recalled food 
being put back into commerce (e.g., recalled 
food is returned and accidentally put back 
into distribution by workers).
After a recall is announced:
• Quickly remove recalled contaminated 
product from the distribution system.
• Notify customers through the regulatory 
agencies and news media as needed.
• Ensure retail customers have clearly defined 
storage areas and handling processes for 
recalled products, including denaturing or 
other process to ensure foods are not resold.
• Put in place systems for safe handling or 
disposal of  recalled products to avoid cross-
contamination to other products, accidental 
redistribution, diversion, and creation of  
other hazards.
Retail Establishments
Recall preparedness (before an outbreak 
occurs):
• Maintain product source and shipping 
information for quick access in conducting 
tracebacks and traceforwards during an 
investigation and/or recall.
• When store cards are issued, obtain 
customers’ e-mail addresses, and inform 
them they will receive notifications of  any 
recalls concerning items they purchase. 
Develop a standardized template for 
consumers giving permission to retail stores 
to provide their store card information to 
outbreak investigators.
• Develop the ability to rapidly notify all 
customers of  a recall through blast e-mail 
and fax, calls, and mail to people who 
purchased recalled foods.
• Identify and develop procedures to prevent 
common errors that lead to recalled food 
being put back into commerce (e.g., recalled 
food is returned and accidentally put back 
onto shelves or into distribution by workers; 
product is pulled from sale, but another 
shipment arrives and is put onto the shelves 
or into distribution).
After a recall is announced:
• Quickly remove recalled contaminated 
product from commerce at the site.
• Notify customers through the regulatory 
agencies and news media as needed.
• Post signs at the point of  sale to advise 
consumers about the recall.
• Put in place fail-safe systems that do not 
allow sale of  recalled products (e.g., cash 
register flags recalled products and prohibits 
sale). Ensure stores have clearly defined 
storage areas and handling processes for 
recalled products, including denaturing or 
other process to ensure foods are not resold.
• Put in place systems for safe handling or 
disposal of  recalled products to avoid cross-
contamination to other products, accidental 
restocking, diversion to unsuspecting 
consumers, and creation of  other hazards. 

















6.2. Control of Source
Consider the possibility of  homeless persons 
removing discarded product from the trash.
• For a highly dangerous condition such 
as botulism, food seizure by the health 
department or regulating agency is 
appropriate to ensure immediate and 
complete removal of  the suspected food 
from the market
To improve the effectiveness of  recall measures 
and industry response, health departments can
• Develop a list of  control measures to 
implement immediately when an outbreak-
related or illness-related recall has been 
identified.
• Identify industry needs, and develop 
guidance for interacting with health 
or agriculture officials investigating 
an outbreak. Provide retailers and 
manufacturers with 24/7 contact numbers 
and e-mails for regulators at the local, 
state, and federal levels, including FDA and 
USDA/FSIS.
• Develop guidance for communicating with 
the news media.
• Develop guidelines for mitigating impact 
of  the recall, such as providing refunds for 
returned product.
• Develop templates, message maps, or 
community information sheets for common 
foodborne agents for use during an 
outbreak.
Regulators responsible for retail food 
facilities need a means to notify all food 
facilities in their jurisdiction immediately 
through e-mail, blast fax, or phone calls. 
Identifying subcategories of  facilities is highly 
recommended so notices can be targeted to 
specific facilities (e.g., notices of  a seafood 
recall sent specifically to seafood restaurants). 
Lack of  such a system is not acceptable. This 
process should include food bank donation 
centers and other sites that might have 
received food donations.
If  any distributors or retailers refuse to 
remove the food, issuance of  a public health 
warning and order to require action might be 
necessary. The appropriate agency for taking 
this action depends on the type of  food and 
etiologic agent.
Monitor to ensure the food is completely 
removed. This often requires close cooperation 
among local, state, and federal agencies on 
recall effectiveness checks. If  the product is not 
immediately removed, determine why. (Did the 
manufacturer notify the distributor? Did the 
distributor notify retailers of  the recall? Did 
notifications occur but no action was taken? 
Was returned recalled product diverted and 
sold elsewhere?)
6.2.2.2.2. Communication with the public 
Messages to the public about foodborne 
disease outbreaks should follow good risk 
communication practices. Ideally, templates 
for public messages should be prepared before 
the outbreak and used consistently. See general 
communication section below.
Notify the public if  the outbreak involves 
distributed product. Provide information 
about how to handle the suspected product 
(discard, special preparation instructions, or 
return to retailer). Provide information about 
the disease, including symptoms, mode of  
transmission, prevention, and actions to take if  
illness occurs.
If  the manufacturer refuses to recall the food, 
it should be advised promptly that public 
health agencies or regulators might issue their 
own notice to the public, and the notice could 
include the message that the firm declined to 
voluntarily recall the product. The message to 
the public should describe the problem and 
provide clear actions.
Means of  notification depend on the 
public health risk and might include press 
releases, radio, television, fax, telephone, 

















6.2. Control of Source
e-mail, or letters. The manufacturer, public 
health agencies, regulatory agencies, retail 
food establishment, or all four can initiate 
notification. These releases should be 
coordinated and include consistent messages to 
avoid confusing the public.
Attempt to reach all members of  the 
population at risk, including non-English–
speaking and low-literacy populations. 
Provide only objective, fact-based information 
about the outbreak. Do not give preliminary, 
unconfirmed information. If  a specific 
food—such as a particular brand of  bagged 
baby spinach—is implicated, the press releases 
need to inform consumers whether the local 
jurisdiction is interested in obtaining the 
product from households that still have it, and 
if  not, the proper method of  disposal.
If  the outbreak is large or the etiologic agent 
is highly virulent, consider setting up an 
emergency hotline so the public can call with 
questions. Persons answering the phones 
should be trained to give consistent responses. 
This may require authorizing emergency 
overtime to answer phones after the early 
evening news.
If  press releases are to be issued by retailers 
or manufacturers, relevant local, state, or 
federal officials should review and approve 
them before release. Manufacturers often 
seek guidance on the contents of  their press 
releases, and public health agencies can 
provide needed information.
The state or local agencies responsible for 
the investigation should issue their own 
press releases, even if  the affected industry 
or business also is issuing a release. Local 
press releases often result in better coverage 
from the local media. If  more than one state 
or local agency is involved, coordination of  
press releases is important. If  time allows, 
give affected industry members or businesses 
an opportunity to comment on your releases. 
However, avoid prolonged negotiations about 
wording.
6.2.2.2.3. Postrecall reporting by the business 
If  a business or manufacturer recalls a 
product, it should prepare interim and final 
reports about the recall. The contents of  
these reports are used to determine the need 
for further recall actions.
The reports should include copies of  all 
notices distributed to the public and through 
the distribution chain, as well as the following 
information:
• Circumstances leading to the recall and  
 actions taken,
• Extent of  distribution of  the suspected food,
• Result of  recall (percentage of  suspected  
 food recovered),
• Method of  disposal or reprocessing of   
 suspected food,
• Difficulties experienced in recall, and
• Actions taken to prevent recurrence of  food- 
 safety problems and any recall difficulties.
6.3. Control of Secondary Transmission
6.3.1. Information for Health-Care 
Providers
Communicate with health-care providers in 
the community to encourage them to report 
cases of  the illness under investigation and to 
provide specific treatment and infection control 
guidance. Encourage health-care providers to 
collect appropriate patient specimens.

















6.3. Control of Secondary Transmission
6.3.2. Information for the Public
Any outbreak is an opportunity—or “teachable 
moment”—to reinforce basic food-safety 
messages to the public and to inform the public 
about how to contact appropriate authorities 
to report suspected foodborne illnesses.
6.3.2.1. Personal protection from disease outbreak
• Thoroughly wash hands with soap and 
warm water after defecation and urination, 
and before preparing or consuming food. 
Also wash hands after changing diapers, 
assisting a child at the toilet, and handling 
animals or animal waste. Hand washing is the 
single most important measure to protect the 
health both of  an individual and other people.
• At home or at a social gathering (e.g., 
potluck dinner), avoid eating food that has 
not been handled properly (e.g., hot food 
that has not been kept hot, cold food that 
has not been kept cold).
6.3.2.2. Proper food preparation
• Use best practices when handling food at 
home (thoroughly cook food; keep hot food 
hot and cold food cold; thoroughly clean all 
food-preparation surfaces and utensils with 
soap and water; avoid contaminating food 
that will not be cooked, such as salads, with 
food that must be cooked, e.g., chicken; and 
wash hands frequently with soap and water).
6.3.2.3. Advice on personal hygiene
• If  you are ill, avoid preparing food for others 
until free of  diarrhea or vomiting.
• Wash hands as described above (Section 
6.3.2.1).
• If  someone in the household has diarrhea or 
vomiting, clean toilet seats and flush handles, 
and wash basin taps and washroom door 
handles with disinfectant after use. If  young 
children are infected, undertake these 
cleaning procedures on their behalf. If  
norovirus (which is highly resistant to adverse 
environmental conditions) is involved, 
promptly clean contaminated surfaces with 
at least a 1:50 dilution of  chlorine bleach and 
then rinse. Wash clothes, towels, and linens 
soiled with vomitus or stool at the highest 
temperature the item will allow.
6.3.3. Exclusion of Infected Persons from 
Settings Where Transmission Can Occur 
(including food-preparation, health-care, and 
child-care settings)
Persons with an enteric illness can shed viruses, 
bacteria, or parasites for weeks after symptoms 
end. Infected skin lesions can be a reservoir for 
pathogens, which can be transmitted to food 
through bare-hand contact.
In general, if  a person has been ill and is 
considered a possible source of  pathogens, 
he or she should be restricted to specific 
areas and tasks that provide minimal risk 
for transmitting the disease. Even if  given 
duties not involving food preparation, workers 
infected with norovirus can transmit infection, 
must wash their hands carefully, and avoid 
bare-hand contact with food.
If  restricting the individual is not possible, 
excluding him or her from the facility might 
be necessary until all likelihood of  shedding 
pathogens has passed. Testing the person 
may be necessary to ensure no further risk. 
Persons who are no longer ill with vomiting or 
diarrhea usually can return to work without 
testing if  they practice good personal hygiene 
and are adequately supervised. The potential 
for risk is agent-dependent. For example a 
person shedding E. coli O157:H7 or Shigella is 
more likely to be a public health threat than 
someone shedding Salmonella.
For pathogen-specific guidance and other 
information about restriction and exclusion 
of  food workers, consult the latest version of  
the FDA Food Code at http://www.cfsan.
fda.gov/~dms/fc05-toc.html. State and local 

















6.3. Control of Secondary Transmission
health departments may not have the legal 
authority to exclude food workers unless that 
individual has acute symptoms. In addition, 
scientific evidence supporting exclusion of  
food workers may not be reflected in state or 
local food codes or may not be available at 
all. However, if  the outbreak control team 
believes a public health threat exists, the team 
should strongly recommend exclusion of  
food workers. Consult your local ordinances 
and state statutes to understand the legal 
authorities under which you must operate.
One issue to consider in deciding whether 
to exclude infected persons is the occasional 
retaliation by employers against workers, 
either by having their pay docked during or 
after the exclusion period or being fired. This 
can hamper investigations because employees 
may be reluctant to provide truthful health 
information to avoid exclusion. Strategies that 
can mitigate this concern include developing 
regulations that prohibit retaliation and 
helping employers identify alternate jobs that 
ill food workers can perform.
Identify and dispose of  or embargo all 
food potentially contaminated by the ill or 
infected worker. When determining which 
food is at risk, consider food-preparation 
procedures, dates the food worker worked, and 
dates the food worker probably was able to 
transmit disease.
6.3.4. Infection Control Precautions
Work with the facility operator to create 
a risk-control plan or consent agreement 
so the operator knows exactly what steps 
need to be taken and has committed to 
control the situation and prevent additional 
outbreaks. The risk-control plan or agreement 
can include actions above and beyond those 
required by regulation (e.g., extra temperature 
checks and logging of  temperature, mandatory 
glove use by all food workers, routine inquiries 
of  staff  before their shifts about whether they 
have had diarrhea or vomiting in the last 
24 hours). Ideally both epidemiologists and 
environmental health specialists are involved 
in creating this plan or agreement. Important 
aspects of  the plan are (a) employee training 
and (b) adequate oversight to ensure employees 
follow proper procedures.
Educate food workers about the implicated 
disease (symptoms, mode of  transmission, 
and prevention) and about general infection 
control precautions.
Emphasize the importance of  thorough hand 
washing and not working when ill.
Reinforce the following:
• Policy of  no bare-hand contact with  
 ready-to-eat foods,
• Proper use of  gloves and utensils when  
 handling ready-to-eat foods,
• Proper holding temperatures, and
• Proper procedures for rapid cooling and  
 thorough cooking and reheating of  foods.
Infection control precautions for hospitalized 
and institutionalized persons with infectious 
diarrhea (particularly easily transmissible 
infections such as Salmonella serotype Typhi, 
Shigella, and norovirus) include
• Isolation of  patients (e.g., in a private room  
 with separate toilet if  possible);
• Barrier nursing precautions;
• Strict control of  the disposal or  
 decontamination of  contaminated clothing,  
 surfaces, and bedding; and
• Strict observation of  personal hygiene  
 measures (see above).
Use chlorine solutions or other approved 
effective sanitizers or methods (e.g., steam 
cleaning carpets) rather than standard cleaning 
chemicals to clean and disinfect all surfaces 
after a norovirus outbreak.

















6.3. Control of Secondary Transmission
Recommended practices for infection control 
frequently are changed and updated. Routinely 
check key sources, such as CDC, to ensure 
your organization’s recommended practices 
are current.
6.3.5. Prophylaxis
Set up processes with area hospitals, 
physicians, local health departments, specialty 
clinics, or other health-care providers to 
provide prophylaxis if  needed. Have tested 
plans in place for large-scale prophylaxis.
Develop processes to identify and 
communicate with persons who may need 
prophylaxis. Depending on the organism, this 
might include giving special consideration to 
protecting special risk groups. For example,
• Certain groups are at higher risk than others 
for severe illness and poor outcomes from 
foodborne disease, including infants, 
pregnant women, and immunocompromised 
persons. Safe food-preparation practices 
and hand washing particularly need to be 
emphasized to these groups.
• Specific advice might need to be issued 
to certain groups, such as advising pregnant 
women and immunocompromised persons 
against consuming unpasteurized dairy 
products or other products potentially 
containing Listeria.
• Persons with underlying chronic hepatitis B 
or C may need to be advised to be 
vaccinated against hepatitis A.
6.4. Communication
6.4.1. With Other Members of the 
Investigation and Control Team
Communicate actions taken and outbreak 
status information to all persons involved in 
an outbreak investigation, including those in 
different agencies or different departments 
within the agency.
Keep the owners or managers of  the 
implicated establishment informed, and 
notify them that they must share any new 
reports of  illness or other new information 
that could affect the investigation. Illness 
complaints reported to retail food chains or 
the manufacturer about a commercial product 
may lead to expansion of  a recall if  additional 
product codes are associated with illness.
6.4.2. With Agency Executives and  
Other Agencies
Ensure that agency heads routinely receive 
information about the status of  the outbreak 
investigation and cleanup.
If  the outbreak is potentially multijurisdictional, 
ensure that other relevant agencies and organi-
zations routinely receive status reports. These 
might include local, state, and federal health, 
agriculture, and regulatory agencies. If  an 
outbreak potentially involves a food from a 
source outside the jurisdiction identifying the 
problem, notify all appropriate surrounding 
health jurisdictions, and call the manufacturer 
and the retail food store chain (if  one is involved) 
to determine whether they also have received 
illness complaints. This early communication 
may help to identify the source quickly.
6.4.3. With the Public
If  the public has been informed about an 
outbreak, periodically issue updates about the 
outbreak’s status.
Recognize that the public obtains news from 
multiple sources—the Internet, television, 
radio, and newspapers. Use all available 
sources to disseminate information. Know the 
typical deadlines for local news outlets, and try 
to release information within those timelines.


















If  the public is not receiving needed 
information from the public health agency, 
people will get it from other sources (which 
might not be accurate). The public health 
agency should be seen as and act as the most 
reliable source of  information.
An agency cannot wait until all the facts are 
available before communicating with the 
public. People need enough information to 
help them make good decisions to protect their 
health.
Important terms (e.g., risk, bacteria) 
might seem common but in fact often are 
misunderstood. Adopt a standardized 
format for reporting risk information. 
Communications about foodborne disease risks 
should be routine (meaning the same process 
should be used each time); this helps make the 
process more familiar and reduces concerns 
about the message.
In communication planning, adopt 
standardized scripts for reporting complex 
procedural or technical information about 
the investigation and actions the public 
should take. Messages to the public should be 
tested first with representatives of  the target 
population.
6.4.4. With the Industry
Contact the firm(s) directly linked to an 
outbreak as soon as possible, and tell them 
as much as possible. Tell them about the 
findings that have implicated their product 
and clearly explain the significance of  the 
findings. Advise them about potential outbreak 
control measures, such as voluntary recall of  
an implicated product. This communication 
can be complicated by an enforcement action 
that may result from the investigation, but 
honesty and forthrightness with the regulated 
firms remain important. Large firms often 
have their own staff  who understand risk 
communication and know what decisions to 
make. Some medium-sized and many small 
firms do not have such expertise and need 
more guidance. Laws and policies of  state and 
local governments differ for these situations. 
Understand your own legal framework so you 
know how to interact with firms potentially 
linked to an outbreak.
The food industry has many trade associations. 
Some overlap, but in general, every segment 
of  the food industry has an association. 
State, local, and federal agencies need 
existing working relationships with these 
associations before an outbreak. At the time 
of  an outbreak, outreach by government 
agencies to the appropriate associations with 
information about the outbreak and about 
actions members should take is helpful to 
prevent spread of  the current problem or 
similar problems in their firms. Similarly, 
establishing working relationships with 
food manufacturing facilities in an agency’s 
jurisdiction can help smooth the investigation 
and control process should an outbreak be 
associated with those facilities.
Outbreaks can be a teachable moment 
for the food industry. When the news 
media carries stories about an outbreak, 
communication within the industry is lively, 
often with misinformation. Food-safety 
and public health agencies need to dispel 
misconceptions before they lead to other 
problems. These agencies also need to 
explain their response to the outbreak and 
restore public faith in the future safety of  the 
implicated product.
Food-safety and public health agencies 
also can collaborate with industry on long-
term development of  training materials for 
members and can speak at industry meetings 
to clarify the prevention message.

















6.5. End of the Outbreak
6.6. Debriefing
6.5.1. Determining When an Outbreak  
is Over
Most outbreaks are considered over when 
two or more incubation periods have passed 
with no new cases. This arbitrary rule may 
not apply to clusters with low attack rates, 
and cases from some sources may appear 
intermittently for years.
6.5.2. Determining When to Remove 
Restrictions
Remove restrictions when no further risk to the 
public exists, i.e., when
• Risk factors in the facility have been  
 eliminated,
• Ill food workers have recovered and are no  
 longer shedding pathogens,
• Tests indicate no further contamination,
• Employees have been taught how to avoid  
 a problem, and
• Managers agree to provide appropriate  
 oversight.
6.5.3. Postoutbreak Monitoring
Monitor the population at risk for signs and 
symptoms to ensure the outbreak has ended 
and the source has been eliminated. Consider 
conducting active surveillance, working with 
health-care providers to increase their vigilance 
for cases, and collecting stool samples from the 
population at risk.
Monitor the implicated foods or facilities 
to make sure no further contamination is 
occurring.
Maintain communication with the implicated 
facility, and tell them if  additional information 
becomes available.
Increase the number of  routine inspections 
at the implicated facility to ensure they 
comply with all required procedures. Old, 
unsafe practices often are difficult to change, 
and new practices might need to be used 
for >1 months before they become routine. 
Consider customized training to support the 
desired behavior change. Determine whether 
behavioral change has occurred long-term. If  
the inspection program is fee-based, consider 
charging more for additional inspections needed 
when a facility is implicated in an outbreak.
All members of  an outbreak control team 
should be briefed about the results of  
the investigation. The complexity of  the 
debriefing depends on the size of  the outbreak. 
For a small outbreak associated with a single 
facility or event, a short written summary may 
be sufficient. For a large outbreak involving 
multiple agencies, a formal debriefing meeting 
is appropriate.
A formal debriefing meeting should
• Identify the cause of  the outbreak and 
measures to prevent additional outbreaks at 
this and other facilities;
• Identify the long-term and structural control 
measures, and plan their implementation;
• Assess the effectiveness of  outbreak control 
measures and difficulties in implementing 
them;
• Assess whether further scientific studies 
should be conducted;
• Clarify resource needs, structural changes, 
or training needs to optimize future outbreak 
response;
• Identify factors that compromised the 
investigations, and seek solutions;


















• Identify necessary changes to current 
investigation and control guidelines and 
development of  new guidelines or protocols 
as required; and
• Discuss any legal issues that may have arisen.
If  additional information becomes available in 
the weeks or months after the outbreak and the 
official debrief, disseminate that information 
to the outbreak control team and appropriate 
external partners.
6.7. Outbreak Report
Prepare reports for all outbreaks. Again, 
the complexity will depend on the size of  
the outbreak. For small outbreaks, a simple 
summary (following a template established by 
the agency) should suffice. The report can be 
used to educate staff  and to look for trends 
across outbreaks that can be useful in future 
investigations.
Use outbreak reports as a continuous quality 
improvement opportunity. If  all the after-
action reports say the same thing, then 
nothing is being corrected.
The final report of  a large outbreak should 
be comprehensive, with information provided 
by all team participants, and should be 
disseminated to all participating organizations. 
Sample outbreak reports are available on the 
CIFOR Clearinghouse website.
Given that outbreak reports, especially reports 
for large outbreaks, are likely to be subject 
to Freedom of  Information Act requests, 
they should be written with public disclosure 
in mind. The reports should not identify 
individuals or other legally nonpublic 
information unless absolutely necessary, nor 
should they include inappropriate language. 
Proper care in writing the report will save 
time redacting information when the report 
is released to the public. Some jurisdictions 
allow or mandate the inclusion of  identifying 
information, so know your local policies and 
laws.
6.8. Other Follow-Up Activities
6.8.1. Future Studies and Research
The outbreak investigation findings may 
indicate the need for future research. For 
example, investigators may determine that for 
certain pathogens in certain foods, standard 
control measures do not seem effective or that 
routine handling practices and their role in 
outbreaks are not completely understood. Such 
observations should be considered for in-depth 
study, either by the food-safety or public health 
agency or by research centers. Identifying 
issues that need follow-up research is 
important to improving the practice of  
responses to outbreaks of  foodborne diseases.
6.8.2. Publication of Outbreak Results
If  something unusual characterized the 
outbreak (e.g., unusual exposure, presence of  a 
pathogen in a food where it had not previously 
been seen) the report should be disseminated 
more widely (Epi-X, MMWR, or other 
national forum; peer-reviewed journals).
Important lessons learned (such as new 
investigation methods that proved particularly 
helpful, control measures that seemed 
particularly effective, actions taken that seemed 
to shorten the outbreak) should be published in 
an appropriate national forum.

















6.8. Other Follow-Up Activities
6.8.3. Education
An outbreak may identify the need for broad 
education of  the public, the food-service and 
food-processing industries, or health-care 
providers. Public service announcements 
may be necessary to remind the public about 
food-preparation precautions. Training for 
food-service workers and managers and food 
processors might need to be modified to 
address specific concerns. Managers need to 
oversee training of  food-service workers and 
food processors and their use of  recommended 
procedures. Health-care providers may need 
continuing education focused on diagnosing, 
treating, or reporting foodborne diseases. Such 
actions can help prevent future outbreaks or 
reduce the number of  cases or severity of  
illness during an outbreak.
6.8.4. Policy Action
Information gained during an outbreak may 
identify the need for new public health or 
regulatory policy at the local, state, or federal 
level. Establishment of  different inspection 
practices, source controls, or surveillance 
procedures, or of  increased control over the 
recall process might be necessary. Reports 
of  past outbreaks should be analyzed to 
determine whether multiple outbreaks support 
the need for new policy. Other public health 
and environmental health agencies also 
should be consulted to determine whether 
concurrence exists on the need for new policy. 
If  so, the issue should be presented to the 
appropriate jurisdictional authority using the 
appropriate policy development processes.
6.9. Multijurisdictional Considerations for Control Measures
Although control measures typically 
are implemented at the local level, 
multijurisdictional outbreaks require extensive 
coordination among agencies to ensure control 
measures are implemented consistently and are 
effective. See Chapter 7 for Multijurisdictional 
Investigation Guidelines.
6.10 Indicators/Measures
Key indicators to help assess control measures 
and the overall success of  efforts to halt 
outbreaks have been developed and can be 
found in Chapter 8.



















Special Considerations for 
Multijurisdictional Outbreaks
A 
multijurisdictional foodborne disease event requires the 
resources of more than one local, state, territorial, tribal, 
or federal public health or food-regulatory agency to 
detect, investigate, or control. A multijurisdictional investigation may 
involve a foodborne disease outbreak or the distribution or recall of a 
contaminated food product.
These guidelines are intended to help improve communication 
and coordination among agencies at all levels of government that 
are investigating multijurisdictional outbreaks. The guidelines are 
proposed to help agencies identify multijurisdictional outbreaks and 
increase the speed of investigation and control of outbreaks.
















































Specifically the guidelines have the following 
objectives:
A. Define when an outbreak is considered 
multijurisdictional,
B. Establish a framework for rapidly assessing 
whether a given foodborne disease event 
affects multiple jurisdictions,
C. Promote early and effective communication 
and coordination among agencies involved 
in multijurisdictional investigations,
D. Detail specific actions that might be needed 
in a multijurisdictional outbreak,
E. Provide guidance on managing the 
transition between the phases of  an 
outbreak investigation during which 
leadership of  the investigation changes, and
F. Provide guidance on post-outbreak 
debriefing and dissemination of  findings.
7.0.1. Scope
These guidelines are subject to two major 
limitations. First, foodborne disease outbreak 
investigation activities are subject to state law. 
Thus, these guidelines may need to be adapted 
to reflect the relationships between state and 
local agencies within a state. Second, they 
cannot cover all possibilities that might emerge 
during an outbreak investigation. However, the 
principles of  communication and coordination 
established by these guidelines should help to 
quickly resolve problems.
For ease of  reading, these guidelines focus 
on relationships among local, state, and 
federal levels. Although territories, tribal 
lands, and the District of  Columbia represent 
independent administrative structures with 
unique legal standing, the general principles 
of  multijurisdictional investigations articulated 
here should be useful for health officials in 
these areas as well.
7.1. Background
In the United States, local or state public 
health or food-regulatory agencies conduct 
most investigations of  foodborne illness 
following routine policies and procedures. 
In many local agencies, sporadic cases of  
specific foodborne disease are investigated by 
communicable disease control or public health 
nursing programs. Consumer complaints about 
foodborne illness frequently are investigated by 
food-regulatory programs. However, outbreak 
investigations usually require coordination 
among these programs at the local level. Thus, 
effective communication and coordination 
generally are required for successful 
investigations of  foodborne disease outbreaks.
In 2001, the National Food Safety System 
(NFSS) Project, Outbreak Coordination and 
Investigation Workgroup, published guidelines 
for improving coordination and communication 
in multistate foodborne disease outbreak 
investigations. The NFSS multistate guidelines 
were developed specifically to address the 
challenges of  coordinating large and complex 
investigations of  foodborne disease outbreaks 
among multiple state and federal public health 
and food-regulatory agencies.
Since development of  these guidelines, the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, raised 
concerns about the potential for intentional 
contamination of  food at all levels of  the 
food system, which would require interaction 
among agencies that previously had not worked 
together. In addition, large multistate case 
clusters and foodborne disease outbreaks have 
continued. For example, during 2002–2005, 
at least 6% of  foodborne disease outbreaks 
reported to the CDC electronic Foodborne 
Outbreak Reporting System (eFORS) involved 















































multistate or multicounty exposures or affected 
residents of  multiple states or counties (Table 
7.1). Furthermore, 40% of  E. coli O157:H7 
outbreaks and 25% of  Salmonella or hepatitis 
A outbreaks were multijurisdictional, largely 
due to the use of  PulseNet for surveillance of  
infection with E. coli O157:H7 and Salmonella. 
Thus, for these most important foodborne 
pathogens, the need for multijurisdictional 
coordination should be anticipated during the 
earliest stages of  an investigation.
The Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak 
Responses (CIFOR) was created in 2006 to 
help develop model programs and processes 
to facilitate the investigation and control 
of  foodborne disease outbreaks. CIFOR 
determined that one priority would be to go 
beyond multistate outbreaks by also developing 
guidelines for multijurisdictional outbreaks. 
Multijurisdictional guidelines apply to multiple 
states but also include localities within a state 
and outbreaks involving multiple agencies 
(Table 7.2).
Recent experiences with multijurisdictional 
investigations have pointed to two 
overriding concerns with communication 
and coordination of  multijurisdictional 
investigations. The first is to establish criteria 
by which a local health agency can recognize 
that a foodborne disease outbreak under 
investigation is multijurisdictional and to 
facilitate rapid communication of  that fact to 
all affected agencies. The second is to establish 
effective means of  integrating local agencies 
into large, multistate investigations that are 
detected and coordinated on a national level.
Table 7 .1 .  Number of multistate exposure, multistate resident, multicounty exposure,  














Confirmed Etiology 1903 43 34 122 31
Escherichia coli 
O157:H7 75 11 1 17 1
Salmonella 448 24 10 65 14
Clostridium 
perfringens 90 0 1 1 2
Staphylococcus 
aureus 61 0 2 3 1
Hepatitis A 24 1 0 5 0
Norovirus 770 0 13 12 9
Other 391 4 6 18 3
Multiple 44 3* 1† 1‡ 1§
Suspected Etiology 1402 0 3 17 18
Unknown Etiology 1438 0 10 17 12
tOtaL 4743 43 47 156 61
* Three multistate exposure outbreaks involving multiple etiologies; 1 Salmonella outbreak caused by 
serotypes Anatum, Muenchen, Javiana, Thompson, and Typhimurium; another Salmonella outbreak caused 
by serotypes Saint Paul and Typhimurium; and a third Salmonella outbreak caused by serotypes Enteritidis, 
Kentucky, and Typhimurium.
†One multistate resident outbreak caused by C. parvum and E. coli O111.
‡ One multicounty exposure Salmonella outbreak caused by serotypes Adelaide and Hadar.
§ One multicounty resident Salmonella outbreak caused by serotypes Newport and Typhimurium.
















































Table 7 .2 .  Categories of multijurisdictional outbreaks
1. Outbreaks affecting multiple local health jurisdictions (e.g., city, county, town) within the same state
2. Outbreaks involving multiple states
3. Outbreaks involving multiple countries
4. Outbreaks affecting multiple distinct agencies (e.g., public health, food-regulatory, emergency  
 management)
5. Outbreaks, regardless of jurisdiction, caused by highly pathogenic or unusual agent (e.g., Clostridium  
 botulinum) that may require specialized laboratory testing, investigation procedures, or treatment
6. Outbreaks in which the suspected or implicated vehicle is a commercially distributed, processed, or  
 ready-to-eat food contaminated before the point of service
7. Outbreaks involving large numbers of cases that may require additional resources to investigate
8. Outbreaks in which intentional contamination is suspected
7.2. Major Indicators of a Multijurisdictional Outbreak 
and Notification Steps
After recognizing a foodborne disease event 
requires multijurisdictional investigation, 
agencies that might need to participate in 
the investigation and agencies that might 
be otherwise affected by the event should 
be immediately notified (Table 7.2, Figure 
7.1). Specific examples of  these indicators 
and required notification steps are described 
below (Table 7.3). In some states, functions 
identified as occurring at the local level may be 
performed at the state level.
Table 7 .3 . 	Examples	of	major	indicators	and	required	notification	steps
OUTBREAK 
DETECTION 
MAjOR INDICATOR NOTIFICATION STEPS
Local Level Commercially distributed, processed, or 
ready-to-eat food contaminated before 
point of service suspected or implicated 
as outbreak vehicle.
Immediately notify state health department, 
relevant state food-regulatory agency, CDC, 
and FDA or USDA/FSIS (depending on 
product and on local and state reporting 
requirements).
Fresh produce item contaminated 
before point of service is suspected or 
implicated as outbreak vehicle.
Immediately notify state health department, 
relevant state food-regulatory agency, CDC, 
and FDA, depending on state and local 
reporting requirements.
Ground beef is implicated in an outbreak 
of Escherichia coli O157:H7 infections.
Immediately notify state health department, 
relevant state food-regulatory agency, CDC, 
and USDA/FSIS, depending on state and 
local reporting requirements.


















































MAjOR INDICATOR NOTIFICATION STEPS
Local Level Molecular subtype characteristics of 
etiologic agent matches the pattern of 
an agent independently associated with 
other foodborne disease outbreaks.
Immediately notify state health department, 
relevant state food-regulatory agency, 
CDC, and FDA or USDA/FSIS, depending 
on product and state and local reporting 
requirements.
Intentional contamination of food item is 
suspected or implicated.
Immediately notify state health department, 
relevant state food-regulatory agency, CDC, 
and FDA or USDA/FSIS (depending on 
product), local law enforcement, and FBI.
Illnesses are associated with 
multiple restaurants or food-service 
establishments, especially when those 
establishments are part of the same chain.
Immediately notify state health department, 
relevant state food-regulatory agency, 
and CDC, depending on local and state 
reporting requirements.
State Level Increase of sporadic infections with 
common subtype characteristics 
identified across multiple jurisdictions.
Immediately notify affected local agencies, 
CDC, and state and federal food-regulatory 
agencies.
Multiple common-source outbreaks 
linked by common agent, food, or water.
Immediately notify affected local agencies, 
CDC, and relevant state and federal food-
regulatory agencies.
Microbiologic food testing by state food-
regulatory agency prompts recall.
Immediately notify affected state and local 
public health agencies, CDC, relevant 
federal food-regulatory agencies.
Illnesses are associated with 
multiple restaurants or food-service 
establishments, especially when those 
establishments are part of the same chain.
Immediately notify relevant state food-
regulatory agency and CDC, depending 
on product and local and state reporting 
requirements.
Federal Level Increase of sporadic infections with 
common subtype characteristics 
identified across multiple states.
Immediately notify affected state and 
local public health agencies, federal food-
regulatory agencies.
Multiple common-source outbreaks 
linked by common agent, food, or water.
Immediately notify affected state and local 
public health agencies, CDC, relevant state 
and federal food-regulatory agencies.
Microbiologic food testing by, or reported 
to, FDA or USDA/FSIS prompts recall.
Immediately notify affected state and local 
public health agencies, CDC, relevant state 
and federal food-regulatory agencies.
Abbreviations: CDC = Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; FDA = Food and Drug Administration; 
USDA/FSIS = U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service; FBI = Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.
7.2. Major Indicators of a Multijurisdictional Outbreak 
and Notification Steps















































Figure 7 .1 .  Multi-jurisdictional Outbreak Decision Tree for Primary Agency  
 Investigating Foodborne Illnesses
This decision tree can assist in determining if a detected outbreak or case cluster is 
multijurisdictional in nature.
7.2. Major Indicators of a Multijurisdictional Outbreak 
and Notification Steps
Is it spread over more than 
one geographic jurisdiction?
Does it involve multiple agencies
(e.g. Public Health, Agriculture, 
Food Regulatory, Emergency 
Management?)
Does it involve an unusual
or particularly pathogenic
organism?
Does it involve a
commercially distributed
processed ready to eat item?










































































7.3. Coordination of Multijurisdictional Investigations
After notification of  affected agencies, 
coordinating the multijurisdictional 
investigation may require establishment of  
a coordinating office to collect, organize, 
and disseminate collective data from the 
investigation. Depending on the scope and 
nature of  the multijurisdictional event, the 
coordinating office may be located at a local 
or state health or food-regulatory agency or at 
CDC, FDA, or USDA/FSIS.
Several principles guide the decision about 
where to locate the coordinating office for a 
given multijurisdictional investigation. The 
primary goal is to avoid interagency conflict 
about coordination that might distract from 
prompt conduct of  the investigation.
• Outbreaks are most efficiently investigated
as close to the source as possible. In 
general, investigations should be coordinated 
at the level at which the outbreak originally 
was detected and investigated. This is likely 
to be where most relevant investigation 
materials will reside, which can facilitate 
organization and analysis of  the data. An 
outbreak involving several local health 
agencies might best be coordinated by a 
lead local agency. Similarly, investigation 
of  a multistate outbreak with most cases 
in one or a few adjacent states might best 
be coordinated by a lead state agency. 
Investigations of  outbreaks of  more widely 
dispersed sporadic cases might best be 
coordinated by CDC.
• The coordinating office must have 
sufficient resources, expertise, and 
legal authority to collect, organize, and 
disseminate data from the investigation. 
Many local agencies might not have 
sufficient resources to effectively coordinate 
a multijurisdictional investigation, or 
state rules might assign jurisdiction over 
multicounty investigations to the state 
health department. In these situations, the 
coordinating office should be located at the 
state level. In multistate investigations, the 
coordinating office should be located at CDC 
if  no individual state is prepared to do so. In 
multistate investigations led by an individual 
state, CDC should support the investigation 
in coordination with the lead agency.
• Outbreak investigations progress through 
phases of  activity, and leadership of  the 
investigation should reflect the focus of  
the investigation at the time. Typically, 
epidemiologic efforts to characterize the 
outbreak by person, place, and time dominate 
the early stages of  an outbreak investigation. 
Efforts to identify the mode of  transmission 
and food vehicle begin to incorporate 
environmental health specialists and food 
regulators. Determining contributing factors, 
conducting regulatory tracebacks, and 
implementing control measures move the 
investigation into the food-regulatory realm. 
Transition of  leadership within the outbreak 
control team should be planned in advance 
by consensus and communicated to the 
entire team. These phases of  activity can be 
elaborated as follows:
 o Investigation of  human illness outbreaks
should be coordinated within public 
health agencies. In addition to public 
health agencies’ greater expertise 
and experience in conducting these 
investigations, rules governing the 
reporting and collection of  information 
about human patients require that 
authorized public health agencies 
maintain and protect that information. 
Although deidentified information may 
be shared across agencies, the redaction 
process may reduce the value of  the 
information available for analysis.
 o Investigations of  food contamination 
events should be coordinated within 
food-regulatory agencies. In addition to 
food-regulatory agencies’ greater expertise 
and experience with these investigations, 
rules governing the collection of  















































7.3. Coordination of Multijurisdictional Investigations
product manufacturing and distribution 
information may dictate that authorized 
food-regulatory agencies not share that 
information with outbreak investigators 
in other agencies. If  that information is 
important to the investigation, outbreak 
investigators should consider collecting 
that information directly, even if  doing so 
results in some duplication of  effort.
• Sharing of  information between public 
health and food-regulatory agencies 
is critical to the effectiveness of  
multijurisdictional investigations. The 
need to share information frequently 
challenges the legal authority of  each party. 
However, rapid and open information 
sharing can greatly enhance the efficiency 
and effectiveness of  multijurisdictional 
investigations. For example, public health 
agencies need access to detailed product 
source and distribution data to conduct 
epidemiologic investigations and evaluate 
potential public health interventions. 
Similarly, food-regulatory agencies need 
detailed case information and preliminary 
results of  epidemiologic investigations 
to guide environmental assessments and 
tracebacks. Because these activities build on 
each other, establishing information-sharing 
protocols during the earliest stages of  the 
investigation is critical. State, local, and federal 
public health officials should ensure that their 
agencies have the legal authorities needed to 
share information and that their professional 
staff  understand those authorities. Because 
federal agencies, by law, are prevented from 
sharing certain data, state and local public 
health officials may need to work directly with 
the establishment implicated in the outbreak 
to obtain those data.
• When an incident involves an agricultural 
commodity and the bulk of  the commodity 
is produced in a limited number of  states, 
those state agricultural agencies should be 
informed of  the outbreak and its progress. 
They too will be receiving inquiries about 
the safety of  their produce/product and 
have a legitimate interest and role to play 
in determining potential sources of  the 
vehicle, as well as preparing for potential 
environmental assessments to determine 
possible points of  contamination, take 
appropriate samples etc. Communication 
with those states, even where no cases occur 
in those states, is essential.
• Identifying the source of  a multi-
jurisdictional outbreak represents a 
collaborative process among local, 
state, and federal agencies and industry. 
Individual food companies and trade 
associations should be engaged early on 
to help with the investigation. Industry 
collaborators may be able to provide 
important information about food product 
identities, formulations and distribution 
patterns that can improve hypothesis 
generation and assist in traceback efforts to 
aid hypothesis testing. Early engagement of  
industry also can facilitate control measures 
by allowing affected industries opportunity 
to implement product withdrawal or recall 
procedures in an orderly way.
• Releasing public information about the 
outbreak should be coordinated with the 
lead investigating agency, when feasible. 
Although the public and news media are 
not aware of  most outbreak investigations, 
the results of  investigations are public 
information. In addition, responding to 
media attention is important to address 
public concerns about the outbreak. 
Although individual agencies participating 
in the investigation may be obligated to 
respond to media inquiries, a coordinated 
communications plan can help provide a 
consistent message about the progress of  the 
investigation or the source of  the outbreak. 
Coordinating communications with the 
media is particularly important when media 
attention is needed for public action to avoid 














































7.3. Coordination of Multijurisdictional Investigations
exposure to a specific contamination source, 
such as a recalled food product.
• Most health departments have incident 
command systems (ICS) that guide 
outbreak responses within the 
public health agencies. Historically 
multijurisdictional foodborne disease 
outbreak investigations have not required 
formal activation of  ICS. ICS are structures 
that provide for internal communications 
within a government system among primary 
event responders, public information officers, 
and security and safety officers and for 
external liaison with various organizations. 
In concept, the ICS structures provide for 
communication and coordination among 
agencies involved with responding to a 
multijurisdictional outbreak of  foodborne 
disease. However, even though the principles 
of  multijurisdictional investigations might be 
similar to ICS responses, in many states and 
local jurisdictions, ICS are formal structures 
controlled by public safety officials with no 
other jurisdiction for food-safety or outbreak 
control. In these situations, activating ICS 
might initiate actions that distract from 
the prompt conduct of  the investigation. 
Agencies involved in foodborne disease 
outbreak investigation and response should 
decide in advance whether and how to apply 
an ICS, and, if  applicable, incorporate the 
ICS structure into their response planning. 
Such planning should be coordinated with 
all other agencies that may be drawn into the 
investigation and response over time. Most 
foodborne disease outbreak investigations do 
not require formal activation of  ICS, but may 
benefit from application of  ICS principles 
and methods. However, if  someone who 
claims to have tampered with food 
contacts an agency, or in any outbreak 
in which intentional contamination is 
suspected, notification of  law enforcement 
officials and assessment of  the credibility 
of  the threat are essential. If  the threat is 
credible, the outbreak will move into a law 
enforcement realm with activation of  the ICS.
• The agency coordinating the investigation 
should conduct an after-action review. 
The coordinating agency should review 
the conduct of  the investigation with 
collaborating agencies, summarize the 
effectiveness of  communication and 
coordination among jurisdictions, and 
identify specific gaps or problems that 
arose during the investigation. Industry 
representatives should also be included to 
share lessons learned.
• All multijurisdictional outbreak 
investigations should be reported as such 
to eFORS.
7.4. Outbreak Detection and Investigation by Level
The following sections are organized by the 
level at which an outbreak is recognized and 
the actions that should follow that recognition.
7.4.1. Outbreak Detection and 
Investigation at the Local Level
7.4.1.1. Detect outbreak 
Outbreaks are detected at the local level by 
one1 of  the following means:
• Consumer complaint identifies group  
 exposure with multiple illnesses.
• Multiple consumer complaints received  
 about the same source.
• Health-care provider reports group  
 exposure with multiple illnesses.
• Investigation of  sporadic case identifies  
 group exposure with multiple illnesses.
• Investigation of  sporadic case cluster  
 identifies common source.















































7.4. Outbreak Detection and Investigation by Level
7.4.1.2. Ensure notification 
With initiation of  an outbreak investigation, a 
local agency should ensure notification of  the 
following agencies, and provide subsequent 
updates as appropriate in accordance with 
state procedures:
• Affected and surrounding county and 
city health departments (epidemiology, 
environmental health, public health 
laboratory).
• State health department (epidemiology, 
environmental health, laboratory).
7.4.1.3. Provide coordination 
During the investigation, a local agency needs 
to coordinate the epidemiology, environmental 
health, regulatory, and laboratory components 
of  the investigation.
When findings indicate that multiple 
jurisdictions might be involved, additional 
communication and coordination are needed:
• Referrals and requests for assistance in  
 incidents of  local significance.
Incident: Local agency identifies a likely 
foodborne disease outbreak in another 
jurisdiction.
Action: Ensure notification of  the 
affected jurisdiction immediately.
Incident: Common-source outbreak 
identified in one jurisdiction has cases 
among persons who reside in two or more 
local jurisdictions.
Action: Request assistance to contact and 
interview cases in other jurisdictions.
These investigations are handled in accordance 
with routine polices and procedures under 
local agency leadership unless otherwise 
specified by state procedures. The level of  
state involvement depends on local or state 
protocols.
• Referrals and requests for assistance in 
incidents representing a transition from 
local to state significance.
Incident: Common-source outbreak identified 
in one jurisdiction, investigation implicates 
processed food or fresh produce item, 
contaminated before the point of  service, in 
absence of  other contributing factors.
Action: Ensure notification of  appropriate 
food-regulatory agencies of  probable 
contaminated food vehicle; trace back 
source to the point where contamination 
most likely occurred; or determine whether 
responsibility for the investigation needs to 
be transferred to a state or federal agency.
Action: Ensure notification of  other 
jurisdictions that might be investigating 
similar related events of  results of  
outbreak investigations regarding agent 
and vehicle.
Action: Subtype agent; upload patterns 
to PulseNet.
Incident: Common-source outbreak 
identified in one jurisdiction, linked 
to outbreaks identified in other local 
jurisdictions, by common agent, food, or 
water.
Action: Ensure notification of  
appropriate food-regulatory agencies and 
other jurisdictions as described above.
Action: Subtype agents associated with 
outbreaks; upload patterns to PulseNet.
Action: Establish coordinating office (or 
individual) for the investigations to collect, 
organize, and disseminate all the data.
Incident: Cluster(s) of  sporadic infections 
with common subtype characteristics 
identified in one local jurisdiction.
Action: Upload patterns to PulseNet.
Action: Interview cases and, once 
hypotheses are generated, controls using 
standardized questionnaire to obtain 
detailed food and environmental exposure 
histories, including product brand and 
retail source.














































7.4. Outbreak Detection and Investigation by Level
Action: Ensure notification of  
appropriate food-regulatory agencies 
of  investigation and potential need to 
initiate investigations to elaborate and test 
hypotheses.
Action: Ensure notification of other 
jurisdictions likely to have additional cases, 
and distribute summary data about cases, 
descriptive epidemiology, investigation 
protocols, and standardized questionnaires 
to jurisdictions.
Action: Establish coordinating office  
(or individual) for investigation to collect, 
organize, and disseminate collective data.
These investigations require information 
sharing and coordination among multiple 
local agencies under local agency leadership 
unless otherwise specified by state procedures. 
The state receives information and provides 
consultation. Emergency management systems 
are not activated.
7.4.2. Outbreak Detection and 
Investigation at the State Level
7.4.2.1. Detect outbreak 
Outbreaks typically are detected at the state 
level by one of  the following means:
• Common-source outbreaks in multiple 
local jurisdictions, or multiple states linked 
by common agent, food, or water.
• Cluster(s) of  sporadic infections with 
common subtype characteristics identified 
across multiple local jurisdictions.
• Statewide increase identified of  
sporadic infections with common subtype 
characteristics.
• Information or alert from another public 
health agency, food-regulatory agency, or 
another country.
7.4.2.2. Ensure notification 
With initiation of  an outbreak investigation, 
the state public health agency should ensure 
notification of  the following agencies and 
provide subsequent updates as appropriate:
• All local health departments likely to be 
affected by the outbreak or involved in the 
investigation.
• The state food-regulatory agency.
• Other state health departments (e.g., regional 
counterparts, or potentially nationally 
through Epi-X, PulseNet, or similar 
networks).
• CDC (Outbreak Response and Surveillance  
 Team).
• Federal regulatory agency offices (e.g., 
USDA/FSIS, FDA, Environmental 
Protection Agency [EPA]), depending on the 
nature and status of  the investigation.
Agency media personnel should also be 
engaged as early as possible, to assist with 
messaging and to ensure consistency of  
message among agencies.
7.4.2.3. Provide coordination 
During the course of  the investigation, a 
state agency needs to coordinate among the 
epidemiology, environmental health, and 
laboratory components of  the investigation 
at the state level and ensure that state 
epidemiology, environmental health, and 
laboratory programs are communicating and 
coordinating activities with counterparts at 
both the local and federal levels.
• Referrals and requests for assistance in  
 incidents of  state significance.
Incident: Case clusters in multiple local 
jurisdictions or statewide increase of  
sporadic infections with common subtype 
characteristics identified.
Action: Upload patterns to PulseNet.
Action: Ensure notification of  all local 
jurisdictions; distribute summary data 
about cases, descriptive epidemiology, 
investigation protocols, and standardized 
questionnaires.















































7.4. Outbreak Detection and Investigation by Level
Action: Request that local agencies 
interview cases and controls as soon as 
possible using standardized questionnaire 
to obtain detailed food-exposure histories, 
including product brand and retail source. 
Assess the availability and willingness 
of  local agency staff  to conduct timely 
interviews. Provide support needed to 
ensure timely conduct of  interviews. As 
investigations heat up, priorities will need 
to be adjusted. Evening and weekend work 
commonly is required. Interviews should 
not be delegated to agencies or individuals 
unable to make the investigation a top 
priority.
Action: Ensure notification of  
appropriate food-regulatory agencies of  
the investigation and the potential need to 
initiate investigations to elaborate and test 
hypotheses.
Action: Establish coordinating office (or 
individual) for investigations to collect, 
organize, and disseminate collective data.
Incident: Common-source outbreaks in 
multiple jurisdictions or multiple states linked 
by common agent, food, or water. When 
a particular exposure is epidemiologically 
implicated or strongly suspected:
Action: Ensure notification of  all 
local jurisdictions, all states, and 
federal agencies of  results of  outbreak 
investigations about agent and vehicle.
Action: Ensure notification of  
appropriate food-regulatory agencies of  
the probable contaminated food vehicle 
in commercial distribution; trace back 
source to the point where contamination 
most likely occurred; or determine 
whether responsibility for action needs to 
be transferred to a federal agency.
Action: Subtype agents associated with 
outbreaks; upload patterns to PulseNet.
Action: Establish the coordinating office 
(or individual) for investigations to collect, 
organize, and disseminate collective 
data. In cooperative investigations, make 
raw data readily available in a common 
format to interested participants from all 
participating agencies.
The resources of  one or more local 
jurisdictions cannot adequately respond to 
these events following routine procedures. 
These investigations require active 
participation from multiple local agencies, 
typically under state agency leadership. 
The state provides response coordination, 
consultation, and information sharing. On the 
basis of  established procedures, emergency 
management systems may be activated at 
the local level or possibly state level. Federal 
agencies are notified and involved depending 
on product type and distribution.
Multistate outbreaks, and outbreaks associated 
with regionally or nationally distributed food 
products involve a transition from state 
to national significance. These outbreaks 
may require regional or national resources. 
Although they require active participation 
from multiple local agencies and state 
response coordination, consultation, and 
information sharing, they also may require 
federal agency leadership, depending on 
the capabilities and willingness of  the states 
involved. In a small number of  events, 
emergency management systems may be 
activated at local and state levels and possibly 
at federal level.
7.4.3. Outbreak Detection and 
Investigation at the Federal Level
7.4.3.1. Detect outbreak 
Outbreaks are detected at the federal level by 
one of  the following means:
• Common-source outbreaks in multiple states  
 linked by common agent, food, or water.
• Cluster(s) of  sporadic infections with 
common subtype characteristics identified in 
multiple states.














































7.4. Outbreak Detection and Investigation by Level
• Regional or national increase of  sporadic 
infections with common subtype 
characteristics identified.
7.4.3.2. Ensure notification 
When an outbreak investigation begins, the 
CDC OutbreakNet Team should ensure 
notification of and provide subsequent updates 
as appropriate to
• State and local health departments (e.g., 
Epi-X, the Foodborne Outbreak Listserve, 
PulseNet).
• Federal regulatory agency offices (USDA/
FSIS, FDA, EPA).
7.4.3.3. Provide coordination 
During the investigation, federal agencies need 
to coordinate the epidemiology, environmental 
health, and laboratory components of  the 
investigation at the federal level and ensure 
that federal epidemiology, environmental 
health and laboratory programs are 
communicating and coordinating activities 
with their counterparts at both the state and 
local levels.
• Referrals and requests for assistance in  
 incidents of  national significance.
Incident: Common-source outbreaks in 
multiple states linked by common agent, 
food, or water
Action: Ensure notification of  all state 
and local jurisdictions, as appropriate, 
of  results of  outbreak investigations 
regarding agent and vehicle.
Action: Ensure notification of  
appropriate food-regulatory agencies 
of  likely contaminated food vehicle in 
commercial distribution; trace back 
source to the point where contamination 
most likely occurred.
Action: Subtype agents associated with 
outbreaks; upload patterns to PulseNet.
Action: Establish coordinating office (or 
individual) for investigations to collect, 
organize, and disseminate collective data.
Incident: Case clusters in multiple states 
or regional or national increase of  
sporadic infections with common subtype 
characteristics identified.
Action: Ensure notification of  all 
states and local jurisdictions, as 
appropriate; distribute summary data 
about cases, descriptive epidemiology, 
investigation protocols, and standardized 
questionnaires.
Action: Request that local or state 
agencies interview cases and controls 
as soon as possible using standardized 
questionnaire to obtain detailed food-
exposure histories, including product 
brand and retail source. Assess the 
availability and willingness of  local or 
state agency staff  to conduct interviews 
in a timely manner. Provide support 
needed to ensure that timely conduct of  
interviews.
Action: Ensure notification of  
appropriate food-regulatory agencies of  
the investigation and the potential need 
to initiate establishment investigations to 
elaborate and test hypotheses.
Action: Establish coordinating office (or 
individual) for investigations to collect, 
organize, and disseminate collective data.
These outbreaks require activation of  local, 
state, regional, and national resources to contain 
disease and protect human health. They 
require active participation from multiple 
local agencies, state response coordination, 
consultation and information sharing, 
and federal agency leadership. Emergency 
management systems may be activated at local, 
state, and federal levels.















































7.5. Multijurisdictional Outbreak Investigations After-Action 
Reports and Reporting to eFORS
The organizations involved should hold a 
conference call 1–3 months after the initial 
investigation ends to review lessons learned 
and to update participants on findings, 
conclusions, and actions taken. Consider 
including consumer groups in this conference 
call or hosting a conference call specifically for 
consumer groups, to help them understand 
what happened and what’s being done to 
prevent recurrence. Also consider including 
industry representatives to help disseminate 
lessons learned from the investigation.
The lead agency(ies) coordinating the 
investigation should prepare an after-action 
report after the conference call. The report 
should summarize the effectiveness of  
communication and coordination among 
jurisdictions and identify specific gaps or 
problems that arose during the investigation. 
All participating agencies should have the 
opportunity to review and comment on the 
report before it is more widely distributed. 
The lead agency(ies) should review after-action 
reports periodically to determine whether 
common problems in investigation or response 
are occurring over time. This can help with an 
agency’s quality improvement efforts.
All multijurisdictional investigations 
should be reported by individual states to 
eFORS. The multijurisdictional nature of  
the investigation should be indicated by 
completion of  appropriate data fields in the 
eFORS report form. Individual state reports 




Performance Indicators for 
Foodborne Disease Programs
A 
long-standing goal of CDC and national public health 
professional organizations has been to build state and 
local capacity for detecting and preventing foodborne 
illness. In 1997, CDC convened an expert panel to draft a core 
competencies report for foodborne disease outbreaks and 
response, focusing on epidemiologic and laboratory capacity. 
The panel’s report was entitled Essential Epidemiology and 
Laboratory Components of a State Foodborne Disease Prevention 
and Control Program. In 1999, as a follow-up to these activities, 
CDC funded the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists 
(CSTE) and the Association of Public Health Laboratories to 
assess states’ foodborne investigation capacity with the goal of 
providing background data by which to determine priority areas 
for building food-safety program support. Subsequently, CSTE’s 
Enteric Diseases Investigation Timelines Study (EDITS) was 
developed to objectively assess intervals from disease onset to 
reporting to CDC for the surveillance of foodborne diseases and 
investigation of foodborne disease outbreaks.


















































Surveillance and outbreak response are 
major components of  states’ foodborne 
investigation capacity and are essential 
for preventing and controlling foodborne 
illness. Multiple entities—almost 3000 local 
health departments, more than 50 state and 
territorial health departments, and several 
federal agencies—interact in a complex system 
covering surveillance to detect and respond to 
enteric and other foodborne diseases.
The occurrence of  large and multistate 
foodborne disease outbreaks and concerns 
about bioterrorism have increased the need 
to rapidly detect and distinguish between 
outbreaks of  foodborne disease and possible 
intentional contamination. Evaluating the 
timeliness and effectiveness of  foodborne 
disease surveillance is a major step toward 
assessing and improving U.S. capacity for 
foodborne disease surveillance and outbreak 
response.
CDC’s Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
Goals established a general framework and a 
few specific performance measures relevant 
to foodborne disease surveillance. However, 
no comprehensive national performance 
standards, measures, or models exist for public 
health agencies to follow to ensure foodborne 
illness surveillance and outbreak detection and 
response systems work at maximum efficiency.
8.1. Purpose and Intended Use
CIFOR has developed measurable indicators 
of  effective surveillance for enteric foodborne 
diseases and for response to outbreaks of  
such diseases by state and local public health 
officials. These indicators are intended for use 
by state and local public health agencies to 
evaluate the performance of  their foodborne 
disease surveillance and control programs. 
Specific indicators and subindicators have been 
identified to support the overall objectives of  
the foodborne disease surveillance program. 
Metrics have been developed to standardize 
evaluation of  the indicators.
The use of  standardized performance criteria 
and metrics serves several functions:
• They promote a common understanding 
of  the key elements of  foodborne disease 
surveillance and control activities across 
local, state, and federal public health 
agencies;
• They facilitate training of  food program 
staff  in the use and interpretation of  the 
performance criteria; and
• They allow for the aggregation of  data at 
state, regional, or national levels to evaluate 
program effectiveness and to identify specific 
needs for improvement and additional 
resource investment.
The indicators are not intended as 
performance standards. Where specific 
performance standards have been established 
(e.g., PulseNet turnaround times, Draft 
Voluntary National Retail Food Regulatory 
Program Standards), meeting the performance 
standard has been adopted as a performance 
indicator. The development of  performance 
standards depends on the availability of  
specific indicators such as these to provide 
a basis for program evaluation. However, 
defining the level of  performance expected 
from foodborne disease surveillance and 
control programs exceeds the scope of  
these Guidelines. Likewise, the performance 
indicators are not intended to be used for 
comparing individual local or state programs. 
The aggregation of  data at state, regional, 
or national levels is intended to provide a 
comprehensive overview of  foodborne disease 
surveillance and control programs, rather than 
a system for ranking them.

















































This chapter contains tables organized to 
highlight major performance indicators by 
program function. The roles and responsibilities 
of  foodborne disease surveillance and control 
programs vary by state according to state law. 
Individual agencies that wish to evaluate their 
programs using these indicators should select 
indicators and metrics that best reflect their 
activities, regardless of  where they fall in the 
document’s table structure.
Overall Foodborne Disease Program Objectives and Indicators
Table 8.1. Objectives of  foodborne disease surveillance program
Table 8.2. Short-ferm objectives, indicators, subindicators, and metrics
Table 8.3. Intermediate objectives, indicators, subindicators, and metrics
Table 8.4. Long-term objectives, indicators, subindicators, and metrics
Major Performance Indicators and Metrics for Program Evaluation
Table 8.5. Local health department: overall foodborne disease surveillance and  
 control programs
Table 8.6. Local health department: communicable disease program
Table 8.7. Local health department: environmental health program
Table 8.8. Local health department: public health laboratory
Table 8.9. State health department: overall foodborne disease surveillance  
 and control programs
Table 8.10. State health department: communicable disease program
Table 8.11. State health department: environmental health program
Table 8.12. State health department: public health laboratory
Table 8.13. Benchmark data established by the Enteric Diseases Investigation  
 Timelines Study (EDITS)
Overall Foodborne Disease Program Objectives and Indicators
Table 8 .1 .  Objectives of foodborne disease surveillance program
SHORT-TERM OBjECTIvES INTERMEDIATE OBjECTIvES LONG-TERM OBjECTIvES
Detect foodborne disease 
events of public health 
importance.
Respond to events in a timely 
manner.
Intervene when appropriate to 
prevent illness.
Determine etiology, vehicle, and 
contributing factors of foodborne 
disease outbreaks.
Monitor trends to identify emerging 
foodborne diseases and food-safety 
problems.
Increase knowledge of foodborne 
disease causes and abatement 
strategies.
Prevent future outbreaks.
Reduce incidence of 
foodborne illness.
Increase health of the general 
population.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Major Performance Indicators and Metrics for Program Evaluation
Table 8 .5 . 	Local	health	department:	overall	foodborne	disease	surveillance	 
 and control programs*




Disposition of, action on, or 
follow-up of complaint or referral 
report alleging food-related 
illness or injury within 24 hours
% of reports resulting in 
disposition, action, or follow-up 
within 24 hours
8.5.2. 
Reported cases with 
specified foodborne illnesses 
interviewed.
Case report maintained in 
searchable database
Searchable database maintained, 
yes/no
Time interval from receipt of 
report to case interview
Median no. days from receipt of 
report to interview of case
8.5.3. 
Isolates of specified foodborne 
pathogens submitted to PHL.
Reported cases for which isolates 
submitted to PHL
% of cases for which isolates were 
submitted to PHL
8.5.4. 
Foodborne disease outbreaks 
investigated.
Time from onset of symptoms to 
initiation of outbreak investigation
Median no. days from onset of 
symptoms of the first/index case 
to outbreak investigation
8.5.5. 
Appropriate control measure 
initiated.
Median no. days from initiation of 
investigation to implementation 
of intervention
8.5.6. 
Etiology of outbreak identified.
Etiology of outbreak identified % of outbreaks for which etiology 
was identified
8.5.7. 
Vehicle of outbreak identified.




Contributing factors identified % of outbreaks for which 
contributing factors were 
identified
8.5.9. 
Trends in no. confirmed 
foodborne disease outbreaks.
No. outbreaks reported to eFORS % of outbreaks reported to state 
health department by year and 
type of agent, compared over 
time
* Includes functions variously assigned to communicable disease or environmental health programs,   
 depending on local jurisdiction.
ABBREvIATIoNS:	
PHL = public health laboratory; eFORS = CDC’s electronic Foodborne Outbreak Reporting System.

















































Major Performance Indicators and Metrics for Program Evaluation
Table 8 .6 . 	Local	health	department:	communicable	disease	program*
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR SUBINDICATOR METRIC
8.6.1. 
Reported cases with 




% of reported cases for which 
complete demographic 
information was available
Exposure history obtained % of reported cases for which 
exposure history was obtained
Case onset date obtained % of reported cases for which 
onset date was reported
Date of report documented % of reported cases for which a 
report date was available
Need for public health 
intervention identified
% of cases for which intervention 
was identified or ruled out
8.6.2. 
Foodborne disease outbreaks 
investigated.
Cases interviewed to determine 
illness and exposure histories
% of investigations for which 
cases were interviewed
Stool samples obtained from 
cases
% of investigations for which stool 
sample were collected from at 
least 1 case
8.6.3. 
Etiology of outbreak identified.
Clinical characteristics of outbreak 
characterized
% of outbreaks for which clinical 
characteristics were described
8.6.4. 
Vehicle of outbreak identified.
Suitable epidemiologic study 
conducted to identify vehicle
% of outbreaks for which an 
epidemiologic study was 
conducted to identify a vehicle
Informational traceback 
conducted to subtype exposure 
histories
% of outbreaks for which an 
informational traceback was 
conducted to help elucidate 
exposure histories
* Includes functions typically assigned to communicable disease programs, not included  
 in overall foodborne disease surveillance and control program indicators.


















































Major Performance Indicators and Metrics for Program Evaluation
Table 8 .7 . 	Local	Health	Department:	Environmental	Health	Program*




Logs or databases maintained for 
all complaint or referral reports 
from other sources alleging 
food-related illness, injury, or 
intentional food contamination. 
Final disposition for each complaint 
recorded in log or database and 
filed in or linked to establishment 
record for retrieval purposes
Draft Voluntary National Retail 
Food Regulatory Program 
Standards, standard 5, part 1.d, 
met, yes/no
Demographic information obtained % of complaints for which 
complete demographic 
information was available
Food history obtained % of complaints for which food 
history was obtained
Outbreak detected No. outbreaks detected
8.7.2. 
Foodborne disease outbreaks 
investigated.
Environmental health assessment 
of establishment conducted, where 
appropriate
% of outbreaks for which an 
establishment was investigated, 
if appropriate
Food flow documented % of environmental assessments 
that included a food flow
Food workers interviewed % of environmental assessments 
that included food worker 
interviews
8.7.3. 
Ill or infected food handlers identified and excluded.
Median no. days from 
initiation of investigation to 
implementation of intervention
8.7.4. 
Deficient food-handling practice identified and corrected.
Median no. days from 




Possible contributing factors to 
the illness, injury, or intentional 
food contamination identified in 
each on-site investigation report
Draft Voluntary National Retail 
Food Regulatory Program 
Standard 5, part 7.a, met, yes/no
* Includes functions typically assigned to environmental health programs, not included in overall  
 foodborne disease surveillance and control program indicators.

















































Major Performance Indicators and Metrics for Program Evaluation
Table 8 .8 . 	Local	health	department:	public	health	laboratory*
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR SUBINDICATOR METRIC
8.8.1. 
Isolates of specified foodborne 
pathogens submitted to PHL.
Stool collection date obtained % of cases for which stool 
collection date was available
Date of submission to PHL 
documented
% of cases for which date of 
submission to PHL was available
Date of serotyping documented % of cases for which serotype 
date was available
Date of subtyping by PFGE 
documented
% of cases for which PFGE 
subtyping date was available
Isolate report maintained in 
searchable database
Searchable database maintained, 
yes/no
Turnaround time from submission 
to serotyping result determined
Median no. days from 
submission of specimen to 
serotyping results
Turnaround time from submission 
to subtyping result Determined
Median no. days from 
submission of specimen to 
subtyping results
8.8.2. 
Foodborne disease outbreaks 
investigated.
Turnaround time from collection of 
stool samples to confirmed culture 
results detemined
Median no. days from 
submission of stool samples to 
receipt of results
8.8.3. 
Etiology of outbreak identified.
Stool samples collected and tested 
for likely agents
% of outbreaks for which at least 
1 stool sample tested for likely 
agents
Food and environmental samples 
collected and tested for likely 
agents
% of outbreaks for which 
environmental samples tested 
for likely agents
* Includes functions typically assigned to public health laboratory programs, not included in overall  
 foodborne disease surveillance and control program indicators. Many local health departments do not  
 perform culture, serotyping, or subtyping and should focus only on the indicators that apply to them.
ABBREvIATIoNS:	
PHL = public health laboratory; PFGE = pulsed-field gel electrophoresis.


















































Major Performance Indicators and Metrics for Program Evaluation
Table 8 .9 . 	State	health	department:	overall	foodborne	disease	surveillance	and	 
 control programs*
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR SUBINDICATOR METRIC
8.9.1. 
Reported cases with specified 
foodborne illnesses interviewed.
Case report maintained in 
searchable database
Searchable database maintained, 
yes/no
8.9.2. 
Isolates of specified foodborne 
pathogens submitted to PHL.
Reported cases for which isolates 
submitted to PHL
% of cases for which isolates 
submitted to PHL
Turnaround time from submission 
to PFGE subtyping result
Median no. days from 
submission of specimen to PFGE 
subtyping results
8.9.3. 
Foodborne disease outbreaks 
investigated.
Time from onset of symptoms to 
initiation of outbreak investigation
Median no. days from onset of 




Cluster source identified % of clusters for which source 
identified
8.9.5. 
Sentinel foodborne events 
investigated.
Event-specific data collected % of sentinel events for which 
data collected
8.9.6. 
Appropriate control measures initiated.
Median no. days from 
initiation of investigation to 
implementation of intervention
8.9.7. 
After-action reviews of outbreak investigations conducted within a 
mean of 60 days after investigation ends (CDC preparedness goal).
CDC preparedness goal met, 
yes/no
8.9.8. 
Trends in no. confirmed 
foodborne disease outbreaks.
No. outbreaks reported to eFORS % of outbreaks reported 
to state health department 
by year and type of agent, 
compared over time
8.9.9. 
Trends in incidence of specified 
foodborne illnesses.
Statewide annual summaries of 
reported foodborne diseases
Annual summary prepared, yes/
no
* Includes functions that may be variously assigned to communicable disease or environmental health  
 programs, depending on local or state jurisdiction.
ABBREvIATIoNS:	
PHL = public health laboratory; PFGE = pulsed-field gel electrophoresis; eFORS = electronic Foodborne 
Outbreak Reporting System; CDC = Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

















































Major Performance Indicators and Metrics for Program Evaluation
Table 8 .10 . 	State	health	department:	communicable	disease	program*
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR SUBINDICATOR METRIC
8.10.1. 
Reported cases with specified 
foodborne illnesses interviewed.
Cases interviewed following 
receipt of report.
Median no. days from receipt of 
report to case interview
8.10.2. 
Foodborne disease outbreaks 
investigated.
Cases interviewed to determine 
illness and exposure histories 
% of investigations for which 
cases interviewed
Stool samples obtained from 
cases
% of investigations for which 
stool samples collected from at 
least 1 case
Controls interviewed to determine 
exposure histories




Cases interviewed to determine 
exposure histories
% of case clusters for which at 
least half the cases interviewed 
to determine exposure history
Time from cluster recognition to 
completion of case and control 
interviews determined
Median no. days from 
identification of cluster to 
completion of all planned 
interviews
8.10.4. 
Etiology of outbreak identified.
Clinical features of outbreak 
characterized
% of outbreaks for which clinical 
characteristics described
8.10.5. 
Vehicle of outbreak identified.
Suitable epidemiologic study 
conducted to identify vehicle
% of outbreaks for which 
epidemiologic study conducted 
to identify a vehicle
Information traceback conducted 
to subtype exposure histories
% of outbreaks for which 
information traceback conducted 
to help elucidate exposure 
histories
8.10.6. 
Trends in no. confirmed 
foodborne disease outbreaks 
identified.
Outbreaks per million population 
determined
Agent-specific outbreak rate 
determined
* Includes functions typically assigned to communicable disease programs, not included in overall foodborne 
 disease surveillance and control program indicators.


















































Major Performance Indicators and Metrics for Program Evaluation
Table 8 .11 . 	State	Health	Department:	Environmental	Health	Program*









Foodborne disease outbreaks 
investigated.
Environmental health assessment 
conducted of food establishment
% of investigations for which 
establishment investigated, if 
appropriate
8.11.3. 
Ill or infected food handlers identified and excluded.
Median no. days from 
initiation of investigation to 
implementation of intervention 
8.11.4. 
Deficient food-handling practice identified and corrected.
Median no. days from 
initiation of investigation to 
implementation of intervention
8.11.5. 
Source of outbreak identified.
Regulatory traceback conducted 
to confirm production source of 
implicated vehicle
% of outbreaks for which 
regulatory traceback conducted 




Preparation of implicated food 
items reviewed
% of outbreaks for which food-
preparation flow reviewed on 
implicated food item
Food-preparation review guided 
by identification of suspected 
agent
% of outbreaks for which food-
preparation flow reviewed, with 
specific agent suspected
8.11.7. 
Trends in no. confirmed 
foodborne disease outbreaks 
identified.
No. outbreaks in restaurants per 
1000 restaurants determined
Restaurant-specific outbreak rate 
determined
8.11.8. 
Results of outbreak investigation summaries incorporated into 
food-safety training activities.




Decrease in no. outbreaks 
attributable to previously 
identified sources and 
contributing factors
Change from baseline in no. 
and % of outbreaks with specific 
sources and contributing factors
* Includes functions typically assigned to environmental health programs, not included in overall foodborne  
 disease surveillance and control program indicators.

















































Major Performance Indicators and Metrics for Program Evaluation
Table 8 .12 . 	State	health	department:	public	health	laboratory*
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR SUBINDICATOR METRIC
8.12.1. 
Isolates of specified foodborne 
pathogens submitted to PHL.
Date of submission to PHL 
documented
% of cases for which date of 
submission to PHL was available
Date of serotyping documented % of cases for which serotyping 
date was available
Date of subtyping by PFGE 
documented
% of cases for which PFGE 
subtyping date was available
Isolate report maintained in 
searchable database
Searchable database maintained, 
yes/no.
Turnaround time from submission 
to serotyping result determined
Median no. days from 
submission of specimen to 
receipt of serotyping results
Subtype clusters identified No. subtype clusters identified
For each type of agent, 90% 
of PFGE subtyping data results 
submitted to PulseNet database 
within 4 working days
CDC preparedness goal met, 
yes/no
8.12.2. 
Foodborne disease outbreaks 
investigated.
Turnaround time from collection 
of stool samples to confirmed 
culture results determined
Median no. days from 
submission of stool samples to 
receipt of culture results 
8.12.3. 
Etiology of outbreak identified.
Stool samples tested for likely 
agents
% of outbreaks for which at least 
1 stool sample tested for likely 
agents
Food and environmental samples 
tested for likely agents
% of outbreaks for which 
environmental samples tested 
for likely agents
* Includes functions typically assigned to public health laboratory programs, not included in overall 
 foodborne disease surveillance and control program indicators.
ABBREvIATIoNS:	
PHL = public health laboratory; PFGE = pulsed-field gel electrophoresis.


















































Major Performance Indicators and Metrics for Program Evaluation
Table 8 .13 .  Benchmark data established by Enteric Diseases Investigation 

















• Exposure history obtained
• Case onset date obtained
• Date of report  
 documented
OUTCOME
• Time from receipt of  
 report to interview of case  
 determined
PROCESS
• 49% of reported cases had some  
 exposure history obtained
• 66% of reported cases had an  
 onset date given
• 42% of reported cases had a report 
 date
OUTCOME
• 0 = Median no. days from receipt  














• Stool collection date  
 obtained
• Date of submission to PHL 
 documented
• Date of subtyping by  
 PFGE documented
OUTCOME
• Reported cases for which  
 isolates submitted to PHL  
 determined
• Turnaround time from  
 submission to subtyping  
 result determined
PROCESS
• 82% of cases had stool collection  
 date available
• 98% of cases had a date of  
 submission to PHL
• 100% of cases had PFGE subtyping 
 date
OUTCOME
• 68% of cases had isolates  
 submitted to PHL
• 3 = Median no. days from  
 submission of specimen to receipt  
 of subtyping results
ABBREvIATIoNS:	
PHL = public health laboratory; PFGE = pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. PHL = public health laboratory; 
PFGE = pulsed-field gel electrophoresis.
Chapter
9
Legal Preparedness for the 
Surveillance and Control of 
Foodborne Disease Outbreaks
L
egal preparedness is an indispensable part of comprehensive 
preparedness for public health threats. CDC defines public 
health legal preparedness as attainment by a public health 
agency or system of specified legal benchmarks or standards of 
preparedness for specified public health concerns. Public health legal 
preparedness has four core elements: a) laws and legal authorities, 
b) competency in understanding and using law, c) coordination 
across sectors and jurisdictions in the implementation of law, and 
d) information about best practices in using law for public health 
purposes
9.0.1. Public Health Legal Preparedness







































































9.0.2. Ensuring Legal Preparedness for 
Foodborne Disease Outbreaks
State and local health officials should ensure 
their agencies and jurisdictions are legally 
prepared for surveillance and control of  
foodborne disease outbreaks. This means 
• They should have the laws and legal 
authorities needed to conduct all the 
functions key to effective surveillance 
and control (e.g., surveillance, reporting, 
enforcement, prevention, mitigation, 
investigation, and regulation);
• Their professional staff  should be trained 
and demonstrate competence in applying 
those laws;
• They should have mutual aid agreements or 
memoranda of  agreement in place to 
facilitate investigation and response across 
jurisdictions and jointly by public health and 
other agencies; and
• They should have access to information 
about and apply best practices in using their 
relevant legal authorities.
The adequacy of  state and local legal 
preparedness for foodborne disease outbreaks 
should be evaluated regularly through exercises 
and after-action reports following responses to 
actual outbreaks.
As part of  ensuring their jurisdictions’ legal 
preparedness, state and local health officials 
should consult with their legal counsel and 
with counterparts in other government 
agencies and private organizations that have 
legal authorities or legal duties relevant 
to successful surveillance and control of  
foodborne disease outbreaks. These include 
such public entities as food-regulatory and 
law enforcement agencies, legal counsel to 
municipal and state governments, and local 
and state courts and court administrators. 
Relevant private entities include private 
laboratories, food wholesalers, grocery 
retailers, and restaurants and other food 
vendors. Where possible, these entities should 
be included in foodborne disease exercises 
to test their understanding of  their legal 
authorities and duties related to outbreaks.
9.0.3. The Constitutional Setting for 
Foodborne Disease Surveillance and 
Control
As government bodies, public health agencies 
operate in the context of  the U.S. Constitution, 
the fundamental law of  the land. Some of  
the principal constitutional features relevant 
to public health agencies are the three-
branch system of  government, federalism, 
and protection for civil liberties and property 
rights. Public health agencies belong to the 
executive branch and are broadly charged to 
implement laws enacted by the legislature and 
as interpreted by the courts. In the federal 
system, the Constitution enumerates specified 
powers for the federal government and 
delegates other powers to the states. (Tribes are 
autonomous or sovereign bodies.) In addition, 
state and local governments possess inherent 
police powers to protect the health and safety 
of  the public. Finally, the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth amendments protect citizens from 
unreasonable searches and from deprivation of  
life, liberty, and private property without due 
process of  law. States’ constitutions, statutory 
law, and court rulings provide additional 
protections relevant to public health agencies’ 
conduct of  foodborne disease surveillance and 
conduct operations.
9.0.4. Legal Basis for State and Local 
Public Health Agencies in Surveillance 
and Control of Foodborne Disease
The primary role of  local and state public 
health agencies is protection and promotion 
of  the public’s health. The legal authority 
supporting that role stems from statutory, 
regulatory, and case (judge-made) law as 
well as from the general police powers. 




































































Important legal parameters for public health 
practice were articulated in the 1905 U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling in the case Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts:
• With compelling reason, individual liberties 
may be subordinated to the well-being of  the 
community.
• The police power of  the state authorizes 
issuance and enforcement of  reasonable 
regulations to protect the health of  the 
community.
• Courts defer to the authority that legislative 
bodies give to public health agencies if  
exercised on the basis of  persuasive public 
health and medical evidence
• Public health agencies may not act in an 
arbitrary manner nor pose unreasonable 
risks for harm.
In general, these parameters apply to state and 
local public health agencies’ surveillance and 
control of  foodborne disease outbreaks. Those 
activities, however, are further authorized and 
conditioned by the statutes, ordinances, and 
case law of  the individual jurisdictions. Some 
of  these laws relate specifically to foodborne 
diseases, but in many jurisdictions, public 
health agencies rely on laws (state statutes 
and local ordinances) that authorize general 
infectious disease surveillance.
9.0.5. Legal Basis for CDC in Surveillance
CDC operates under Congressionally enacted 
statutory law and, especially, in the case 
of  foodborne disease surveillance, under 
provisions of  the Public Health Service Act. 
CDC is not authorized to mandate reporting 
of  diseases and conditions either by state and 
local governments or by private entities.
Among many other provisions, the Public 
Health Service Act authorizes CDC to gather 
data on nationally notifiable diseases pursuant 
to guidelines CDC develops in partnership 
with state and local public health agencies 
and professional societies. Many of  these 
data come from state and local public health 
agencies. CDC partners with the Council 
of  State and Territorial Epidemiologists 
(CSTE) to establish (and modify as needed) 
case definitions. These guidelines and case 
definitions, however, are not legally binding. 
CDC does not collect personal identifiers on 
routine surveillance data that it receives from 
public health departments.
The Act also authorizes CDC to perform 
laboratory tests on specimens received from 
state and local governments (and from other 
sources) to identify pathogens, confirm 
serotypes of  molecular subtypes, and perform 
diagnostic assays and report findings to 
appropriate state and local health departments. 
Virtually all enteric disease specimens tested in 
CDC laboratories are initially tested in state or 
local public health laboratories.
By providing botulinum antiserum, CDC 
learns of  cases of  botulism and verifies that the 
appropriate state or local health department is 
aware of  them.
9.1. Legal Framework for Mandatory Disease Reporting
9.1.1. Statutes and Regulations
9.1.1.1. Authorization by legislature 
The legislature generally gives broad statutory 
authority to the state health department 
to collect information and require reports 
of  conditions of  public health importance, 
without specifying the exact diseases or 
infections.
In addition to broad authority, states typically 
have several disease-specific statutes, such as 
human immunodeficiency virus/acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome, tuberculosis, 






































































9.1. Legal Framework for Mandatory Disease Reporting
and vaccine-preventable diseases, that 
authorize surveillance and control activities. 
All states have statutes addressing response to 
bioterrorism incidents.
9.1.1.2. Regulatory process for maintaining and 
updating list of  reportable diseases 
Every state has an oversight body or entity 
authorized to promulgate regulations (typically 
a board of  health established by statute). The 
reportable disease list is revised or updated 
after study of, and public input on, the 
proposed changes.
The list of  reportable diseases and conditions 
and laboratory findings is maintained and 
updated by epidemiologists and health officers 
in state and local agencies, with review and 
approval by the oversight body. Required 
reporting of  specific laboratory test results 
(as opposed to regulatory language of  “any 
positive test for …”) generally means the list 
must be regularly updated.
Reportable disease regulations are established 
within the context of  the basic public 
health compact. In return for allowing the 
government to collect without consent medical 
and personal information about selected 
conditions, the public requires the government 
to maintain confidentiality of  the records and 
to prevent or minimize public health threats.
9.1.2. Reporting Processes
9.1.2.1. Time frame and content of  reports 
Regulations usually specify the time frame 
for reporting (e.g., within 7 days, within 24 
hours, immediately) and the information to be 
reported (e.g., diagnosis; personal identifying 
and locating information; and date of  onset 
or diagnosis, regardless of  whether the case is 
suspected or confirmed).
9.1.2.2. Sources of  reports 
Regulations specify what entities are required 
to report. The usual sources of  mandatory 
reports are
• Laboratories, including
 o Hospital-based laboratories,
 o National or regional commercial referral  
  laboratories,
 o Local or state health department  
  laboratories, and
 o CDC laboratories;
• Hospitals (e.g., hospitalized patients reported 
 by infection control practitioners);
• Emergency departments;
• Office-based health-care providers;
• Long-term–care facilities or nursing homes; 
 and
• Schools and child-care centers.
An agency may also receive reports from other 
public health agencies, for example, in other 
state health departments.
Arrangements and ongoing communication 
should be established with national or regional 
commercial laboratories to ensure results for 
relevant cases are received by the investigating 
agencies, even when those tests are conducted 
out-of-state. The same communication 
channels should be established with hospitals 
that are out-of-state but serve a population 
within the community affected by the 
outbreak.
The source of  a report does not affect 
the legalstatus of  the information—if  it 
is required, it is protected by statutes and 
regulations. Conversely, reports to the agency 
of  illness not listed as a reportable condition 
may not be subject to disease surveillance 
regulations and confidentiality protections (see 
section 9.1.5. below).
9.1.2.3. Reporting methods 
A state or municipality can use any of  a variety 
of  methods for reporting. Specifics vary from 
one locale to another. These methods include
• Telephone;



































































9.1. Legal Framework for Mandatory Disease Reporting
• Hardcopy (fax or mail);
• Electronic batch reports sent by e-mail; and
• Internet-based, highly secure disease 
reporting to websites maintained by state or 
local public health agencies.
9.1.2.4. Required submission of  laboratory specimens 
Some public health agencies have adopted 
regulations that require hospital and national 
diagnostic laboratories to submit isolates of  
specific pathogens to a state or local health 
department laboratory for further testing. 
One example would be a requirement for 
submission of  all Escherichia coli O157:H7 
isolates for PFGE testing. This requirement 
improves surveillance for foodborne disease 
as common subtypes are identified. In some 
locales, voluntary submission of  specimens 
to the central referral laboratory achieves the 
same goal.
9.1.3. Accessing Medical and  
Laboratory Records
Typically, broad authority to conduct 
surveillance includes authority to investigate 
and control diseases of  public health 
significance, including review of  relevant and 
pertinent medical and laboratory records and 
reports, i.e., information that is not necessarily 
included in the basic case report.
9.1.4. Enforcement
Because non-reporting by health-care 
providers is common, redundant reporting 
systems have been established (e.g., Salmonella 
infection is reportable by both physicians and 
laboratories) to ensure a case will be reported. 
Nonetheless, failure to comply with reporting 
regulations is punishable. This is rarely 
enforced because penalizing a health-care 
provider may not result in future compliance 
and may reverberate throughout the clinical 
sector (i.e., may be counterproductive to the 
system).
Penalties or sanctions, however, may be 
imposed if  lack of  a report leads directly 
to an outbreak (for example, a food worker 
with hepatitis A is not reported, and 
immuneglobulin is thus not administered to 
restaurant customers). In most cases of  non-
reporting, the public health agency explains 
the regulatory requirement and its rationale 
and asks for future compliance, rather than 
seeking penalties or sanctions.
Reporting is difficult to enforce with a 
laboratory or health-care provider outside 
the agency’s jurisdiction, such as when state 
X seeks reports from a referral laboratory 
in state Y. In this situation, lack of  reporting 
usually results from misunderstanding of  how 
to report.
Occasionally a laboratory will state it complies 
with requirements of  the agency in which it 
is physically located—which might or might 
not require reporting of  the particular disease, 
infection, or laboratory result.
9.1.5. Protection of Confidentiality
Personally identifying information in disease 
reports and investigation records is confidential 
and exempt from disclosure in response to 
freedom of  information requests. If  personally 
identifying information can be redacted and 
no other exemptions from disclosure apply, 
such records may have to be released. In 
redacting personally identifying information, 
descriptors such as age, sex, race/ethnicity, 
residence, and date of  diagnosis may make the 
person identifiable. Preparing final outbreak 
investigation summary reports without any 
personally identifying information can speed 
up and simplify release of  those reports to 
attorneys or media when they are requested.
Occasionally a public health agency must 
respond to a media inquiry in which the media 
has learned the name of  a particular case from 
another source. The agency’s response to the 
media inquiry must be carefully structured 






































































9.1. Legal Framework for Mandatory Disease Reporting
to avoid to unintentional confirmation of  the 
patient’s name.
The public health agency generally is restricted 
from sharing personal identifying information 
with other government agencies without the 
consent of  the reported person, except
• Virtually every state has an exception for 
sharing information with law enforcement 
agencies when investigating a bioterrorism 
incident;
• Many state statutes contain an exception 
for sharing information when, in the 
agency’s judgment, sharing is necessary to 
protect the public health;
• State and local public health agencies often 
expect that when they provide epidemiologic 
and laboratory data to federal food-safety 
agencies (such as FDA or USDA), they will 
receive from those agencies results of  the 
product investigations. However, this rarely is 
the case because results of  the investigations 
may contain trade secrets or confidential 
commercial information or be part of  a legal 
enforcement action or criminal case.
Reporting statutes typically provide for 
punishment of  government employees for a 
breach of  confidential information held by the 
public health agency.
Health information protected by the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of  1996 (HIPAA) may be disclosed by 
the reporting source without individual 
authorization to a public health agency 
authorized by law to collect or receive such 
information, including a contractor (e.g., 
academic institutions) to which a government 
agency has granted authority. This disclosure 
without individual authorization does not 
include disclosure of  protected health 
information for research purposes.
The legal requirement to report relieves the 
reporting source (e.g., physician) of  concern 
that reporting breaches the privacy of  the 
doctor-patient relationship. Explaining this to 




Effective reporting of  foodborne disease cases 
hinges on coordination of  reporting across 
jurisdictions (e.g., local, state, and federal 
government) and across sectors (e.g., health 
care and public health). State and local health 
officials should periodically assess the need 
for memoranda of  agreement (or other legal 
agreements) with partners in other jurisdictions 
and sectors to ensure timely and effective 
reporting. (Note: A valuable resource for 
assessing and improving cross-jurisdictional 
and cross-sector coordination is the “Menu of  
Suggested Provisions for Public Health Mutual 
Aid Agreements,” available at http://www.cdc.
gov/phlp/mutualaid).
9.2. Legal Framework for Surveillance and Investigation of 
Foodborne and Enteric Diseases
9.2.1. Sources of  Surveillance Information 
Reports of  food-related illness may come to 
the attention of  the state or local health agency 
in a variety of  ways:
A. Surveillance reports for enteric diseases,  
 such as Salmonella, Shigella, and Campylobacter;
B. Request for antitoxin for botulism;
C. Reports of  food poisoning or gastrointestinal
illness in defined groups, such as diarrhea 
and vomiting among residents of  a nursing 
home or school or among attendees at a 
work-related meeting;



































































9.2. Legal Framework for Surveillance and Investigation of 
Foodborne and Enteric Diseases
D. Enteric disease suspected of  being caused  
 intentionally;
E. Complaints of  alleged contaminated, 
adulterated, or improperly cooked food 
purchased from stores or in restaurants and 
reported voluntarily by the general public; 
and
F. Syndromic surveillance using deidentified  
 emergency department or pharmacy data.
9.2.2. Statutes and Regulations 
Governing Surveillance and Investigation
Confirmed or probable cases identified from 
items a–d above are subject to the reporting 
statute(s) and regulations of  the health agency. 
Items e and f  generally do not have as strong 
a level of  legal protection as do named case 
reports because they are either voluntary, 
unconfirmed disease reports (item E) or 
diagnoses for which names collected are not 
confirmed (item F).
Routine investigation of  enteric diseases to 
determine the source of  exposure, risk factors 
for infection, and contacts of  a contagious 
case is usually considered part of  surveillance 
activities authorized by state and local statutes.
CDC may participate in an investigation of  
an outbreak of  enteric disease if  invited by the 
state.
9.3. Legal Framework for Measures and Methods to Prevent or 
Mitigate Foodborne Disease Outbreaks
9.3.1. General
Because of  (a) improvements in laboratory 
and communication technologies that can 
be used to link cases previously termed 
“sporadic” and (b) globalization of  the food-
production industries, more multistate and 
international foodborne disease outbreaks are 
being discovered, thus changing the locus of  
outbreak investigations and control measures.
9.3.2. Federal Role
The changes noted above have resulted in an 
increasingly direct, leading role in the control 
of  foodborne diseases by several federal 
public health and regulatory agencies: US 
Department of  Health and Human Services/
CDC; Food and Drug Administration; US 
Department of  Agriculture/Food Safety 
Inspection Service; U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency; and when bioterrorism is 
suspected, U.S. Department of  Justice and U.S. 
Department of  Homeland Security. These 
agencies exercise their authority over food 
safety at various stages along the farm-to-table 
continuum primarily by inspections:
• Safety of  food, feed, and animals on the  
 farm;
• Plant and animal health on the farm,  
 including animal vaccines;
• Pesticide use on the farm;
• Food processing;
• Slaughter and processing of  meat and  
 poultry products and egg products;
• Labeling, transportation, storage, and retail  
 sale of  food; and
• Cruise ships, trains, buses, airplanes (e.g., 
all interstate transportation) and the 
servicing areas for these transportation 
vehicles (21 CFR 1240 and 1250).
These agencies also coordinate and collaborate 
in multistate investigations.
FDA has jurisdiction over restaurants, 






































































9.3. Legal Framework for Measures and Methods to Prevent or 
Mitigate Foodborne Disease Outbreaks
groceries, and other retail establishments, but 
it generally defers to state and local health 
agencies to enforce their own requirements 
through inspections.
The primary legislation by which FDA 
exercises authority over food is the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). 
A goal of  FDA is to prevent contamination 
of  food product before distribution, but the 
legislation allows it to pursue
• Voluntary compliance through the issuance 
of  inspectional observations, untitled letters, 
and warning letters;
• Civil action, such as an injunction to prevent 
future violations of  the FFDCA (i.e., 
continued distribution of  adulterated food);
• Seizure action to remove specific lots of  
adulterated food (FDA also asks the producer 
or distributor, as appropriate, to voluntarily 
recall an adulterated food);
• Criminal action against an individual or 
company that violates the FFDCA, such as 
by causing food to become adulterated by 
inadequate processing and handling;
• Since the Bioterrorism Act of  2002, FDA 
has the authority to administratively detain 
certain food for up to 30 days (administrative 
detention does not require a court order);
• FDA’s authority under the FFDCA is limited 
by the requirement for interstate commerce. 
However, under the Public Health Service 
Act, FDA can regulate intrastate commerce 
in some circumstances;
• State agencies may in some instances be 
swifter than FDA because they may require 
less evidence of  problems before taking 
action than the requirements imposed on 
FDA by its legislation; and
• Amendments to the FFDCA in 2007 require 
FDA to establish a registry for reporting by 
individuals, companies, and local and state 
agencies of  food that may cause serious 
adverse health consequences or death to 
humans or animals.
A good discussion of  the differences in the 
jurisdictional authority between the USDA 
and the FDA can be found in Kux L, Sobel J, 
and Fain KM. Control of  Foodborne Diseases; 
In: Goodman RA, Hoffman RE, Lopez W, 
Matthews GW, Rothstein MA, Foster KL. 
Law in Public Health Practice. 2nd ed. New York: 
Oxford University Press; 2007: 361-384.
9.3.3. Roles and Legal Authority of State 
and Local Public Health Agencies
Environmental health specialists and 
epidemiologists should understand their 
respective roles and legal authorities for 
various public health actions. In addition, 
they should know how and when they need 
to obtain expert legal counsel and upper-level 
management support and decision-making.
In instances in which improper food 
preparation and preparation at the local 
level results in foodborne disease, the broad 
authority of  public health agencies to control 
epidemics and end nuisances, as well as specific 
authority they have to inspect restaurants and 
ensure proper food safety, is used to
• Close restaurants;
• Embargo, seize, or destroy contaminated  
 food or require removal of  contaminated  
 lots from retail stores;
• Require changes in food preparation; and
• Temporarily remove infectious persons from  
 the workplace.
These actions typically are taken through 
agency administrative orders. Such orders 
should contain time limits and specificy the 
conditions for removing them. If  necessary, 
agencies may seek enforcement through court 
orders.



































































9.4. Public Health Investigations as the Basis for Regulatory 
Actions or Criminal Prosecution
9.4.1. Chain of Custody
Laboratory specimens must be collected and 
submitted using procedures that ensure the 
chain of  custody of  the specimen, defined by 
one author as follows: “Everyone handling 
the sample [or specimen] must be able to 
demonstrate it is, and has been, identified as 
coming from the person [or item] in question 
to be admissible and probative in court”1
9.4.2.	Joint	Investigation	and	Collection	
of Evidence
Some investigations are initiated by public 
health officials but widen to other interests 
and agencies when a public health event 
results from a potential criminal act. Joint 
investigation by public health, food-safety and 
law enforcement agencies may be hindered 
by the different legal powers and investigatory 
practices each agency brings to such an event. 
For example, officials from food-safety and 
public health agencies are authorized to collect 
and test samples to determine their public 
health threat while law enforcement officials 
may consider samples subject to seizure as 
evidence. Food-safety, public health and law 
enforcement officials all must conform to 
constitutional standards (e.g., Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments) about collection of  evidence, 
especially in situations requiring a joint 
investigation by public health, food safety, and 
law enforcement.
State and local health officials, in collaboration 
with counterparts in law enforcement agencies, 
should periodically assess the need for 
memoranda of  understanding to clarify the 
roles of  public health and law enforcement 
agencies in conducting joint investigations. 
State and local health and law enforcement 
officials who have roles in investigating 
foodborne disease outbreaks should 
understand, and demonstrate competence 
in applying, their legal authorities in 
conducting joint investigations. (Note: Valuable 
resources for improving competency in joint 
investigation are the training curriculum 
“Forensic Epidemiology, v. 3.0”, and the 
“Model Memorandum of  Understanding 
for Joint Public Health-Law Enforcement 
Investigations”, both accessible at accessible at 
http://www.cdc.gov/phlp/).
9.4.3. Role of Data in Regulatory Action
Epidemiologic and laboratory data may 
provide strong evidence linking illness to 
consumption of  a particular food, resulting 
in a traceback investigation. When involving 
multiple states, federal regulatory agencies 
typically lead the traceback investigation.
Because of  the need to link epidemiologic data 
with product information to take actions that 
protect the public health, the roles of  state and 
local public health agencies and CDC must be 
coordinated with the roles of  federal regulatory 
agencies.
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GLOSSARy
Note: The definitions given are valid as they are 
used in this publication, but different definitions 
may be used in other contexts.
Active	surveillance:	 
Actively contacting potential sources of  disease 
reports to solicit and collect reports or specimens, 
rather than waiting until they are submitted to 
the mandated government agency. Potential 
sources of  disease reports or specimens include 
laboratories, hospitals, and physicians.
Adulterated:	 
A legal term meaning a food product fails to meet 
federal or state standards. Adulteration usually 
refers to noncompliance with health or safety 
standards as determined in the United States by 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the 
U.S. Department of  Agriculture (USDA).
Analytic	study:	 
In epidemiology, a study designed to examine 
associations, commonly putative or hypothesized 
causal relationships; usually concerned with 
identifying or measuring the effects of  risk factors 
or with the health effects of  specific exposures.
Bare-handed	contact:	 
Contact between bare skin and food items during 
preparation or serving (covered under section 
3-301.11 of  the FDA Food Code).
Case:	 
In epidemiology, a countable instance in the 
population or study group of  a particular disease, 
health disorder, or condition under investigation; 
in these guidelines, an individual with the 
particular disease.
Case-control	study:	 
A type of  observational analytic study. 
Enrollment into the study is based on presence 
(“case”) or absence (“control”) of  disease. 
Characteristics such, as previous exposure, are 
then compared between cases and controls.
Case	definition:	 
Standardized criteria for deciding whether a 
person has a particular disease or health-related 
condition, by specifying clinical criteria and 
limitations on time, place, and person.
Chain-of-custody:	 
Standards and procedures for which evidentiary 
documentation and strict record keeping are 
indicated or required. The chain-of-custody 
establishes proof  that the items of  evidence 
collected during an investigation are the same 
as those being presented in a court of  law. The 
chain-of-custody requires direct interviews and 
collection of  supporting documentation (e.g., 
invoices, bills of  lading, import documents) 
during the investigation. The chain-of-custody 
also establishes who had contact with the 
evidence; the date and time the evidence was 
handled; the circumstances under which the 
evidence was handled; and what changes, if  any, 
were made in the evidence.
Cluster:	 
An unusual aggregation of  cases grouped in 
time or space. The term is commonly used in 
pathogen-specific surveillance, when multiple 
infections caused by similar microbial strains 
are identified by a public health laboratory. 
The purpose of  identifying clusters is to trigger 
further investigations to determine whether they 
may represent an outbreak. The number of  cases 
needed to form a cluster cannot be absolutely 
defined; cluster definition may vary by type 
of  agent, novelty of  the subtype, season, and 
resources available for further investigation.
Cohort:	 
A well-defined group of  people who have had a 
common experience or exposure, who are then 
followed up for the incidence of  new diseases 
or events, as in a cohort or prospective study. A 
group of  people born during a particular period 
or year is called a birth cohort.
Cohort	study:	 
A type of  observational analytic study. 
Enrollment into the study is based on exposure 
characteristics or membership in a group. 
Disease, death, or other health-related outcomes 
are then ascertained and compared.
Contributing	Factors:	 
The food safety practices and  behaviors which 
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Control:	 
In a case-control study, comparison group of  
persons without disease.
Denaturing:	 
Applying substance, such as household bleach or 
carbolic acid, to all portions of  food products to 
prevent their use for food purposes.
eFoRS:	 
Electronic Foodborne Outbreak Reporting 
System. A secure Web-based reporting system 
that allows state health departments to report 
foodborne disease outbreaks electronically 
to CDC. eFORS is being subsumed into 
the National Outbreak Reporting System 
(NORS), which will include outbreaks from all 
transmission routes, including water, person to 
person, and animal contact.
Embargo:	 
An order issued by a permit-issuing official or 
his/her designated representative at a state 
or local agency that prevents food from being 
used, sold, donated, discarded, repackaged or 
otherwise disposed of  until the order is lifted by 
the permit-issuing official, his/her designated 
representative, or court of  competent jurisdiction. 
Environmental	health	specialist:	 
An environmental health specialist, or sanitarian, 
conducts research or performs investigations 
to identify, diminish, and/or eliminat sources 
of  pollutants and hazards that affect either the 
environment or the health of  the population. 
They may collect, synthesize, study, report, and 
take action on the basis of  data derived from 
measurements or observations of  air, food, soil, 
water, and other sources.
Epidemiologist:	 
An investigator who studies the occurrence of  
disease or other health-related conditions or 
events in defined populations. The control of  
disease in populations also is often considered to 
be a task for the epidemiologist. Epidemiologists 
conduct surveillance and carry out investigations 
using hypothesis testing and analytic research 
to identify the causes of  disease, including the 
physical, biologic, social, cultural, and behavioral 
factors that influence health.
Epi-X:	 
Epi-X is CDC’s Web-based communications 
solution for public health professionals. Through 
Epi-X, CDC officials, state and local health 
departments, poison control centers, and other 
public health professionals can access and share 
preliminary health surveillance information—
quickly and securely. Users can also be notified of  
breaking health events as they occur.
Food	code:	 
A reference guide published by FDA. The guide 
instructs retail outlets, such as restaurants and 
grocery stores, and institutions, such as nursing 
homes, how to prevent foodborne illness. It 
consists of  a model code adopted by nearly 
3000 state, local and tribal jurisdictions as the 
legal basis for their food inspection program for 
safeguarding public health. It ensures that food 
is safe and unadulterated (free from impurities) 
and honestly presented to the consumer. It also 
provides references and public health reasons and 
explanations for code provisions, guidelines, and 
sample forms. FDA first published the Food Code 
in 1993 and revises it every 4 years.
Food-	establishment:	 
An operation that (a) stores, prepares, packages, 
serves, vends food directly to the consumer, or 
otherwise provides food for human consumption 
such as a restaurant; satellite or catered food 
location; catering operation if  the operation 
provides food directly to a consumer or to a 
conveyance used to transport people; market; 
vending location; institution or food bank; and 
(b) relinquishes possession of  food directly, or 
indirectly through a delivery service such as home 
delivery of  grocery orders or restaurant takeout 
orders, or delivery service that is provided by 
common carriers. 
Food-safety	regulatory	agency: 
Government agencies at the local, state, or 
federal level that are granted regulatory oversight 
of  some aspect of  the food industry. The goal 
of  food-regulatory agencies is to ensure the 
public food supply is safe from disease caused 
by infection from human handling or by 
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Foodborne	disease:	 
Any disease caused by ingestion of  contaminated 
food. Although some agents are more likely than 
others to be transmitted by food, identification 
of  foodborne, waterborne, person-to-person, 
or animal-to-person transmission requires 
investigation. Furthermore, multiple modes 
of  transmission may be involved in any single 
outbreak.
Foodborne	disease	surveillance:	 
Surveillance of  diseases or conditions that might 
be foodborne. Thus, all diseases of  enteric origin 
may be tracked by this mechanism, including 
norovirus infection (which involves substantial 
person-to-person transmission), listeriosis (which 
may have a diarrheal stage but generally is 
detected by blood culture), or botulism (which 
presents as neurologic disease).
Foodnet	Atlas	of	Exposures:	 
The results of  periodic population-based surveys 
undertaken at selected sites in the United States. 
The survey collects information about exposures 
that might be associated with foodborne illnesses 
and can be used to estimate the background rate 
of  different food exposures in the community.
HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control	Point):	 
A science-based and systematic approach to 
prevent potential food-safety problems by 
anticipating how biologic, chemical, or physical 
hazards are most likely and by installing 
appropriate measures to prevent them.
Imminent	hazard:	 
An important threat or danger to health that 
exists when evidence is sufficient to show that a 
product, practice, circumstance, or event creates 
a situation that requires immediate correction or 
cessation of  operation to prevent injury based on 
(a) the number of  potential injuries and (b) the 
nature, severity, and duration of  the anticipated 
injury.
Impound:	 
To take possession of  or to seize and hold in the 
custody of  the law.
Jurisdiction:	 
A government entity with the legal authority to 
interpret and apply the law. Also refers to the 
limits or territory within which that authority 
may be exercised. 
Multijurisdictional:	 
A multijurisdictional foodborne disease event 
requires the resources of  more than one local, 
state, territorial, tribal, or federal public health 
or food-regulatory agency to detect, investigate, 
or control. A multijurisdictional investigation 
may involve a foodborne disease outbreak or 
the distribution or recall of  a contaminated food 
product.
outbreak:	 
Two or more cases of  a similar illness shown 
by an investigation to result from a common 
exposure, such as ingestion of  a common food. 
An outbreak is a cluster with a clear association 
between cases, with or without a recognized 
common source or known disease agent. Single 
cases of  certain rare and serious conditions, such 
as gastrointestinal anthrax, botulism, or cholera, 
elicit an outbreak-like response.
outbreak	Response	Protocol:	 
A comprehensive document outlining the roles, 
responsibilities and required actions of  all 
individuals and organizations involved in the 
investigation of  a foodborne disease outbreak. 
Outbreak response protocols may be developed 
for a specific organization or may encompass 
multiple organizations and jurisdictions.
outbreakNet:	 
A national collaboration of  epidemiologists 
and other public health officials who investigate 
outbreaks of  foodborne, waterborne, and 
other enteric illnesses in the United States. The 
purpose of  OutbreakNet is to ensure rapid, 
coordinated detection and response to multistate 
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Public	health	agency:	 
A government agency established at the 
local, state, or federal level that is responsible 
for developing and managing public health 
programs, including surveillance for infectious 
disease and noninfectious conditions, 
interventions to prevent and limit the spread of  
disease, and promotion of  healthy behaviors and 
environments. 
PulseNet:	 
An international surveillance network comprising 
national, state, and local public health and 
food-regulatory agency laboratories that conduct 
standardized molecular subtyping of  foodborne 
disease pathogens (i.e., DNA fingerprinting) 
and maintain centrally accessible databases 
of  patterns. PulseNet also functions as a 
communication hub for laboratories involved in 
food and foodborne disease monitoring.
Recall:	 
A voluntary action of  removing a product from 
retail or distribution. The action is conducted 
by a manufacturer or distributor to protect the 
public from products that may cause health 
problems or possible death.
Reportable	conditions	(notifiable	diseases):	 
The list of  diseases based on state laws or 
regulations that should be reported by health-
care providers (e.g., physicians and their medical 
staff, laboratories, and hospitals) to local or 
state health agencies. The list of  notifiable 
diseases and legal obligation for reporting differ 
from state to state. States can report notifiable 
diseases to CDC, which maintains a list of  
nationally notifiable diseases, but compliance is 
voluntary. CDC reports selected diseases to the 
World Health Organization in compliance with 
International Health Regulations.
Sporadic	case:	 
A case not linked epidemiologically to other 
cases of  the same illness. Single sporadic cases 
of  extremely rare and serious conditions, such 
as gastrointestinal anthrax, botulism, or cholera, 
merit a detailed investigation as soon as possible, 
as though they were outbreaks, to prevent any 
further cases.
Surveillance:	 
The systematic collection, analysis, 
interpretation, and dissemination of  data for 
public health action.
Traceback:	 
The process by which the origin or source of  a 
cluster of  contaminated food is identified.
Traceforward:	 
Tracking a recalled product from the origin or 
source through the distribution system.
Trawling, trolling, shotgun or hypothesis-
generating	questionnaire:	 
A variety of  interview forms designed to capture 
a wide range of  exposures. These forms may 
be designed with embedded questions focused 
on disease-specific hypotheses (e.g., exposures 
previously associated with the pathogen or 
plausibly associated with the pathogen) as well 
as other food items and exposures that have not 
been associated with the pathogen, which may 
consolidate the hypothesis-generation and testing 
processes into a single step. For instance, the 
trawling questionnaire for an outbreak of  E. coli 
O157:H7 infection may contain standardized 
questions about known transmission mechanisms 
for this agent, such as hamburger consumption, 
child-care attendance, recreational pool use, 
animal exposures, and other exposures identified 
in previous outbreaks which function as a priori 
hypotheses.
USDA/FSIS Consumer Complaint 
Monitoring	System	(CCMS):  
An electronic database for capturing consumer 
complaints. Since 2001, USDA/FSIS has 
used this database to record, triage, and track 
complaints about FSIS-regulated meat, poultry, 
and egg products. CCMS helps to identify 
and trace adulterated product in commerce 


















Upper gastrointestinal tract symptoms (nausea, vomiting) occur first or predominate
<1 hrs Nausea, vomiting, unusual taste, 
burning of mouth
Metallic salts
1–2 hrs Nausea, vomiting, cyanosis, headache, 
dizziness, dyspnea, trembling, 
weakness, loss of consciousness
Nitrites
1–6 hrs  
(mean 2–4 hrs)
Nausea, vomiting, retching, diarrhea, 
abdominal pain, prostration
Staphylococcus aureus and its 
enterotoxins
8–16 hrs  
(2–4 hrs emesis possible)
Vomiting, abdominal cramps, diarrhea, 
nausea
Bacillus cereus
6–24 hrs Nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, thirst, 
dilation of pupils, collapse, coma
Amanita species mushrooms
Sore throat and respiratory symptoms occur
12–72 hrs Sore throat, fever, nausea, vomiting, 
rhinorrhea, sometimes a rash
Streptococcus pyogenes
2–5 days Inflamed throat and nose, spreading 
grayish exudate, fever, chills, sore 
throat, malaise, difficulty swallowing, 
edema of cervical lymph node
Corynebacterium diphtheriae
Lower gastrointestinal tract symptoms (abdominal cramps, diarrhea) occur first or predominate
2–36 hrs  
(mean 6–12 hrs)
Abdominal cramps, diarrhea, 
putrefactive diarrhea associated with 
Clostridium perfringens, sometimes 
nausea and vomiting
Clostridium perfringens, Bacillus 
cereus, Streptococcus faecalis, 
Staphylococcus faecium
12–74 hrs  
(mean 18–36 hrs)
Abdominal cramps, diarrhea, vomiting, 
fever, chills, malaise, nausea, headache 
possible. Sometimes bloody or mucoid 
diarrhea, cutaneous lesions associated 
with Vibrio vulnificus. Yersinia 
enterocolitica infection mimics flu and 
acute appendicitis
Salmonella species (including 
S. arizonae), Shigella, 
enteropathogenic Escherichia 
coli, other Enterobacteriacae, 




jejuni, Vibrio cholerae (O1 and non-
O1) Vibrio vulnificus, Vibrio fluvialis
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Onset, Duration, and Symptoms of Foodborne Illness 






1–6 wks Mucoid diarrhea (fatty stools) 
abdominal pain, weight loss
Giardia lamblia
1 to several weeks Abdominal pain, diarrhea, 
constipation, headache, drowsiness, 
ulcers, variable—often asymptomatic
Entamoeba histolytica
3–6 mos Nervousness, insomnia, hunger pains, 
anorexia, weight loss, abdominal pain, 
sometimes gastroenteritis
Taenia saginata, T. solium
Neurologic symptoms (visual disturbances, vertigo, tingling, paralysis) occur
<1 hr *** See Gastrointestinal and/or 
neurologic symptoms (shellfish toxins) 
below
Shellfish toxin
Gastroenteritis, nervousness, blurred 
vision, chest pain, cyanosis, twitching, 
convulsions
Organic phosphate
Excessive salivation, perspiration, 
gastroenteritis, irregular pulse, pupils 
constricted, asthmatic breathing
Muscaria-type mushrooms
Tingling and numbness, dizziness, 
pallor, gastrohemmorrhage, and 
desquamation of skin, fixed eyes, loss 
of reflexes, twitching, paralysis
Tetradon (tetrodotoxin) toxins
1–6 hrs Tingling and numbness, 
gastroenteritis, dizziness, dry mouth, 
muscular aches, dilated pupils, blurred 
vision, paralysis
Ciguatera toxin
Nausea, vomiting, tingling, dizziness, 
weakness, anorexia, weight loss, 
confusion
Chlorinated hydrocarbons
2 hrs–6 days, usually 
12–36 hrs
Vertigo; double or blurred vision; loss 
of reflex to light; difficulty swallowing. 
speaking, and breathing; dry mouth; 
weakness; respiratory paralysis
Clostridium botulinum and its 
neurotoxins
>72 hrs Numbness, weakness of legs, spastic 
paralysis, impairment of vision, 
blindness, coma
Organic mercury
Gastroenteritis, leg pain, ungainly 
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Allergic symptoms (facial flushing, itching) occur
<1 hr Headache, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, 
peppery taste, burning of throat, facial 
swelling and flushing, stomach pain, 
itching of skin.
Histamine (scombroid)
Numbness around mouth, tingling 
sensation, flushing, dizziness, 
headache, nausea
Monosodium glutamate
Flushing, sensation of warmth, itching, 
abdominal pain, puffing of face and 
knees
Nicotinic acid
Generalized infection symptoms 
(fever, chills, malaise, prostration, aches, swollen lymph nodes) occur
4–28 days 
(mean 9 days)
Gastroenteritis, fever, edema about 





Malaise, headache, fever, cough, 
nausea, vomiting, constipation, 
abdominal pain, chills, rose spots, 
bloody stools
Salmonella typhi
10–13 days Fever, headache, myalgia, rash. Toxoplasma gondii
10–50 days, 
mean 25–30 days
Fever, malaise, lassitude, anorexia, 
nausea, abdominal pain, jaundice
Etiologic agent not yet isolated—
probably viral
Varying periods, 
depending on specific 
illness
Fever, chills, headache or joint ache, 
prostration, malaise, swollen lymph 
nodes, other specific symptoms of 
disease in question
Bacillus anthracis, Brucella 
melitensis, B. abortus, 
B. suis, Coxiella burnetii, 
Francisella tularensis, Listeria 
monocytogenes, Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis, Mycobacterium 
species, Pasteurella multocida, 
Streptobacillus moniliformis, 
Campylobacter jejuni, Leptospira 
species.
Gastrointestinal and/or neurologic symptoms (shellfish toxins)
0.5–2 hrs Tingling, burning, numbness, 
drowsiness, incoherent speech, 
respiratory paralysis
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2–5 mins to 3–4 hrs Reversal of hot and cold sensation, 
tingling; numbness of lips, tongue 
and throat; muscle aches, dizziness, 
diarrhea, vomiting
Neurotoxic shellfish poisoning 
(brevetoxins)
30 mins to 2–3 hrs Nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal 
pain, chills, fever
Diarrheic shellfish poisoning 
(dinophysis toxin, okadaic acid, 
pectenotoxin, yessotoxin)
24 hrs (gastrointestinal) to 
48 hrs (neurologic)
Vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal pain, 
confusion, memory loss, disorientation, 
seizure, coma
Amnesic shellfish poisoning (domoic 
acid)
* From FDA. Bad Bug Book: Foodborne Pathogenic Microorganisms and Natural Toxins Handbook. 
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Appendix 3
List of Key Websites and Resources Cited
Applied Epidemiology Competencies:  
www.cste.org 
CDC’s Diseases and Conditions A–Z index:  
http://www.cdc.gov/diseasesConditions 
CIFOR Clearinghouse:  
www.cifor.us
Control of Communicable Diseases Manual (latest edition),  
American Public Health Association Press
Environmental Assessment Forms and Consumer Complaint Forms:  
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/EHSNet/ 
FDA Food Code:  
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/fc05-toc.html
FoodNet Atlas of Exposures:  
http://www.cdc.gov/foodnet/studies_pages/pop.htm
Forensic Epidemiology, v. 3.0: training curriculum,  
http://www.cdc.gov/phlp/ 
Model Memorandum of Understanding for  
joint Public Health-Law Enforcement Investigations:  
http://www.cdc.gov/phlp/
National Botulism Surveillance Program:  
http://www.cdc.gov/nczved/dfbmd/disease_listing/files/botulism.pdf
Procedures to Investigate Foodborne Illness (latest edition),  
International Association for Food Protection
Standardized Outbreak Questionnaires:  
http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks/standard_ques.htm
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